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Economic
Power, Technological Advantage,
and
Imperial Strength:
Britain
as a Unique Global Power, 1860 – 1890.
Andrew
Lambert
King’s
College, London
Between 1860 and 1890
Britain
greatly expanded her formal and informal empire, and her commercial
activity, while avoiding war with any other major power. Although this
period witnessed a revolution in the technologies of war, communication
and transport, and profound changes in the European state system
Britain
secured her interests on low and falling defence estimates. This
combination of circumstances was neither accidental, nor fortunate. It
reflected a coherent response to the problems facing the state, and the
development of core capabilities for a truly global strategy. In
examining the development of British strategy between 1860 and 1890 this
study will focus on the major influences, expanding and changing
commercial activity, the emergent technologies of iron, steam, and
telegraphy, and the vast extent of the potential defence commitment.[1]
The
British Economy 1860-1890.
By
1860 the British economy had adapted to the ‘Free Trade’ policy that
followed the repeal of the Corn and Navigation Laws in the 1840s. Any
adverse effects were largely disguised by tremendous expansion of the
world economy, the beginning of a ten fold increase in trade between
1850 and 1910, and the introduction of iron steam ships. The impulse
provided by American and Australian gold discoveries, and the ability of
railways to open continental regions to trade, and falling long distance
freight rates sustained this expansion. Britain’s share of this
expanding world trade was relatively stable, partly because her
extensive empire provided secure markets and key raw materials when
American and European markets were becoming more competitive, and
subject to tariff barriers.
While the empire was a valuable segment of the economy, it was never
dominant, occupying about 25% of the market in most areas. The most
dynamic sector of the British economy was the export of capital, by 1890
almost £100 million annually, much of it invested outside the empire.
This sector was intimately linked to the financial services and
commercial support systems of the City of
London
. The pre-eminence of the City of
London
in finance and trade was reflected in British dominance of world
shipping and related services. By 1900
Britain
had over £2,000 million invested overseas, providing an income to cover
the balance of payments deficit on manufactured goods and food.[2]
Sterling
and Free Trade made the world system fluid.[3]
In this era of ‘Gentlemanly Capitalism’ the City of
London
and financial services came to dominate the economy, with links between
the City and Governments growing ever closer. Agricultural values
were in decline, while manufacturing remained provincial. The wealth
generated by the City gave it enormous influence and made it a vital
source of state revenue. In turn the City made certain governments
recognised that the dominant roles of sterling and the City in global
trade reflected cheap government, low taxes, balanced budgets, a gold
standard, and the security afforded to trade and investments by the
Royal Navy. In balancing these qualities, in effect settling the premium
to be paid on national wealth in the form of defence expenditure
successive Governments tried to steer a fine line between running risks
and over-taxing the national resource. In August 1857 Liberal First Sea
Lord Sir Charles Wood, a one time Chancellor of the Exchequer, defended
the post-Crimean War retrenchment from Royal criticism by referring to
the unique staying power of the British economy. While
Russia
and
France
were effectively exhausted by two years of war
Britain
was, ‘more willing and more able to continue the war than at its
commencement.’[4]
Most liberal economists believed that this long term power had been
created by low levels of taxation and expenditure in peace time. This
orthodoxy would be taken to new levels by
Gladstone
.
The major political benefit of economic success came in the collapse of
mid-century political agitation, one of the key arguments used in favour
of ‘Free Trade’. Limited political reform, domestic prosperity, and
opportunities for emigration defused the unrest of the 1840s.[5]
Throughout the century the aggressive expansion of trade into
non-imperial areas was a key government task, notably for Lord
Palmerston, Liberal Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister (1830-41,
1846-51, 1855-58, 1859-65). For Palmerston the answer to economic
distress at home was an ambitious foreign policy to open new markets.[6]
After the Second Reform Act of 1867 British politics was dominated by
domestic and economic concerns, which replaced foreign policy and
defence as the key concerns of statesmen. The dominant figure of this
era, William Gladstone, Liberal Chancellor of the Exchequer (1852-55,
1859-66) and Prime Minister, (1868-74, 1879-1885, 1892-94) took a less
interventionist stance. Confident that British trade would always
triumph, and taking British power as a given, he presided over a period
of very low defence spending, as part of an overall small government
stance.[7]
He did not value the empire and ignored colonial defence scares, cutting
both the defence budget and the colonial share of that budget.
Gladstone
’s financial policies led to a marked fall in the cost of servicing
the National Debt, the legacy of previous wars, from 41% of government
expenditure in 1860 to 27% in 1890.[8]
While the Conservatives under Benjamin Disraeli were less economically
minded, and became more avowedly imperialist in the mid 1870s both men
found their external policy influenced by economic issues, notably the
acquisition of the Suez Canal shares in 1875, and the occupation of
Egypt
in 1882.[9]
In 1888 the City shifted to a Unionist/Conservative posture[10]
and awarded the Conservatives the ultimate accolade, supporting a major
conversion of National Debt that reduced interest on £500 million of
stock by ½ %. This demonstrated the City’s confidence in peace and
stability. As Niall Ferguson has suggested: ’The Victorians appeared
to have achieved empire without overstretch’.[11]
Such optimism would not last, but the 1888 conversion was a high-water
mark of imperial power.
The financial elite knew that the British economy would only prosper if
the world was open to trade, and the seas, the great common across which
goods and services were exchanged, were open to British shipping. In
this context ‘Imperial Defence’ takes on an entirely different
meaning. World trade was the basis of British power, and the security of
that trade, rather than of the
British Empire
provided the mission of the Royal Navy. The fact that some trade was
with the empire complicated the picture, but it did not affect the
fundamentals.[12]
The empire was a mechanism to stabilise the international capital market
for the City, not an object to be defended. In essence
Britain
could not function without international trade, and this ensured the
success of the City when challenged by manufacturing and protectionist
interests in the early twentieth century.[13]
The only serious threat to the economic basis of British power was
Europe
. This was not an economic issue, but a strategic problem. British
investment in
Europe
had fallen from 50% of total capital exports in 1854 to only 5% by 1900.[14]
Unsurprisingly trade followed the same pattern, although the decline was
less marked. In an increasingly protectionist market British trade
suffered. However the rest of the world took up the slack, and the
British economy continued to grow strongly down to 1914. While
Europe
was stable, balanced and prosperous British interests were secure. The
wars of 1864, 1866 and 1870-71 did not threaten vital strategic or
commercial interests, although these were signaled to the belligerents,
notably the need to respect the independence of
Belgium
in 1870. Therefore
Britain
did not need to intervene. Only the threat of a potential hegemonic
power occupying the Rhine/Scheldt region would force
Britain
to act. This did not occur until after 1890.
As
Britain
had no positive interests that would be served by taking part in a
European war in this period, she used the ideology of ‘Free Trade’
to position her all-powerful fleet as a ‘world-policeman’, rather
than the cutting edge of a national strategy. This image, actively
fostered by contemporary publicists, continues to confuse the unwary. In
reality the link between trade and power was clear. The import duty on
Chinese tea more than covered the cost of the Royal Navy in 1850, and
was still meeting half the cost in 1857.[15]
By contrast the self governing colonies made a minimal contribution.
Britain
spent £1.14 per head per annum on defence, the self governing colonies
12p, respectively 37% and 3-4% of central government spending.[16]
Consequently the British Government was unimpressed by colonial
alarmism, the more so when it was often linked to protectionist measures
against British goods. With no serious threat in
Europe
, or the wider world, defence spending remained low until 1889.[17]
War threatened the British system in three related ways. First it would
reduce access to markets, calling into question the underlying economic
strength that was the basis of British power. Secondly it would raise
expenditure and taxes, making
Britain
less attractive for investors. Finally it would re-open fundamental
questions about the existing social system, as it had during the Crimean
War (1854-1856), when the middle class demanded a greater share in
government. Therefore when British access to markets was called into
question the City of
London
pushed for a major naval build-up, as an ‘insurance premium’ on the
existing order. Founded in 1882 as a City pressure group the London
Chamber of Commerce persuaded the Conservative Government of 1886-1892
that their mutual interests required extra naval protection. In 1889,
only one year after the conversion of the National Debt, the Government
introduced the Naval Defence Act which, as Prime Minister Lord Salisbury
told the Chamber, was intended to protect their trade.[18]
Little wonder the City abandoned the Liberals, although the imperialist
urge was tempered by a continuing preference for investing outside the
formal empire. The City interests requiring protection were global; they
were not restricted to formal and informal empire. The only effective
defence was based on naval mastery, preferably secured through arms
races rather than war.
