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Australian
Naval Defence and the 1887 Colonial
Conference: Context, Policy and Reaction
Daniel
Owen Spence, Sheffield
Hallam
University
As Britain entered the 1870s her
position as the world's pre-eminent power was under threat in the
face of increased economic, industrial and military competition
from other nations such as the United
States and the newly-unified Germany.
One reaction to these new threats was to draw closer to the Empire,
and thinkers such as Charles Dilke in his
book Greater Britain (1868), and J. A. Froude in his essay
'England and her Colonies' (1870), lauded the virtues of imperial
unity amongst the white settlements. By then the white colonies had
developed rapidly in population and wealth, and as such were seen
increasingly as a resource that could be used to strengthen Britain
and the Empire.
During
the 1860s, debate had taken place regarding the economics of
colonial defence, as taxpayers in Britain
were prepared to shoulder the costs of home defence,
but not the increasingly expensive burden of defending the colonies
through internal policing and frontier wars[i][1].
Thought therefore drifted towards encouraging the colonies
to pay for their own local defence, and
British troops were slowly withdrawn from the colonies with the
establishment of local militias.
However, the navy remained a British expense.
The
1870s saw the first discussions taking place in regard to the
creation of an integrated system of defence
for Great
Britain, its overseas
territories, and the commercial and strategic links between
them. The navy would play a
crucial role in such a system by protecting the vital trade routes
that connected the Empire.
However, it was not a topic that exercised general public opinion
at the time, therefore neither the Liberals under Gladstone, nor
the Conservatives under Disraeli and Salisbury, gave it much
attention as domestic matters were what formed the key electoral
battleground, and ‘both parties wished to minimise
the cost of empire and its impact on the evolving parliamentary
system in Britain.'[ii][2]
It
was therefore left to professionals in the services or the civil
service to develop ideas regarding imperial defence,
which were then discussed in service and other journals with the
intention of influencing ministers and service chiefs. Captain John Colomb
of the Royal Navy was one such advocate, whose pamphleteering from
1867 was a constant message urging the creation of an integrated
system of defence. Figures such as Colomb, Colonel Sir William Jervois,
and the Conservative peer Lord Carnarvon,
provided the arguments for public discussion, and their efforts
stimulated a 'growing willingness of departments of state - the
Admiralty, the War Office, the Colonial Office and, to a much
lesser degree the Treasury - to talk to each other and agree the
crucial elements of imperial defence'[iii][3].
From
1878 onwards the question of imperial defence
would gain an increasing level of interest and importance in Britain
and the Empire. As it did,
the issue of Australia's
naval defence would become a prominent
feature of this debate.
The Emerging
Question of Australian Naval Defence,
1878-1887
It
was not until the threat of war with Russia emerged in 1878
that concrete action was taken regarding imperial defence, with the creation of the Colonial Defence Committee in 1878. This was followed up in 1879 with
the commissioning of a two-and-a-half year study, fronted by the
prominent Conservative peer and imperialist Lord Carnarvon, of long-ranged planning for colonial
defence, which would 'inquire into the defence of British possessions and commerce
abroad'. The commission came to the conclusion that:
'With
regard to the second and larger question of the naval defence of Australia generally as an integral
portion of the British Empire, and of Australian commerce on the
high seas, the time, in our opinion, has arrived when the Colonies
may reasonably be expected to take upon themselves some share of
that defence - a burden hitherto
exclusively borne by the mother-country... we see no reason why the
Australian Colonies should not make a moderate contribution in
money towards the cost of that squadron which is maintained by the
mother-country for the protection of interests common to the
Colonies and herself.'[iv][4]
Though it had already generally been accepted
by the Australian Colonies that they would 'themselves provide, at
their own cost, the local forces, forts, batteries, and other appliances
requisite for the protection of their principle ports'[v][5], this is the first time that it
was proposed that they should contribute to the costs of the
Australian squadron as well.