However, the naval build up that began in 1889 should not be seen as a
negative, defensive, response. Under the aegis of a renewed Royal Navy
Britain secured control of South African gold a diamonds, much of
sub-Saharan Africa, and improved control of non-imperial markets like
South America
.[19]
Britain
recognised that trade and investments might have to be protected by war,
but economic, social and political concerns made fighting the policy of
last resort. Instead
Britain
used financial power to secure markets, and create the naval might to
back up her careful diplomacy. It was for this deterrent role against
other major powers that the Royal Navy was maintained at a high level,
not the defence of outlying imperial assets. The Naval Defence Act fleet
was designed to win battles in European waters, not patrol the colonies.
The empire, however, defined, would continue to be secured by
maintaining the peace and stability of
Europe
. If war broke out rival fleets would be blockaded in their homeports,
or destroyed in battle. Only as a last resort would ships be dispatched
to the distant corners of the globe. They could be sent quickly, and
operated effectively anywhere in the world because
Britain
, and
Britain
alone, had the facilities to direct and support them.
Much of the infrastructure that sustained and extended the economic
dominance of the City of
London
was also used to maintain global power. Between 1860 and 1890 the globe
was effectively encircled by
London
centred, British owned, laid and operated submarine telegraph cables,
largely sustained by everyday economic use. The cable generated new
types of business and internationalised the financial world, increasing
the primacy of
London
.[20]
By 1890 the City, as the centre of ‘an expanding world economy knit
together by instant communications’ dominated the British economy, and
ensured governments understood and supported its concerns.[21]
The prime mover of world trade, the largely British built iron
steamship, depended on the cable for market information, and supplies of
British coal for motive power and a guaranteed export cargo. Along with
the
London
insurance and shipping markets these assets gave
Britain
the ability to monitor the cable traffic and shipping movements of rival
powers. The intimate relationship between economic activity and Imperial
strategy limited the government role and expenditure in providing vital
infrastructure to subsidies for cable companies, defending coaling
harbours, and occasionally pushing specific projects like the
‘all-red’ cable routes. The main burden was borne by the private
sector.
Technological
Advantage.
The
astonishing development in military and related technologies between
1860 and 1890 profoundly altered the relationship between land and sea
based strategies, to
Britain
’s advantage. Power projection capabilities, economic leverage and
speed of communications of sea based systems were all enhanced by
technology. Between 1840 and 1860 steam warships, heavy, shell firing
guns and the iron hulls and armour transformed the strategic
relationship between land and sea.[22]
Steam ships could pass existing shore defences built to resist sailing
ships, while armoured firepower and long range guns could destroy forts,
or the arsenals and cities that lay behind them. Merchant steam ships
enabled ever larger expeditionary forces to be moved, and sustained by
sea.[23]
Land based systems were unable to cope with this expanding power
projection capability because of the sheer scale of the defensive task.
It was economically impossible to provide fixed defences for the entire
seaboard of
Russia
,
France
, or the
United States
against British maritime power. By contrast the ability of the British
to concentrate their mobile forces, using the same assets in any quarter
of the globe, greatly enhanced their deterrent effect and limited their
cost.
This enhanced capability had been carefully cultivated.
Britain
pioneered many of the key technologies, and their less obviously warlike
ancillaries in the 1840s, to counter a French challenge to her sea
control. When the Crimean War broke out in March 1854 British planners
simply transferred the plans for an attack on
Cherbourg
to Russian arsenals.[24]
Once the massive British private shipbuilding and engineering industries
had been harnessed to build anew flotilla the coastal warfare concept
was applied. In a two day bombardment the dockyard at Sweaborg was
destroyed by long range fire without the loss of a single man[25].
Subsequent British plans to attack Cronstadt and
St. Petersburg
with a much larger force, including ironclads, encouraged
Russia
to sue for peace in 1856. Nor was the lesson lost on other powers, the
armament built for Cronstadt was demonstrated at Spithead on
St. George’s
Day (April 23rd) 1856. The Times declared:
A
new system of naval warfare has been created…. We have now the means
of waging really offensive war, not only against fleets, but harbours,
fortresses and rivers, not merely of blockading, but of invading and
carrying the warfare of the sea to the very heart of the land.[26]
The
Review demonstrated to the assembled diplomatic corps that the Cherbourg
Strategy could be applied equally well to elsewhere. Among the more
important examples would be the ‘Trent Crisis’ of 1861[27]
war scares with
Russia
in 1878 and 1885, and the ‘Fashoda Crisis’ of 1898. On each occasion
the threat of an attack on a major naval base/fortress/city deterred
actions inimical to British interests well short of war.
These positive developments have been ignored by historians of British
power. Adopting a declinist model[28]
they argue that
Britain
would be starved into submission by a serious attack on her shipping.
This argument is unsustainable in the face of British dominance of
global shipping, coal, insurance markets and communications. These
reduced, rather than increased the threat. A 10 fold increase in world
trade between 1860 and 1900 translated into an almost equal growth in
the annual tonnage of shipping movements.[29]
Furthermore, the increasing efficiency of the marine steam engine[30]
captured the key trades from sailing ships, and channelled shipping into
narrowly defined routes. The argument that these developments harmed
Britain
was logically unsound, to restate it today requires an uncritical
acceptance of the deliberately alarmist case made by the City of
London
and the Naval Intelligence Division in the late 1880s, solely to push up
naval spending.[31]
In fact the threat to oceanic shipping was declining. Contemporary
warships depended of frequent access to major bases for effective
operation. Their complex, high performance engines demanded extensive
skilled maintenance.[32]
Speed and range were also influenced by underwater fouling, which could
only be removed in a dry dock. Without a sheltered anchorage warships
could not even refuel, and by 1890 navies could not rely on sails. Only
Britain
had a global network of naval bases and commercial harbours from which
well maintained, fully fuelled cruisers could sortie to meet any threat.
Her rivals had few bases outside the metropolitan area, and none
approaching the size and quality of those under British control. Any
attack on British oceanic commerce in this period, already hamstrung by
the abolition of privateering, would have been short-lived and
ineffective.[33]
Naval planners recognised that
Britain
had the power to stop the shipping of any rival, with serious
implications for their ability to wage war. At the same time economic
blockade was a major feature of the new wave of navalist writing that
began to emerge in 1890.[34]
While
Britain
had always used her naval power to cripple the economic life of her
rivals, the effectiveness of blockades had been greatly enhanced by
naval technical development between 1860 and 1890.
Although
the effective power of British forces was growing, rather than their
size, the key to using them effectively to secure British interests was
improved control. (The modern concept of network centric warfare.) After
1815
Britain
applied substantial financial and technical assets to the provision of
superior long distance communications, pioneering oceanic steamships and
submarine telegraph cables. These developments, although essentially
commercial, were aided, directed and influenced by the application of
Government funds. At every stage speed and reliability were enhanced,
improving the ability of the centre to control the periphery, and more
significantly, of the centre to direct forces from the centre or other
parts of the periphery to reinforce a threatened area. In this way the
Empire, formal and informal, was welded into a single strategic entity.[35]
Improved communications were especially useful to
Britain
, because
Britain
alone had the capability to use the information to move her forces
across the globe. She could also deny such communications to an enemy.
As
Britain
controlled the sea, and almost all the submarine cables, and
cable-laying tonnage enemy cables could be cut, or re-used.[36]
The submarine telegraph cable had been pioneered in the 1840s,
attracting immediate naval interest. First used to link
Dover
and
Calais
in 1851 it created a new type of global power. Effective communication
links improved central control, reducing local freedom of action and
allowing centrally directed forces to reinforce any region under threat.