The squadron was provided by Britain for 'the
protection of interests common to the
Colonies and herself', and was open to be sent whenever and
wherever the Admiralty wanted, including outside of Australian
waters. In his essay 'Australia, the Trent
crisis of 1861 and the strategy of imperial defence',
Andrew Lambert has explained how Britain's 'flying
squadron' strategy had come to be adopted. The Trent
crisis of 1861 had demonstrated that '[Britain's] global
empire could not be secured against serious attack by local defences... The only strategy that combined real
power, global reach and relative economy was one based on the
offensive strength of the Royal Navy'[vi][6]. That meant intercepting an
enemy fleet out at sea or blockading the enemy's ports, not
adopting a defensive posture in front of the coastlines of Britain's
possessions. A year before the crisis the Mills Committee Report
into the defence of the colonies had been
published, and its findings had come to a similar conclusion:
'The
tendency of modern warfare is to strike blows at the heart of a
hostile power; and that it is therefore desirable to concentrate
the troops required for the defence of
the UK as much as possible, and to trust mainly to naval supremacy
for securing against foreign aggression the distant dependencies of
the Empire.'[vii][7]
The 'flying squadron' advocated by the Report
and supported by experiences of the Trent crisis was then
put into immediate effect when Gladstone became Prime Minister and
Liberal leader in 1868. It can not be ignored that the primary
motivation behind Gladstone's thinking may have been less one of
naval strategy and more about financial considerations, as
Gladstone 'sought economies on the distant stations to
counterbalance increased expenditure at home'[viii][8]. Nevertheless it remained the
basis of Britain's
imperial defence strategy for the next
two decades.
Having little naval heritage themselves, the
Australian Colonies failed to understand that against potential
European enemies, it was possible that the squadron could better
serve their defence in the Mediterranean
Sea for example, than being confined to Australian waters for port defences.
As a result, the Carnarvon
commission suspected that were the Colonies asked, they would
demand 'that any contribution from the Australian Colonies should
be coupled with restrictions upon the free movement of the
squadron'[ix][9], which the commission was
unwilling to concede. For
since the late 1870s, the question had already been discussed as to
'whether the protection of colonial ports generally is to be
undertaken either wholly or in part by vessels of the Royal Navy
stationed locally for that purpose'[x][10], and it had been agreed in
principle that 'the fleet is required for cruising, and cannot be
kept in harbour to guard its own
supplies'[xi][11].
Like Britain, the Australian
Colonies were also beginning to feel insecure due to European
colonial ambitions. In the
1870s the French set up a penal colony in New Caledonia and there were rumours that they intended to invade Vanatu.
In the 1880s the Germans began to assert themselves in New Guinea, thus threatening the
coast of Queensland, and fears of
Russian invasion were exacerbated in 1882 when a Russian fleet
visited Melbourne.
In search of added security, the Australian
Colonies held an Intercolonial Conference
in Sydney
in January 1881. Here, the
Premier of South Australia proposed that the colonies should
contribute one-half the expense of any additional naval forces,
though "he was, singularly enough the only man in the Colonies
at the time who took that view"[xii][12]. It was agreed that 'the naval defence of these Colonies, considering the
large imperial interests involved "should continue to be the
exclusive charge of the Imperial Government, and that the strength
of the Australian squadron should be increased"'[xiii][13]. As a result of this stance from
the Australian Governments, the Royal Commission recommended that a
formal proposal of its conclusions should not be made to the
Colonies at the time.
However, it saw 'reason to hope that, considering their
fast-increasing prosperity, the larger Colonies will, before long,
be prepared, even in times of peace, to accept the principle of a
contribution towards the cost of the Australian squadron, and that
the other Colonies will follow their example'[xiv][14].
The 1880s saw increased public interest in
imperial defence and a desire for closer
union, as anxieties became fuelled through the media. On 15 September 1884, the
sensationalist editor W. T. Stead published an article on the front
page of the Pall Mall Gazette entitled 'What is the Truth
about the Navy?', where he called into question the effective
strength of the Royal Navy[xv][15]. Fears of war were also again
provoked by another Russian crisis in 1885.