North America was connected by 1867,
India
by 1870,
Australia
and
Japan
by 1872,
Brazil
by 1873, and the rest of the world quickly thereafter. Links between the
main telegraph company, Eastern, and Government were close[37],
and in times of crisis, notably the occupation of
Egypt
in 1882, the company went beyond what might be expected of a commercial
concern.[38]
The Zulu War of 1878 was one of the first significant conflicts in which
strategic communications were used to shift forces, with a new cable
being laid from
Aden
to
Durban
to improve central control.[39]
Empire, however defined, was now defended as a single unit, rather than
as a series of geographically and intellectually distinct areas. In 1899
it took only two months to lay 3,000 miles of cable from the
Cape Verde
Islands
to
Cape Town
for the South African War.[40]
Little wonder the French considered the cable network more important to
British power than the navy.[41]
However, the effective exploitation of these epochal developments in
ship, weapon and communication technology relied on a relatively
unnoticed element in the totality of Imperial defence infrastructure.
The dry-dock would be the pivot around which British Imperial strategy
was transformed between 1860 and 1890. They were the basic requirement
for sustained local operations. Dry docks were developed when ships
became too large to be beached for repairs, and by the seventeenth
century had been transformed into major stone structures with pivoted
gates.[42]
Although costly such docks were an invaluable force-multiplier. They
underpinned the adoption of a blockade strategy by the English in the
1690s, while the construction of docks at Bombay in the mid 18th
century gave Britain command of the India Ocean[43],
but the great age of the dry-dock was a product of the steam age.
Screw propelled steam ships needed frequent docking to keep their hulls
clean, and until the late 1860s to maintain their critical stern glands.
This work was only possible in a dry-dock. The construction of docks
with adequate depth of water at the sill, and the necessary width was
complex and costly. Unless the area was blessed with suitable geology
massive structural underpinning was required to support the stonework.
This, in turn, had to be strong enough to withstand the weight of water
and ship, and resist the upward pressure of ground water. Dock design
and construction were specialist tasks, in which large British
engineering concerns specialised.[44]
Nor were these structures without precedent. The single most important
factor in the rise of British naval mastery in the long 18th
century had been the sustained application of capital to the creation
and expansion of naval bases, both at home and around the Empire. Only
fleets with local bases for supply, repair and concentration could
maintain command of key sea areas. While bases were expensive,
they proved invaluable. Between 1815 and 1860 new bases were developed,
to meet the expanding demand for naval support from the aggressive,
expansionist British commercial sector. These included the Falkland
Islands,
Aden
, Hong Kong and
Sydney
. Existing bases at
Malta
, Gibraltar, Bermuda, and
Halifax
were improved, while facilities at
Esquimalt
,
Singapore
and
Cape Town
were useful, as were naval depots in foreign harbours, at Rio,
Valparaiso
,
Callao
and
Hawaii
. The expansion of support facilities was driven by the need for
squadrons to follow economic activity, but limited by cost. A planned
new Indian Ocean base at Trincomalee was aborted as
Britain
’s easternmost economic interests shifted into the
China
seas.[45]
The spread of docking accommodation between 1860 and 1890 was driven by
technical change, commercial pressure and strategic need. Dry-docks
would enable the Royal Navy to send squadrons to any part of the globe,
and maintain them there. They were vital to the effective use of naval
units. In areas of overwhelming strategic need, where economic activity
was inadequate to support them, docks were built in Imperial Fortresses.
Elsewhere the Navy encouraged the construction of commercial docks,
providing government financial assistance to ensure they were configured
for, and gave priority to, warships. The emergence of an effective
policy followed a period of haphazard development at the outer reaches
of Empire.
The development of Imperial docks before 1860 was limited to the Home
islands and
Malta
. While a dock had been started at
Malta
in 1812 it was only after the Syrian crisis of 1840 and the threat of
war with
France
that a new dock was ordered. It opened in 1848. The total cost of £111,000
fell on the Government. By 1857 the dock had to be extended to take the
longest ships, but was still too shallow for first rate steamer, or the
ironclads that followed in the 1860s. The telegraph connection arrived
in 1857. A second dock built between 1866 and 1871 at a cost of £150,000,
with two more in 1890-92 and 1899 as battleships became deeper and
broader.[46]
The development of a major base at
Gibraltar
provided additional docking accommodation at a vital point by the turn
of the century.[47]
Outside European waters the defence of British interests was a question
of trade and communications rather than territory. This required a
dominant Navy to control the world’s oceans. British territories and
markets had always been secured by the blockade or destruction of enemy
fleets in European waters. Any threat outside European waters would be
limited. Consequently the development of docking accommodation could be
more reactive. The East India Company docks at
Bombay
were the first such structures outside
Europe
, providing a model of state and commercial inter-action that would be
developed in the next century. The first new Imperial/Commercial dock
was built in
Australia
.
Sydney
had become a significant naval base by the 1830s, because it was
supporting extensive commercial shipping.[48]
It provided victuals and a naval stores depot[49],
but the Navy had no plan to build a dock. In 1845 the local
administration suggested that a dock capable of holding warships would
be of great advantage to the Colony and the Empire. Despite the initial
refusal of the Admiralty to offer financial support the project went
ahead, and in 1847 the Admiralty reconsidered, offering a substantial
sum, provided the dock could take ‘a large frigate or steamer’ and
warships received priority. The dock finally opened in September 1857,
and the first vessel to enter was a warship.[50]
Growing commercial demand had created a maritime infrastructure at
Sydney
capable of supporting a Royal Navy squadron, which was then established
to protect the commerce.
The contribution of the dock to the defence of
Australia
was obvious. It acted as a force multiplier for Royal Navy units,
enabling them to refit and repair more effectively, and more rapidly,
that any rival force in the region. However useful
Sydney
was as a naval base it was first and foremost a thriving commercial
port, situated in a colony with responsible government. Consequently
there was no need for the full cost of the dock to be met by the
Imperial Government in
London
.
The example of
Sydney
was followed at
Hong Kong
in the early 1860s, because the existing accommodation at Whampoa was
‘scanty’ and insecure.[51]
Whampoa dock, near
Canton
, had been built to dock iron hulled P&O liners. Opened in 1855 it
was wrecked shortly afterwards during the Second Opium War, prompting
the Admiralty to urge the Hong Kong merchants to develop a dock on the
Island
. This was quickly built, opening in mid 1860, with a larger structure,
suitable for first class frigates opening in 1862, and an even grander
effort in 1867, with enough depth of water for battleships. The
Admiralty and Commander in Chief, Sir James Hope, had been heavily
involved in the process, offering a loan of £5,000 for every foot of
depth over the sill below 21 feet, up to 24 feet. With Whampoa
re-opening and further docks building at
Kowloon
and the Japanese naval base at
Yokohama
in 1875 the available dock accommodation in
China
seas was positively luxurious.[52]
Singapore
opened a dry dock in 1859 and a second dock in 1890.[53]
In 1864 the House of Commons set up a Select Committee to consider
Admiralty plans to increase the docking accommodation at
Portsmouth
and the other Home Dockyards, but within two months the remit was
extended to include docking accommodation at
Malta
and on all Foreign Stations. Membership of the Committee, which included
two former First Lords of the Admiralty, two Political Secretaries and a
naval officer together with members representing political and
engineering concerns, suggested high level Admiralty involvement and a
prepared agenda. The current Political Secretary, Captain Lord Clarence
Paget, took the chair. Only a handful of naval witnesses were called,
although they included the three key policy makers, First Lord of the
Admiralty the Duke of Somerset, First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Frederick
Grey and Controller of the Navy Rear Admiral Sir Robert Spencer
Robinson. The report was ready within two months.[54]
Somerset
revealed the Admiralty approach:
it
would be an advantage if you always had a dock to run to whenever you
wanted it; that difficulty may be met, perhaps, by some opportunities of
getting additional accommodation from some commercial dock.
The
purpose was to provide a focal point for strategic concentration, and
for this role he greatly preferred locating any dock on a defensible
island, citing
Bermuda
.[55]
Vice Admiral Sir Michael Seymour, recently commanding in
China
, considered it ‘very advisable’ to follow the Hong Kong example to
ensure that private docks would be useful to the Navy in regions ‘such
as
China
and
Australia
’.[56]
Grey recommended the Hong Kong subsidy method, and reported that
projects were under consideration at
Cape Town
,
Vancouver
and the
Falkland Islands
. He favoured Bermuda for the American Station dock, as
Halifax
was iced up for four months every year. Robinson also spoke the language
of the new policy. He stressed that: ’the Navy would be worked more
economically if there were docks on certain foreign stations, than it is
now’.[57]
In order to achieve this object he and Grey revealed
that the new capital ships of the Bellerophon class would be
shorter than the current Warrior type, thereby increasing the
number of available docks, and reducing the cost of modifying those
already built.[58]
Rear-Admiral Richards, Hydrographer of the Navy, produced a table of
existing docking accommodation. There were 37 in the
United Kingdom
, although only 9 were suitable for the biggest ships while 18, left
over from the sailing ship era, were too short for modern heavy ships.
The dock at
Malta
and five small ones at
Bombay
were joined by 20 more commercial docks in colonial territory, although
only two, the Fitzroy at
Sydney
, and the projected Hope Dock at
Hong Kong
were really suitable for naval use. They were the only two with a
subsidy. None of the others could take a vessel larger than a corvette,
fully loaded for sea.[59]
The Committee was struck by the lack of any suitable dock in the
Americas
, Admiral Milne had advised building at Bermuda, the ‘key’ to the
United States
[60],
while Admiral Seymour preferred
Halifax
, but the Committee agreed with Grey, Milne and
Somerset
. Admiral Hope, who had negotiated the dock agreement at Hong Kong, was
now in the West Indies with orders to report on
Bermuda
. The Committee called for a first class dock. Elsewhere they were
content to extend the
Hong Kong
approach, offering a loan to the dock owners based on a fixed proportion
of money for every foot below the 21 foot depth of water over the sill
that was created, to a maximum of 24 feet. The extra four feet were
‘of the deepest importance’ to the Country, and call for ‘much
expenditure.. to preserve the naval position of this country.’
The need for heavy investment in docks had:
become
almost indispensable, in consequence of the conversion of the Navy into
a Steam Navy. In former times it as the practice to have ships down on
careening wharves when in want of repair; but this expedient is not
resorted to in the case of steam vessels, as their machinery would be
deranged by the operation, and consequently, on stations where there are
no Docks of sufficient size, it is necessary to send them home whenever
their bottom require to be either cleaned or repaired. During their
absence from their stations, the cost of wages, victuals, coals, and of
wear and tear, is a dead loss, and this loss would be of constant
recurrence in the case of iron ships; as it is necessary to dock them,
for the mere purpose of cleaning their bottoms, at least four or five
times in the course of the ordinary duration of a commission.
To
offset the cost the Committee suggested that the minor Home Dockyards of
Deptford, Woolwich and Pembroke might be sold to fund the capital costs.[61]
The first two were closed by
Gladstone
’s ministry in 1868 when they adopted the new Imperial strategy. More
immediately new docks at
Portsmouth
and
Malta
were funded, while the proposal to offer loans for suitable docks, in
British possessions, was placed on the Statute book in 1865. Drafted by
the Admiralty team of Captain Lord Clarence Paget, the Political
Secretary, and Junior Civil Lord Hugh Childers the Act made up to £300,000
available through the Bank of England, with each dock being eligible for
a loan of up to £20,000 for 21 years at 4%, secured by a priority
mortgage.[62]
This Act, and the work urged by the Dock Committee would form the corner
stone of the new Imperial Strategy.
The recommendation to create a dock at Bermuda was accepted by
Government, while initiatives at
Halifax
,
Singapore
and Vancouver would bear fruit in due course. By the mid 1880s the
docking situation of the
British Empire
had improved, while the Hydrographer’s Department began to issue a
comprehensive list of all docks and basins.[63]
The architects of this policy, Paget and Childers, treated docking
accommodation as integral to the new Imperial Strategy. Docks were both
the basis of local defence, and a link in the imperial system.
Outside European waters the extension of docking would be intimately
linked to the floating commerce that required protection. When the
Admiral commanding the North American Station proposed building dry dock
at
Halifax
in 1852 he stressed that the commercial sector should carry much of the
cost, and named Cunard as a key supporter.[64]
While commercial interest was still being cited in 1864[65],
nothing was done. Naval demand would not justify an Imperial dock, and
the commercial sector would not pick up the cost at this time. When the
Halifax Graving Dock finally opened in 1889 it was a commercial project,
although encouraged by an Admiralty subsidy of $10,000 a year.[66]
In the interval the North American Station acquired an Imperial dock at
Bermuda
, where the strategic importance of the island was far greater than the
commercial demand for a dock. In addition the local geology made a
conventional structure impossible.[67]
In a bold measure the Admiralty adopted a new technology effectively
straight off the drawing board. An iron floating dry dock was towed out
in 1869 by two of the largest battleships afloat. This innovative
technology enabled the Royal Navy to operate first class ironclads in
the
New World
, although such ships were rarely dispatched. The first mastless capital
ship, designed to operate from first class bases, HMS Devastation was
begun in 1869. The threat posed by this new combination of floating dock
and ironclad was not lost on the more acute observers in the
United States
.[68]
In other areas the relatively low level of threat allowed the Government
to wait until commercial needs required a private dock.
Cape Town
was typical. Here the development of commercial harbour facilities on a
grand scale began shortly after representative government was granted in
1854. From the outset the Admiralty pressed for a big dry dock, but it
was only begun in 1876 and completed in 1882.[69]
Such slow progress reflected the absence of any naval conflict, and
sensible Treasury refusal to carry the full costs.
New Zealand
wanted an Imperial naval presence, so it built a very large dock at
Auckland
between 1884 and 1888. Together with the offer of land and facilities
close by, the dock made the city attractive to the Royal Navy.[70]
The dry dock at
Esquimalt
,
British Columbia
, opened in 1887, linked with local coal supplies and trans-continental
rail and cable communications, to ensure
Britain
dominated this remote, but far from unimportant quarter of the globe.
Begun by
British Columbia
, with Imperial assistance provided under the Colonial Docks (Loans) Act
of 1865, it was completed by the Canadian Government as part of the
Union of Canada.[71]
When Admiral Sir John Fisher spoke of ‘Five strategic keys that lock
up the globe!’
they
were
Dover
, Gibraltar, the Cape,
Alexandria
and
Singapore
.[72]
He might have added
Bermuda
, but the concept was correct. These bases either had, or were very
close to major dockyards, they were connected by cable, defensible and,
in the hands of a superior navy, secured global power.
Imperial
Strength.
The
development of imperial communications and docking accommodation were
directed by a clear strategy, and met the core concerns of British
statesmen. British strategy had been under constant review since 1815,
and remained fundamentally commercial, not territorial. In 1815
Britain
had handed valuable colonies back to
Holland
and
France
, but kept key naval bases. Territory was only useful to secure trade,
or strategic harbours.
Britain
had demonstrated the capacity to engage larger states with powerful
armies in prolonged wars of attrition, using maritime power to avoid
defeat, and bolster state finances. The key issue remained stability and
peace in
Europe
. If this could be secured any threats to outlying imperial possessions
would be minimal. Consequently the main British forces were stationed in
European waters, where their war role would be the blockade or
destruction of enemy naval forces. There was little chance of French or
Russian warships attacking the empire if their own coasts were under
attack.
Down to the late 1850s the strategy of Imperial Defence was essentially
unaltered, however much the political and economic aspects of the
problem had been debated. Local garrisons and stationed naval forces
were largely self-sufficient, working closely with the colonial
governors, and rarely able to consult
London
before acting. While the three main strands of British political
thought, tory, whig/liberal and radical, held different views on the
level of military force to be stationed in the colonies, they agreed
that British forces should not be tied down on internal security duties,
consequently the size of the Army deployed in the colonies fell
consistently from 1815. In 1846 Earl Grey, Secretary for War and the
Colonies, imposed some logic on the system. He began by handing over the
forts and barracks in
New South Wales
to the Colony, and removing the British troops. He also concentrated the
troops deployed in
Canada
into the two major fortresses of
Quebec
and
Halifax
.[73]
With responsible government came responsibility for internal security.