In the Queen's Speech on the prorogation of
Parliament in 1886, Queen Victoria
stated:
"I
have observed with much satisfaction the interest which, in an
increasing degree, is evinced by the people of this country in the
welfare of their Colonial and Indian fellow subjects; I am led to
the conviction that there is on all sides a growing desire to draw
closer in every practicable way the bonds which unite the various
portions of the Empire..."[xvi][16]
The issue found endorsement amongst the
Imperial Federation League, and in the first number of the League's
journal it was stated that 'Imperial Defence
is not only a prime factor in Imperial Federation, it is the main
burden which Imperial Federation takes upon itself'[xvii][17]. The historian Howard D'Egville credits a lecture delivered by John Colomb, one of the League's co-founders,
entitled "Imperial Federation, Naval and Military", as
having 'had a very distinct influence in turning the current of
official thought towards the larger aspects of British Defence'[xviii][18].
In the Australian colonies Sir Samuel Griffith,
the Premier of Queensland, was a major figure in turning Australian
political attention towards addressing the issue of their own naval
defence. In November 1883 at a convention
in Sydney, he submitted a resolution
to create a Federal Australasian Council 'to deal, inter alia, with
the maritime defences of Australasia, beyond territorial limits”'[xix][19]. Later, in a memorandum dated
1 June 1885, Griffith
stated:
'So far
as regards dealing with a hostile squadron in Australian waters, we
have at present to rely entirely upon such ships as the Imperial
Government are able to detach for this
station. And it is manifest that the ships at present on station
are insufficient in number and quality to afford such offensive and
defensive force as a community of over 3,000,000 persons, with
wealth far beyond that possessed by a similar number in most other
parts of the world, ought to have at its command.'[xx][20]
It
is interesting to note Griffith's
choice of language here as it indicates the mindset with which the
Australian delegates later entered the 1887 Colonial Conference.
They believed that the Australian squadron 'ought' to be at their
command, and thus goes some way to explain their insistence that
control over the squadron's deployment should ultimately lie in the
hands of the colonies. I shall address this in further detail
later.
The need to improve the make up of the Australian station was
also apparent to the Admiralty and on September 9th 1885 a
memorandum was sent to Rear-Admiral Tryon, commander of the
Australian squadron, instructing him to 'encourage an extension of
the Imperial navy'[xxi][21]. However, the Admiralty scheme was
rejected by the Colonies, as it proposed that the entire expense,
including capital costs and annual maintenance, should be paid
entirely out of Colonial funds.
The debate gained newspaper coverage in Britain, with the editor of The
Times arguing that Australia 'is in urgent
want of more effective means of defence',
and urging that:
'If Australia
will throw in her lot with this country, and will take her just
share in the burden of naval defence, she
will receive in return more than full equivalent. To have a distinct navy of her
own, furnished with modern appliances and keeping pace with modern
science, is scarcely possible for her. With the help of this country she
can obtain all she needs, and we learn with pleasure that she is
now seeking to avail herself of that help on her own interest and
in ours... union is strength, and that, for a country situated as
Australia is, there can be no strength found adequate to her needs
on any other terms.'[xxii][22]
Sir Dillon Bell the Agent-General of New Zealand,
argued that 'the Colonies had said they wanted an "Australian
Fleet" (in the sense of a fleet assigned to local service),
and that they ought therefore to be prepared to pay towards the
prime cost as well as the maintenance'[xxiii][23]. The Conservative politician Sir
Clement Kinloch Cooke, also wrote:
'what
Australia really wants is a navy - ships that she can call her own,
the possession of which will diminish, if not destroy, the danger
that must arise to her coasting trade owing to the immediate
presence of foreign Powers in the event of a European war... Invite
the colonies to provide the money, which they are well able to do,
and with Australian gold build ironclads and cruisers in our own
dockyards, and, while thus providing for the naval defence of our Pacific possessions, we shall at
the same time be lessening the pauperism that prevails in England
and giving work to thousands of the unemployed...
Hand the ships over to
the Federal Australian Council to use as they may determine for the
common safety of our colonial shores; but let their movements in a
matter where Imperial and Colonial interests are combined be
subject to telegraphic instruction from England...'[xxiv][24]
This was the stumbling block, as the Admiralty
was reluctant to commit to keeping ships permanently in Australian
waters, yet the Colonies were unwilling to contribute to the
capital cost of the new vessels unless this was the case. It was the British who
compromised, and on 24 December 1885 in a letter to the Governors
of the Australian Colonies, Tryon offered that 'the vessels
provided at the cost of the colonies should be retained within the
limits of the Australian seas'.
After further correspondence, a scheme was suggested whereby
the Colonies would bear the cost of maintaining the new fleet, and
five per cent of the cost of construction.
At the Imperial Federation League Conference of
August 1886, the need for a more integrated system of imperial defence was further emphasised
by Colomb, who in the course of his paper
read at the conference, said "Federation for common defence is, I believe, essentially necessary
for Imperial safety", and he urged the calling of a Conference
representative of the Parliaments of the Empire, "to examine
the facts of our position and to fix the principles which are to
guide our arrangements for defence"[xxv][25]. On 11 August, a delegation of the
League was sent to the Prime Minister Lord Salisbury and the Secretary
of State for the Colonies Edward Stanhope, urging them to call a
conference or appoint a Royal Commission, representative of the United Kingdom
and the self-governing colonies, to consider practical means of
improving imperial defence and intercommunication. The Prime minister, impressed by
their arguments, promised to assemble a Conference 'at no distant
date'[xxvi][26]. On 25 November a circular
dispatch was sent out to the self-governing colonies, inviting them
to take part in a conference set for the following year amid the
golden jubilee celebrations, with imperial defence
and imperial communications as the two main subjects to be
discussed.
Sir Henry Holland, who took over as Colonial Secretary
from Stanhope, asserted that 'all other matters must wait until the
safety of the Empire is secured'[xxvii][27], and The Times also
agreed that the defence of the
Australasian Colonies was a pressing issue that needed addressing:
'When
Sydney harbour is safe against sudden
attacks, when New Zealand is not at the mercy of a single hostile
ironclad, when each Colony is able to assist itself and its neighbours in an emergency... we shall pass on
with renewed confidence to the consideration of other questions. A few more similar efforts of
co-operation and we shall have got the substance, if not the form,
of Federation.'[xxviii][28]
The
1887 Colonial Conference
In his opening speech at the Conference, Lord
Salisbury emphasised to the delegates
that "the real and most important business upon which you will
be engaged" would be "the union for purposes of mutual defence".
Salisbury went on to criticise the
notion that the only risks of attack to which the Colonies were
liable were such as might arise from "imperial action and
policy", for 'there had taken place of recent years a great
growth in the naval power of European countries, and though these
countries might not be contemplating aggression, it was impossible
to ignore the fact that the "facilities" for such action
had been enormously increased by the development of steam and
electric communication'[xxix][29]. In his conclusion, Salisbury was
quick to dismiss any idea that "this proposal is a mere
contrivance on our part to lighten our burden, or that it results
from any indolence or selfishness of ours":
"What
we desire is that all parts of the Empire should be equally
prosperous, equally glorious; and for that we desire that all
should take their fair and legitimate part in a task of which all
ought to be proud."[xxx][30]
In turning to the
subjects for discussion, the President of the Conference Sir Henry
Holland, said that for his own part he would not consider the
Conference to have failed if it did "nothing more than place
military and naval defence on a sound
footing"[xxxi][31]. He then reviewed the developments
of the previous ten years, stating that "prior to 1878 little
had been done to modernise the external defences of the Empire", and the matter
was only seriously considered 'when apprehensions of war [with Russia]
awoke this country and the colonies to the unguarded state of
outlying parts of the Empire'[xxxii][32].
Holland highlighted the two most important
subjects under discussion as being "the local defence of ports and other Imperial coaling
stations", and the "desirability of strengthening the
fleet in Australian waters by the addition of a local force",
following on from the discussions with Admiral Tryon. The subject of naval defence came to occupy ten days out of the
twenty, and the majority of this time was taken up in trying to
establish a "basis" from which contributions from the
Colonies towards the Empire's common defence
could be procured.