External security remained a naval question, although local bases and
supplies had an important role.
The central role of docking accommodation in Imperial Strategy becomes
obvious when viewed alongside the provision of coast defences. Fixed
defences were provided for naval bases and ports, not territory. The
level of coast defence reflected the degree of threat felt by the local
Legislature, and the level of support available from the Imperial
Government.[74]
The absence of effective coast defences threatened to tie Royal Navy
units to local and harbour defence in the event of war, a role which
would negate their mobility and strategic flexibility. The Admiralty
believed that the floating trade of the Empire should be defended by the
Royal Navy, but that colonial harbours were the responsibility of the
colonial authorities. When responsible government was granted to New
South Wales in 1856 London expected the colony would contribute to
its’ own security[75],
providing internal policing and harbour defence, to protect the Royal
Navy’s local base.
While the Crimean War reminded the colonies of the need for defence, it
also witnessed profound changes in material, tactics and strategy that
forced the British Government to re-examine national strategy.[76]
The French threat, based on ironclads, coastal offensives and an
invasion from
Cherbourg
, forced the ministers to redistribute the fleet, and re-consider
Imperial defence. The other driver was economic. New fortification
programmes were limited to the major dockyards and Alderney, which
effectively countered
Cherbourg
, while a new ironclad fleet and the powerful coast assault fleet built
to fight
Russia
defeated the French challenge. However, their cost forced the ministers
to investigate other aspects of defence expenditure.
The Admiralty’s attention was drawn to global strategy by the Queen.
Alarmed by what she had seen on a visit to
Cherbourg
in April 1858 she demanded that her naval advisors, the Board of
Admiralty, report on the naval tasks in the event of war with the
France
. Third Sea Lord Rear Admiral Sir Alexander Milne stressed the primacy
of securing command of European waters, and taking the initiative
against the French harbours. Milne estimated force levels for overseas
stations, but admitted the navy was simply too small to spare such
forces.[77]
Fourth
Sea
Lord Captain James Drummond went further:
Our
extensive Colonies would in war prove a weakness. They must be considered
after our home defences are in a measure provided for; and it
becomes a question to what extent the Colonies could be independent, and
provide towards their own defence, by raising men and fortifying their
harbours.
We should also require to consider our several coaling stations abroad,
and the protection necessary to keep them available.[78]
The
Admiralty stressed that colonial defence was primarily a naval and
global question, which should not be hampered by local considerations.
Consequently if the colonies wanted their own naval forces the Admiralty
encouraged them to acquire local defence craft, and to contribute
towards the cost of Imperial squadrons.[79]
A review of the forces in Australian waters in 1859 led the Admiralty to
argue that this was a question for the Cabinet[80],
furthermore the squadron was:
necessary
not only to provide for the defence of the Colony, but, in the event of
war, to give periodical convoys to treasure ships proceeding home either
by the Cape of Good Hope or Cape Horn.
While
the Admiralty was prepared to send more ships ‘as soon as the home
defence is sufficiently provided for’[81],
that sufficiency was never achieved. The station had relied on a handful
of small ships before the discovery of gold in the early 1850s increased
the value of Australian shipping. Even so the Admiralty expected any
attack would come in the
Atlantic
. However, the formation of an enlarged and separate Australian Station
in March 1859, based at
Sydney
, recognised both the increased threat and the ability of the colonies
to support such a force.[82]
By 1861 a ‘Royal Colonial Navy of Victoria’, wholly owned, operated
and paid for by the Colony could conduct local policing tasks, reducing
the need for Imperial forces in peace time. Local fortifications mean
that in war time the local Commander could take the initiative,
confident ‘the principal ports on the station were free from the
attack of a single vessel.’
Looking
to the vast demand that would be made upon the Board of Admiralty for
the protection of the Colonies of Great Britain, in the event of war
with a Great Naval Power, my Lords consider that the simple plan of
encouraging each colony to trust in a great measure to its own means of
naval defence is one which must be decided on by the Country.[83]
This
statement reflected a new Imperial strategy, adopted earlier that year,
acknowledging the primary role of the Royal Navy in defending the
colonies from external threat, and securing their shipping from hostile
cruisers. The Colonies would be left to develop their own local defence
forces.
The new policy stemmed from an initiative by the Conservative Secretary
for War General Peel. In 1859 he set up an inter-Departmental Committee
to establish general principles in colonial defence. The Treasury, War
and Colonial Office group found no principles, and little method, just
years of ad hoc decisions. They recommended distinguishing between
Imperial and Colonial positions. The former,
Malta
, Gibraltar, and
Bermuda
, were held for Imperial and not local commercial advantage. The latter,
prosperous and self-governing, should be encouraged to contribute to the
cost of local defence, under the overall defence provided by ‘naval
superiority’.[84]
The Report was published in March 1860, by a new Liberal Government,
prompting further discussion. Twelve months later Arthur Mills, a
liberal MP interested in colonial questions, moved for a Select
Committee of the House of Commons to consider colonial military defence
and costs. Despite his personal opposition Prime Minister Palmerston
allowed the Committee to proceed, recognising the interest of
Gladstone
, as Chancellor of the Exchequer. The cross-party Committee included
three cabinet ministers, several colonial and financial experts and some
promising young MPs.
The most important evidence came from
Gladstone
. He was already engaged in a long running, and ultimately unsuccessful
battle with Palmerston and the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Duke of
Somerset, to reign in the unprecedented level of peace-time naval
expenditure required to defeat the French naval challenge. With support,
and ideas from Paget, Childers and the radical wing of the party
Gladstone wanted economies on distant stations to counter-balance
increased expenditure at home.[85]
He told the Committee that the Colonies did not pay anything approaching
the cost of their defence, and to make matters worse, failed to send
their contribution on time.[86]
He called for a radical change in the concept of
Imperial Strategy:
I
think the change is enormous, and that, in point of fact, our present
system is one founded upon a state of things and a condition of this
Empire relatively to other powers which has entirely passed away. In
former times, our communications with our colonies were rare, slow and
uncertain, and it would have been very dangerous indeed to trust to the
principle of supporting them from the centre; but now, on the contrary,
the communications with the world in general are constant, rapid and
certain and
England
is the very centre of those communications. We have enormous advantages
for supporting them upon the principle of keeping our great mass of
force at home, and supplying them as they may require.[87]
The
report of the Mills Committee recognised that the strategy of Imperial
Defence had been profoundly affected by coastal offensive warfare with
ironclads, and the development of reliable global communications.
Despite the best efforts of General Burgoyne, the Inspector General of
Fortifications, it condemned the construction of forts that could not be
manned in wartime as inefficient, ‘for places, the defence of which
mainly depends on superiority at sea’. This point was applied to the
West Indies
and the distant possessions of the Crown.[88]
As
Gladstone
stressed: ‘Our supremacy at sea is absolutely vital to our existence,
I mean to our present place in the world.
England
would no longer be
England
if she lost it.’ Therefore he urged the reduction of all overseas
garrisons, apart from
Malta
and
Gibraltar
.[89]
The
Committee’s conclusions may appear somewhat ambiguous:
the
tendency of modern warfare is to strike blows at the heart of a hostile
power; and that it is therefore desirable to concentrate the troops
required for the defence of the
United Kingdom
as much as possible, and to trust mainly to naval supremacy for securing
against foreign aggression the distant dependencies of the Empire.[90]
However,
the ‘defensive’ cast of this summation was misleading. The Imperial
government was thinking of applying British maritime power from the
centre against the ‘heart of any hostile power’, either to deter
aggression, or to force an aggressor to disgorge captured territory. Any
maritime force acting from the centre would necessarily include the
concentrated military force. However, such a strategy could not be
openly promulgated, for the Liberal majority in the House of Commons
included a significant, and vociferous radical element that wished to
dispose of all colonies, and opposed any military spending that was not
purely ‘defensive’. One consequence was an excessive reliance on
coast defence vessels, which the radicals were promoting as economic
substitutes for forts.[91]
Before this Report could be acted upon the issues it had considered were
thrown into sharp focus by the ‘Trent Crisis’ of December
1861.