From early on in the
conference, the Australian Colonies were marked out from the rest
of the Empire and the self-governing Colonies due to their own
efforts to fortify themselves.
It seemed that there was little knowledge in Britain
of these efforts as Edward Stanhope, now Secretary of War, stated:
'I had no
idea, and I do not believe that the people of this country had any
idea, of the very large sums of money that have been spent in the
Australian Colonies for the purposes of defence,
or of the thoroughly efficient manner in which they are endeavouring in so many cases to preserve
themselves against hostile attack.'[xxxiii][33]
However, rather than
being rewarded for their diligence, their efforts actually resulted
in more generous treatment being afforded to other Colonies. This was because whereas the
other Colonies had shown an unwillingness to pay towards defence costs, the Australian Colonies had been
willing to contribute financially, and therefore it was easier for
the British Government not to press the more reluctant
Colonies. For example, Halifax was the headquarters of the North
American Squadron, and as a result it was defended under the sole
charge of the British Government, however Sydney was the headquarters of
the Australasian Squadron but was defended at the sole charge of
the New South Wales Government.
Though both arguably constituted cases of imperial interest,
they were not treated as such, as the Australian Colonies had “recognised” the responsibility of defending
their own ports. Also, in
the case of Halifax, its relatively
close distance to Britain
made it more important from a home defence
point of view. It could
therefore be argued that though Halifax's
circumstances came under the pretext of imperial interest, the
major reason for its funding was because its defence
had a direct affect on Britain's,
whereas Australia,
situated on the other side of the world, did not. Their geographic isolation from Britain
and the major stations of the Royal Navy had prompted the
Australian Colonies to take their defence
into their own hands, and explains their desire for a larger,
permanent, Australasian fleet.
In regards to a
financial contribution to the Admiralty, there was disagreement
amongst the delegates as to what basis this should be divided
amongst the six Australian Colonies and New Zealand. The Royal Commission had not
defined this but suggested that 'speaking generally, it would seem
that each Colony should pay a sum proportioned to its commerce and
population'[xxxiv][34]. During the negotiations with
Admiral Tryon, a population basis was proposed but there was some
dispute as to whether or not this had been accepted. Sir Samuel Griffith, the Premier
of Queensland, favoured a system based on
the commerce of the individual Colonies and proposed that the
apportionment should be entrusted to the British Board of Trade,
which was agreed by most of the other Australasian delegates. However, Sir Saul Samuel of New South Wales objected as "the
commerce and trade of some of the other Colonies is not so large as that of New South Wales"[xxxv][35]. In the end, the population basis
was accepted, 'the relative similarity of economic conditions
throughout the Australasian Colonies reducing the force of the
objections which generally may be raised against this basis of
apportionment'[xxxvi][36]. With this agreed amongst the
Colonies, it left the question as to the basis of apportionment
between Australasia and Britain.
The British Government
were determined to secure a scheme which "would serve as a
basis and model for any future arrangement in the case of other
Colonies"[xxxvii][37], and were therefore willing to
compromise on the original proposal offered by Tryon. They were prepared to relieve the
Colonies of the additional cost that would be incurred in war, and
they agreed to accept the liability of replacing any vessels that
might be lost through accident.
It was then agreed that for five cruisers and two torpedo
boats, the Colonies would 'pay for maintenance a sum not exceeding
£91,000 per annum, and for depreciation a percentage of five
percent on the initial cost, which, with other incidental charges,
is estimated to amount to a further sum not exceeding £35,000 per
annum'[xxxviii][38]. The negotiations, in the words of
the British delegate Lord George Hamilton, had reached "a very
satisfactory conclusion'[xxxix][39].
Despite this, there was
disgruntlement amongst some of the Australasian delegates over the
fact that no recognized "basis" of contribution had been
agreed. Sir Henry Holland
responded to this in a paper of "remarks" on the opening
discussion, which was officially circulated before the session
closed:
‘There has
never been any attempt to find a financial basis, and the
arrangement cannot well be placed in this light... the present
proposals of the Admiralty were made with a view to meet the
Colonial requirements, as far as possible, without throwing a burden
on the taxpayers at home, which they would certainly resist. But what financial basis is
possible? In any such
calculation the home taxpayer would claim credit for a peace naval
expenditure already exceeding and average of £13,000,000 per annum,
and the total peace contribution now asked from the Australasian
Colonies, £122,597 per annum, would appear trifling in comparison.'[xl][40]
Holland then argued that
of the total Australasian commerce, nearly four-tenths was
inter-colonial, and over one-tenth was foreign, leaving only
one-half for trade in which Britain was interested, while the
amount of trade per head of population was in the Colonies nearly
double the British average[xli][41]:
“On all
accounts, therefore, it appeared to us to be desirable to make a
simple and definite offer to the Colonies, rather than seek for an
adjustment on a basis which would either be fallacious, or would
tend to arouse the susceptibilities of the heavily burdened
tax-payers at home. It may
be true, as has been stated, that the proposed arrangement rests on
no numerical basis, but, from what I have said, it will be evident
that the scheme cannot be regarded as illiberal, whether considered
in the light of relative interests or relative burdens.”[xlii][42]
Just as had been stated
in the earlier negotiations, the Colonies demanded that the ships
remain 'under the limits of the Australasian station'[xliii][43], and could be taken away
"only with the consent of the Colonial Governments"[xliv][44]. However, there seems to be some
confusion from both sides over this clause. In response, Lord George Hamilton
remarked:
"The
fact is that in war or any emergency, whatever arrangements are
made in time of peace are overruled. I think this provides for any
ordinary emergency."[xlv][45]
However, the Australians
seemed under the impression that the ships were to remain in
Australasian waters whatever the situation:
'The
Admiralty undertook that, as the fleet would be paid for by the
Australian Colonies, it would be devoted solely to their protection,
no matter what causes might arise in other parts of the empire that
might render its presence desirable.'[xlvi][46]
This side of the
agreement caused particular discontent with the British. Sir Henry Holland emphasised to the Australian delegates the
benefits that they derived from the navy generally and its
world-wide coaling stations, to which they contributed nothing, and
complained:
"The
whole question seemed to be handled as if Australasia
were in a ring-fence, and provided that the force maintained within
that fence was adequate, all the conditions of defence
were fulfilled."
British objections arose from the fact that
they were desperate to establish a precedent of Colonial
contributions towards naval costs.
However, as they found from the Sydney Conference of 1881,
and during the subsequent negotiations with Admiral Tryon, the
Australian Colonies would only agree to contribute financially if
the ships were 'retained within the limits of the Australian
seas'. The Admiralty were opposed to the principle of keeping any
ships permanently on a particular station, but they sacrificed this
objection in order to gain the acceptance of the Colonies and
establish the precedent they desired. Therefore the British could not
complain that the Australian Colonies were acting as if they were
in a "ring-fence", as that had always been the mentality
of the Colonies, and the British had accepted this.
One of the Cape
delegates, Mr J. H. Hofmeyr,
held the view that "so long as no system of federation or
government in which [the Colonies] are represented has been hit
upon or developed, so long they cannot be expected to be duty bound
to defend themselves against the European enemies of England"[xlvii][47]. However he saw a need in the
future for the Colonies to contribute towards the Empire's naval defence, and so proposed the following system:
"The
feasibility of promoting a closer union between the various parts
of the British Empire by means of
an Imperial Tariff or Customs to be levied, independently of the
duties payable under existing tariffs, on goods entering the Empire
from abroad, the revenue derived from such tariff to be devoted to
the general Defence of the Empire."[xlviii][48]
Because such a system would have required an
alteration of Britain's
Free Trade policy, Alfred Deakin of Victoria
pointed out that the question was "one really for the English
people, not for the Colonies"[xlix][49]. However Hofmeyr
at least tried to provide a system from which a "basis"
of contribution could be derived that was transferable across the
Empire. It also 'probably
had a bearing on the subsequent development of a policy for closer
union of the Empire in other directions'[l][50] such as future schemes offered
by Joseph Chamberlain.