The successful resolution of the ‘
Trent
’ Crisis by deterrence, based on the movement of existing forces
from the centre to the threatened periphery, controlled by cable, or
mail steam communications, provided a powerful endorsement for the work
of the Mills Committee.[92]
Just as the ‘Trent Crisis’ subsided the Admiralty responded
to another Australian plea for naval defence by requesting that the
Colonial Office draft Act of Parliament to establish colonial navies.
The Admiralty wanted to mobilise the resources of the colonies in the
event of war with ‘a Great Naval Power’ rather than allowing them
simply to rely on the Imperial Government. The key task for colonial
forces would be to protect ports and coastal cities from attack. These
defences ought to be provided locally, in
Australia
and
Canada
. Colonial naval forces would ‘materially save on our expenditure’,
and would be sustained by self interest and national pride. They would
not replace the Imperial role in protecting commerce, but should
prevent alarm at every rumour of war. Ultimately:
It
would seem to be sound policy to let them learn gradually how to protect
themselves and also the cost of doing it. It would not probably hasten
the time when they would desire the whole burden to rest on their
shoulders.[93]
The
Colonial Office accepted that an individual hostile cruiser might appear
off Australian harbours, but against these local measures believed to be
in hand should be adequate.
London
was pressing the local authorities to provide their own defence.[94]
For the next four years occasional alarms kept the issue of Australian
defence alive,[95]
while the Imperial and Colonial authorities tried to balance the demands
of responsible government, local defence and Imperial security.[96]
The 1865 Colonial Naval Defence Act allowed the
colonies to create their own navies, but fearful that these local naval
forces might cause an international incident they were restricted to
colonial waters.[97]
This met the objects of the Admiralty, which required secure and well
equipped ports from which to operate Imperial squadrons. At this time
the maritime trade of
Australia
was growing rapidly, so that facilities capable of supporting the Royal
Navy developed without Imperial interference. After 1861 harbour
defences at
Melbourne
,
Sydney
,
Newcastle
,
Hobart
,
Adelaide
and Fremantle made them secure bases. The former soon had a graving dock
and a powerful coast defence ironclad, making
Port
Philip
Bay
a secure haven.[98]
These developments made the Imperial squadron on station vastly more
powerful than any possible threat, not from increased numbers or
strength of ships, but because the British ships could rely on secure
harbours, coal and other naval stores, potential recruits, vital graving
docks, engineering back up and the best communications in the region.
The arrival of the telegraph cable in 1872 merely reinforced the long
standing superiority of British communications.
After 1861 British strategy shifted away from the stationed forces, both
land and sea, of the previous sixty years toward the mobile, centrally
controlled units advocated by the Mills Committee. With suitable local
facilities and good communications stationed forces could be reduced to
colonial policing types. When
Gladstone
became Prime Minister in 1868 the detached squadron strategy was
adopted. The original idea, and much of the detail had been provided by
his long time ally the quasi-radical First Secretary to the Admiralty,
Paget. Alone among the radicals Paget had the professional standing to
propose such a strategic shift, and used his position at the Board to
develop this policy after 1859.[99]
In late 1864, after it had been endorsed by the Docks Committee,
Gladstone
renewed his call for a ‘Flying Squadron’ strategy. Paget and Civil
Lord Childers provided financial detail.[100]
Palmerston remained resolutely opposed, and when Paget conceded it
depended on future improvements, the Cabinet rejected
Gladstone
’s proposal.[101]
Yet within months Paget and Childers’s Colonial
Dock (Loan) Act had laid the foundations for the new strategy, while the
death of Palmerston in October removed the last serious obstacle. During
Lord Russell’s brief tenure as Prime Minister, 1865-66,
Somerset
remained at the Admiralty to frustrate
Gladstone
’s plans. However, there was no place for him in
Gladstone
’s 1868 ministry.
The ‘Flying Squadron’ strategy was declared as Liberal party policy
by Childers,
Gladstone
’s loyal lieutenant and one time Australian politician in the House of
Commons in 1867. When
Gladstone
formed his government in December 1868 Childers became First Lord of the
Admiralty. Within weeks the Admiralty had settled the reduction of
overseas squadrons with the Foreign Secretary.[102]
Station force levels reflected local tasks, rather than strategic
threat. Childers summed up his work:
The
diminution of the force permanently maintained in distant seas will
enable my Lords to send a cruising squadron of frigates and corvettes to
visit the stations from time to time, and my Lords anticipate that much
benefit to the naval service will be derived from this policy.[103]
The
first ‘Flying Squadron’ of four frigates and two corvettes arrived
at
Melbourne
in November 1869, going on to Sydney and Hobart before crossing the
Tasman Sea
.[104]
This was the most powerful naval force yet seen in
the region. In 1878 and 1885 the possibility of war with Russian was
deterred by the assembly of a power projection fleet at Spithead, not
the local defences of the
British Empire
.[105]
While the Russians feared for St. Petersburg Sydney
and Melbourne were safe.
The ‘Trent Crisis’ demonstrated that
Britain
could not station forces in
Canada
to meet the United States Army. She had to rely on deterrence. Her
global empire could not be secured against serious attack by local
defences. This was a matter of basic economics and political expediency.
Britain
would not pay for a high level of local defence, nor would her colonies.
The only strategy that combined real power, global reach and relative
economy was one based on the offensive strength of the Royal Navy.
Throughout the 19th century the Royal Navy had the power to
destroy any rival navy, securing British interests, and releasing the
fleet for further offensive operations, including economic blockades,
seizure of overseas or isolated territories as diplomatic assets, and
attacks on major cities. British thinking envisaged a war of limited
commitment of manpower and money, husbanding resources and strength for
another twenty year conflict. While this strategy could not destroy a
major power, it would exhaust their military and economic resources and
ultimately break their political will. Sea power gave
Britain
the ability to attack an enemy at their weakest, or most sensitive
point, rather than simply countering an attack at the point it crossed
the Imperial frontier. Mastery of global communications and the
development of suitable base facilities, especially dry docks, ensured
that a maritime striking force could be dispatched from the centre of
the Empire, staging through the global chain of bases, to project power
against any rival, in any theatre. That this did not have to be done
between 1861 and 1914 reflects the success of centrally directed
deterrence in reducing the threat to the empire.
Conclusion:
Because
the British never wrote down their core strategic doctrine in the period
1815-1914 many historians have argued that there was no strategy. This
is not correct. In pursuing their economic agendas the British developed
a maritime strategy, in which naval power was intimately linked to the
economic activity it served. The system was constantly upgraded to
exploit new technologies and meet changing political realities. Between
1856 and 1868 the strategy shifted from stationed forces to a centrally
controlled ‘expeditionary’ strategy. The combination of British
cables, British coal and British dry-docks locked up the globe, and
enabled a relatively small country, with low levels of defence spending
to control the world, despite the spread of imperial and informal
commercial interests. When the level of tension in
Europe
began to rise, in part linked to rivalries over the non-European world,
the British responded, increasing defence spending, improving their
cable network, building new docks, and re-deploying their forces. The
fundamental strategic mobility of naval power makes the tendency of many
historians to draw important, negative conclusions from the movement of
ships and squadrons from periphery to the centre is unwise. The key
indicators of imperial strategy were the fixed assets: communications,
docks and fortifications.
The main threat to
Britain
’s unique, and highly advantageous situation came from the one area
that she could not control, the continent of
Europe
. However, Britain was able to exert significant influence even here,
because her aims were essentially negative, the maintenance of an
approximate equilibrium, in which no one power dominated the western
continent, and the key invasion staging posts of the Rhine and the
Scheldt remained in the hands of a minor power, Holland, and neutral
Belgium. Any threat to this situation, notably that posed by the
Franco-Prussian war of 1870, saw the British act quickly and
effectively. It is essential to stress that British policy in
Europe
was carefully calculated.
By 1890
Britain
’s twenty-five year epoch of unchallenged imperial dominance was over.