Reaction
to the Naval Agreement
To most observers, the
Conference appeared a success and demonstrated a new level of
cooperation and unity between Britain and the Empire.
The naval agreement between Britain and the
Australian Colonies in particular represented the concrete
manifestation of this success:
'Though
the official reports of the meetings of the Colonial Conference are
confined to a formal record of the proceedings, it is no secret
that the Conference has so far proved a conspicuous success and has
already achieved substantial results.
... The
Colonies have been invited to join the Mother Country in a species
of naval partnership, and they have readily responded to the
invitation.'[li][51]
As well as being lauded as an example of
imperial cooperation, the naval agreement was also seen as a
practical success that would 'make a substantial addition to the
effective strength of the fleet'[lii][52]. Sir Henry Holland stated
"the mere knowledge" of the squadron's presence
"will definitely reduce the risks of attempted aggression in
Australasian waters"[liii][53].
In the Australasian
Naval and Military Gazette, it was reported that the
developments of the Conference had captured the interest and
endorsement from people across England,
not just the politicians and journalists in London:
'the holding of such a conference was the natural
outcome of the great change that had taken place in English opinion
with regard to the colonies.
Wherever they went in England now they found
the greatest possible interest taken in colonial affairs. They no longer heard advocated a
policy of indifference in regard to the colonies, and no one was
heard to talk with any degree of complacency about their possible
separation from the mother country.
As far as he was able to gather, the feeling seemed
universal to all that was possible to strengthen the ties which
band the two together.
... This
partnership between the Imperial Government and the colonies showed
to the whole world that the mother country and her possessions were
so thoroughly united that they could come to an understanding to
work together in a common way for a common object.'[liv][54]
However, behind the
public facade, the Conference was not as united or harmonious as
the politicians made out.
For example, in the case of the New Hebrides, Alfred Deakin, fearing that Britain
would cede the islands to France, desired a more
vigorous imperial policy to protect Australian interests there[lv][55]. In response, Salisbury
wrote a private letter to Holland,
where he declared the Australians:
'the most unreasonable people I have ever heard
or dreamt of. They want us
to incur all the bloodshed and the danger, and the stupendous cost
of a war with France, of which almost the exclusive burden will
fall on us, for a group of islands which to us are as useless as
the South Pole - and to which they are only attached by a
debating-club sentiment.'[lvi][56]
Salisbury’s comments
show that despite any positive agreements achieved through the
Conference for the benefit and development of mutual interests,
there still existed a 'them and us' mentality amongst
politicians. Each delegate
at the Conference was concerned with local questions, and looked at
the way problems affected their particular colony rather than the
Empire as a whole. This
explains the mentality of the Australian delegates in their
insistence that the fleet remained in Australasian waters. Denis Judd also argues that the
desire to contribute sprang from 'self-interest rather than of
imperial patriotism':
'The
Australasian colonies were sparsely populated European settlements
on the fringe of the Asian land-mass, and were conscious of their
isolation. The rising power
of Japan, and
the threatening presence of Russia
in the Far East, heightened the
sense of isolation and insecurity.
There is no doubt that the colonies were buying a measure of
security with their annual payments to the Royal Navy's upkeep.'[lvii][57]
In a letter to The
Times dated July 21st, Lord Brassey
contended that 'valuable as the reinforcement would be... it can scarcely
be accepted as an adequate provision for the protection of the vast
British interests which have been created in this distant quarter
of the globe', therefore 'additional ships should be provided by a
judicious redistribution of ships on foreign stations'. He argued that Australia's
'growth of population and trade has not been followed by a
proportionate strengthening of our Navy in these waters', and he
too referred to the significance of Russia, where 'the recent
additions to the Russian fleet in the Pacific have naturally
created a feeling of anxiety in Australia', citing a recent
comparison of both fleets in the Melbourne Argus which
"is by no means pleasant reading". He stated that it had become the
'clear duty' of the British to strengthen the fleet, but also 'in a
political point of view the presence of a larger force on the
Australian station may be urged as a means of strengthening the
hands of those who desire to preserve the connexion
with the mother country'[lviii][58].
Brassey,
though he had recently moved to Australia, was
concerned with ‘British interests’, and as such was not motivated
by the same concerns for ‘local interests’ as Australian
politicians. Instead he
urged the strengthening of the fleet so as ‘to preserve the connexion with the mother country'. He was concerned with this for,
in Australia at
the time, there were people who believed that a severance with Britain
was becoming increasingly likely.
This was mooted in an article in the Brisbane Courier
of July 26, which explained the reasons why severance might occur:
'Our
differences with the Home Government in recent years have been due
to what in our opinion, was a vacillation and hesitation. A good instance is seen in the
way in which part of New Guinea was allowed
to fall into German hands... The Australian communities, which have
to be passive, though deeply interested, spectators of the conduct
of Imperial affairs, are by no means persuaded that those affairs
have been wisely managed... It appears to us that much of the
irresolution displayed has been due to the pressure of the domestic
policy of Great
Britain on her Government.'
The article then cites Gladstone's Irish Home Rule
policy, which 'infinitely increased' the 'prospect of the danger'
of severance, as 'if he succeeds - as he probably will - the whole
nature of the Parliament which selects and controls the rulers of
the Empire will be changed.':
'It will
become in reality a federal Assembly, wrapt
up for years to come in the most difficult task of adjusting relations
between Ireland and Great Britain... How will such a Parliament
control the affairs of the Empire?... the probabilities certainly
are that Imperial affairs - that is to say, affairs which concern
us - will be far worse managed in the future than they have been in
the past... it is at least possible that the affairs of the Empire
may be so mismanaged… that we Australians may come to look to
severance as the lesser of two evils.'[lix][59]
As a result, the article
questioned whether instead of paying contributions to the British
navy, it would be wiser for the Australian Colonies to build their
own Australian fleet for home defence.
For in the case that "separation", though 'very unpopular
among the colonists', should be forced upon them, it would be vital
to possess their own fleet built, paid for, and manned by
Australians. Immediately
after the Conference, it had been written in the Australian
Naval and Military Gazette that 'some people would have
preferred a federal fleet, rather than the plan agreed upon', yet
this was dismissed as 'a federal fleet would in the course of ten
years have become altogether obsolete, and under the plan adopted
we should be constantly getting changes in officers and men'[lx][60].
Nicholas Lambert has
argued that in fact 'rather than strengthen the ties between the
colonies and the Mother Country, the 1887 Australian Naval
Agreement achieved exactly the opposite'[lxi][61]. In fact a fraught
relationship developed between the Admiralty and Colonial
politicians. There was clear disagreement between both parties as
to whom the ships actually belonged. In Australia they were
increasingly being regarded as 'our ships' and thus Australian
politicians came to place a growing number of demands upon the
Admiralty, such as requesting the squadron visit their cities and
calling for Australians to serve aboard the cruisers. One
demand that the Australian
colonies persistently made which Lambert cites, is that upon
reaching Australia the squadron should 'enter Sydney in review
order and then proceed to visit each state capital in turn',
ignoring the Admiralty's explanations that 'after steaming 12,000
miles the ships would not be in a fit state and thus would not
create a good impression'[lxii][62]. This led the Senior Naval
Lord on 18 June 1891 to comment that:
'It is
to be hoped that the Australian's demands will have some finality.
It appears the Admiralty after all the trouble have
not satisfied the colonies and they are not satisfied themselves –
with the arrangements – no one is pleased.'[lxiii][63]
In certain quarters the
opinion also grew that the Australian colonies could and should
contribute more than had been originally agreed. In a letter to The Times
dated 24 August 1894, Francis de Labilliere,
an Australian lawyer and one of the founders of the Imperial
Federation League, stated that the 'short-comings of the colonies
in not supporting the British Navy are glaringly set forth':
'The Navy,
employed a | 