The growing economies of the
USA
and
Germany
, and the imperial expansion of
France
and
Russia
were inexorably raising the stakes and forcing
Britain
to increase defence spending, reconsider the basis of her strategy, and
within little more than a decade, to accept alliances and Ententes with
other major powers. However, all that was in the future, in 1890 Britain
could look back on 25 years of cheap security, effective Imperial
defence and global power based on sound strategy, cheap government and
maximising technological opportunity.
__________________________________________________
APPENDIX
ONE:
BRITISH
STATE
AND DEFENCE SPENDING: 1860 - 1890.
In
£ million.
Total
Income [under year]
I.
Total Expenditure
II.
Defence Expenditure Navy
III.
as % of Budget.
1860
I.
II.
III.
70.1
69.6
24.9
15.5%
1870
73.7
67.1
21.5
13.9%
1880
73.3
81.5
25.2
12.3%
1890
94.6
90.6
26.3[106]
16.8%[107]
[1]
This paper forms part of a wide ranging re-assessment
of British strategy between 1815 and 1914. It first appeared only
in German as, “Wirtschaftliche Macht, technologischer Vorsprung und
Imperiale Stärke: Grossbritannien als einzigartige globale Macht: 1860
bis 1890,” in M. Epkenhans and G.P. Gross, Das Militär und der
Aufbruch die Moderne 1860 bis 1890 (Munich 2003).
[2] The standard account of this process is:
Cain, P.J. & Hopkins, A.G. British
Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion 1688-1914.
London
1993 see esp. pp. 125-177.
[3] Cain, P. J. ‘Economics
and Empire: The Metropolitan Context’
in Porter, A. ed. The
Oxford
History of the
British Empire
: vol. III The Nineteenth Century.
Oxford
1999. esp. pp. 42-50.
[4] Wood Memorandum August 1857: Royal Archives E
49 f.30.
[5] Imlah, A. H. Economic Aspects of the
Pax Britannica. Harvard 1958 pp.186-8.
[6]
Lynn
. M. ‘British
Policy, Trade, and Informal Empire in the Mid-Nineteenth Century’
in Porter ed. pp.101-121. Wong, J. Y. Deadly Dreams: Opium and
the Arrow War (1856-1860) in
China
.
Cambridge
1998. Pp.470-78 argues that British imperialism was complex, and
included key economic elements, in which Palmerston took a leading role.
[7] Cain & Hopkins pp.204-5.
[8]
Ferguson
, N. The World’s
Banker: The History o the House of Rothschild.
London
1998 p.819.
[9] Kynaston, D. The City of
London
: Vol I. A World of its Own 1815-1890.
London
1994 pp.335-40.
Ferguson
pp.817-26For links between Government and finance, and the City’s
bellicose attitude to securing investments
see: Cain & Hopkins pp.206-8.
[10]
Ferguson
p.853.
[11]
Clapham, J. H. The Bank of
England
. Vol. II.
Cambridge
1944 p.318.
Ferguson
p.863.
[12]
Porter, A. ed. The
Oxford
History of the
British Empire
: vol. III The Nineteenth Century. The
importance of non-empire areas, capital export and global trade in
sustaining British power are debated in this volume. There are chapters
on areas that were never part of the formal Empire.
[13]
Notably Joseph Chamberlain’s
Tariff Reform and Imperial Preference movement of 1904-06.
[14]
Ferguson
p.680.
[15]
Wong pp.350-55.
[16]
Cain & Hopkins p.239.
[17]
Ferguson
p.812.
[18]
Kynaston pp.377-8.
[19]
Cain & Hopkins p.315.
[20]
Kynaston pp. 175, 226, 258, 260, 306, 348-9.
[21]
ibid p.400 quote, and see
pp.430-6 for the 1890 Baring Crisis.
[22]
Lambert, A.D. ed. Steam, Steel and Shellfire: The
Steam Warship 1815-1890.
London
1991 provides a comprehensive analysis of these developments.
[23]
The Crimean War (1854-1856) and the American Civil
War (1861-1865) were the key demonstrations of this enhanced power. see
Lambert, A D. ‘The
British response to the construction of
Cherbourg
, 1840-1850. A study in strategy, technology
and infrastructure.’ 7th Anglo-French Naval History Conference,
Greenwich
April 2001.
[24]
Lambert, A D The
Crimean War: British Grand Strategy against
Russia
1853-1856.
Manchester
1990 pp.73-4.
[25]
Lambert, A D ‘Under
the Heel of Britannia: The Bombardment of Sweaborg, August 1855.’
In Hore, P. ed. Seapower Ashore.
(Chatham 2001).
[26] Editorial
24th April 1856, in Lambert & Badsey, The
War Correspondents: The Crimean War.
Gloucester
1994 pp.304-5.
[27]
Lambert, A.D. ‘Winning
without fighting; British Grand Strategy and its application to the
United State, 1815-1865.’
Michael Handel Memorial Conference, US Naval
War
College
Nov. 2001.
[28]
For a discussion of this thesis see: Lambert, A. D. ‘The
Royal Navy, 1856-1914: Deterrence and the Strategy of World Power.’
in Neilson, K. & Errington, E. J., eds. Navies and Global
Defence: Theories and Strategies.
Westport
,
Conn.
1995 pp. 69-92 esp. pp. 71-4.
[29]
The key indicator here would be the tons carried per
mile per annum, not the size of the shipping pool. Steam ships make more
voyages than sailing ships, and fast ships more than slow ones.
[30]
Griffiths
, D. Steam at Sea: Two Centuries of Steam-Powered Ships.
London
1997.
[31]
Mullins, R. ‘Sharpening
the Trident’
1889 Unpub.
Univ.
of
London
Ph.D. 2000
[32]
A three quarter power crossing of the
Atlantic
by a cruiser with triple expansion engines would end with a visit to the
dockyard, and weeks of maintenance.
[33]
For the legal and strategic issues see: Lambert, A.D.
‘
Great Britain
and Maritime Law from the Declaration of Paris to the era of Total War.’
Conference Paper, delivered in
Oslo
, August 2001. The failure of German oceanic cruiser warfare in 1914 is
instructive.
[34]
Mahan, A. T. The Influence of
Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire.
Boston
1892 is the key text.
[35]
For an example of smaller imperial works see: Earle,
S. J. A Question of Defence: The Story of Green Hill Fort,
Thursday Island
.
Thursday Island
1993. This fort covered the key shipping route and coal depot in
the Torres Straits. It was built by
Queensland
, the Imperial government providing guns.
[36]
Headrick, D. R. The Invisible Weapon:
Telecommunications and International Politics, 1851-1945.
New York
1991. Kennedy, P. M. ‘Imperial
Cable Communications and Strategy, 1870-1914’English
Historical Review LXXXVI (1971) pp.728-52.
[37]
For links between Lord Stanley, later 15th Earl of Derby
and Easter Chairman Sir John Pender see: Vincent, J. ed. Disraeli,
Derby
and the Conservative Party: The Political Journal of Lord Stanley,
1849-1869. Hassocks 1978 p.222. &
Vincent ed. The
Derby
Diaries, 1869-1878.
London
1995 p.117.
[38]
Barty-King, H. Girdle Round the Earth: The Story
of Cable and Wireless.
London
1979 pp.73-4. Eastern Telegraph was one of the constituent parts
of the modern Company.
[39]
Ibid pp.69-70.&
Kennedy ‘Cable’
p.741.
[40]
Barty-King p.126.
[41]
Kennedy ‘Cable’
p.748.
[42]
Dietz, B. ‘Dikes,
Dockheads and Gates: English Docks and Sea power in the Sixteenth and
Seventeenth Centuries’.
Mariner’s
Mirror. Vol.88 May
2002 pp.144-54.
[43]
Duffy, M. ‘Devon
and the Naval Strategy of the French Wars, 1689-1815’
in The New Maritime History of
Devon
. Vol. I
London
1992 pp. 182-4. Lambert, A.D. ‘Strategy,
Policy and Ship-building: The Bombay Dockyard ,
the Indian Navy and Imperial Security in
Eastern
Seas
, 1784-1869.’
In Bowen, H. Lincoln, M. & Rigby, N. The
Worlds of the East India Company.Woodbridge 2002 pp. 137-152,
esp. pp. 150-1.
[44]
Colson, C. Notes on Docks and Dock Construction.
London
1894. Colson was Assistant Director of Works at the Admiralty.
[45]
Graham, G. S.
Great Britain
and the
Indian Ocean
1810 - 1850.
Oxford
1967 pp.305-28.
[46]
Bonnini, J. & Casser, M. The
Malta
Grand
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and its Dockyard.
Malta
1994 pp.38-122.
[47]
Brassey, Lord The
Naval Annual 1886.
Portsmouth
1886 p.100.
[48]
Bach, J. A Maritime History of
Australia
.
Sydney
1976 esp. ch.II & XII for dock, support facilities and local coal
supplies.
[49]
Bach, J. The
Australia
Station: A History of the Royal Navy in the South-West Pacific
1821-1913. Kensington NSW 1986 p.199
[50]
Jeremy, J.
Cockatoo
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:
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’s Historic
Dockyard.
Sydney
1998 pp. 7-10
[51]
Report of a Select Committee on the Dock and Basin
Accommodation available for the Repair of Her Majesty’s
Ships. House of Commons 1864 vol. VIII p.45.
[52]
Coates, A. Whampoa: Ships on the Shore.
Hong Kong
1980 pp.7-85.
[53]
Singapore
: Portrait of a Port: 1819-1984.
Singapore
1984.
[54]
Journals of the House of Commons 1864
pp.87, 91, 94, 161, 203, 222, 324, 428.
[55]
1864 Select Committee 2nd Report, Evidence p.43.
[56]
ibid. p.45.
[57]
ibid. p.163.
[58]
ibid. p.164.
[59]
ibid. 1st Report p.57.
[60]
ibid. 2nd report p.14.
[61]
ibid. p.vii.
[62]
An Act to authorise Loans in aid of the construction
of Docks in British Possessions. 5th July 1865. 28
& 29 Vict. 1865 cap. CVI
[63]
Havergal, A. Dock Book, containing dimensions of
the Wet and Dry Docks, Patent Slips &c. the
world etc. London Hydrographic Dept. 1886, with annual corrections
to 1890.
[64]
Admiral Sir G. Seymour (C-in-C North
America
) to The Duke of Northumberland (First Lord of the Admiralty) 3.11.1852:
Northumberland MSS. Alnwick Castle E4 f.407
[65]
Captain J. C. D. Hay 1864 Report p.167. Hay had been
Flag Captain on the Station 1856058.
[66]
Smith, M. G. The King’s
Yard: An Illustrated History of the
Halifax
Dockyard.
Halifax
1985 p.12
[67]
See http://Bermuda-online.org.rnd.htmp.5 for a brief survey
of earlier dock projects.
[68]
See John Ericsson’s
contemporary opinion, cited in Sandler, S. The
Emergence of the Modern Capital Ship.
Newark
,
Delaware
, 1979 p.243.
[69]
Newall, P.
Cape Town
Harbour
: 1652 to the Present.
Cape Town
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[70]
McGibbon, I. The Path to Gallipoli: Defending
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184-1915.
Auckland
1991 pp.66-67. Ross, J. The White Ensign
in early
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.
Wellington
1967 pp.96-7.
[71]
Gough, B. M. The Royal Navy on the
Northwest
Coast
of
North America
, 1810-1914.
Vancouver
1971 pp.224-7.
[72]
Kennedy, P. M. The Rise and Fall
of British Naval Mastery.
London
1976 p.206
[73]
Tunstall, W.C.B. ‘Imperial
Defence 1815-1870 in The
Cambridge
History of the
British Empire
: Volume II 1783-1870.
Cambridge
1940 pp.806-12
[74]
For the case of
Australia
see: Peacock, R.K. Early Coast Defences in
Australia
, 1787-1901. Dept. of Defence MS. Australian War Memorial,
Canberra
.
Austin
. M. The Army in
Australia
, 1840-50.
Canberra
1979 pp. 150-173.
[75]
Bach Royal Navy p.177
[76]
Lambert Crimean War 1990
[77]
Milne memo. April 1858, MLN 142/2: Milne MSS National
Maritime Museum
[78]
Drummond Memo. April 1858: MLN 142/2
[79]
Gordon
,
D.C.
The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defence, 1870-1914.
Baltimore
1965 pp. 7-9
[80]
Colonial Office - Admiralty 25.4.1859: Milne minute
28.4.1859 & reply 30.6.1859 ADM 1/5721
[81]
Milne Memo. of 20.6.1859
on ibid: Macandie, G.L. The Genesis of the
Royal Australian Navy.
Sydney
1949 pp.14-15
[82]
Macandie p.14
[83]
Admiralty to Colonial Office 26.12.1861: ADM 13/47
draft by Captain Paget.
[84]
Tunstall p.828
[85]
Gladstone
-
Somerset
18.12.1860:
Somerset
MSS Buckinghamshire Record Office 2A/14/13
[86]
Shannon, R. Gladstone: Volume One 1809-1865.
London
1982 p.433.
[87]
Gladstone
evidence 6.6.1861: PP 1861 vol. XIII Select Committee on Colonial
Military Expenditure (Mills) p.263
[88]
Mills Final Report: ibid. p. vii
[89]
Gladstone
: ibid p.260.
[90]
Tunstall pp. 832: Gordon pp.10-23
[91]
Lambert, A. D. ‘Politics,
Technology and Policy-making: Palmerston, Gladstone and the
management of the Ironclad Naval Race, 1859-1865’The
Northern Mariner Vol.VIII July
1998 p.27
[92]
For details see: Lambert, ‘Winning
without fighting; British Grand Strategy and its application to the
United State, 1815-1865.’
& ‘
Australia
, the “
Trent
’
Crisis” of
1861 and the strategy of Imperial Defence‘ in Stevens, D. ed. Southern Trident: Strategy,
History and the rise of Australian Naval Power. Crows
Nest NSW 2001 pp.99-118.
[93]
Colonial Office to Admiralty 16.1.1862: Admiralty
minute on by Romaine: ADM 1/5797
[94]
Johnson, D.H. Volunteers at Heart: The
Queensland
Defence Forces 1860-1901.
Queensland
1975 p.33
[95]
ibid. pp.43-45
[96]
Gordon
,
D.C.
The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defence, 1870-1914.
Baltimore
1965 provides a detailed coverage of the period from 1860.
[97]
Macandie p.12 & 21.
[98]
Bach Royal Navy pp.179-181
[99]
Gladstone
memorandum on Naval Policy 18.12.1860: Somerset MSS Buckingham Record
Office 2A/14/13: the detail and specific proposals suggest this paper
was inspired or drafted by Paget.
[100]
Gladstone
to
Somerset
13.13.1864: Add. 44,304 f203
Gladstone
to Paget 22 & 26.12.1864: Add. 44,408 f188 & 196
Paget to
Gladstone
25.12.1864: ibid. f192
[101]
Paget memo. for
Gladstone
1.1.1865: Add. 44,601 fl, Matthew H.G.C.
ed. The
Gladstone
Diaries 1.1.1865 - 31.1.1865
Paget to
Gladstone
9.1.1865: Add. 44,409 f28 Palmerston to Queen
Victoria
20.1.1865: Buckle, G. ed. The Letters of
Queen
Victoria
: 2nd. Series vol. I.
London
1928 pp. 248-9
[102]
Beeler pp.35-7 & Table 1.
[103]
Childers draft letter to Earl Clarendon, The Foreign
Secretary 23.1.1869 in Hattendorf, J. et al eds. British Naval
Documents 1204-1960. London Navy Records Society 1993 pp.593-5
[104]
Egerton, Mrs F. Admiral Sir Geoffrey Phipps Hornby.
London
1896 pp.145-50
[105]
Lambert, A D. ‘
Great Britain
and the Baltic, 1809-1890’
in Rystad et al. Eds. In Quest of Trade and Security: The
Baltic in Great Power Politics, Part One 1500-1900.
Lund
1994 pp.297-334
[106]
Mitchell, B. R. & Deane, P. Abstract of
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Cambridge
1962.
[107]
Beeler, J. F. British Naval Policy in the
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