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John Prados and
Ray W. Stubbe, Valley of Decision: The Siege of Khe
Sanh, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press,
2004. 576pp.
Reviewed
by Dr. Nikolas Gardner
University of Salford
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This is the first soft
cover edition of Prados and Stubbe’s poignant and authoritative study of Khe Sanh, originally
published in 1991. Although the authors have added no new material to
this edition, the book certainly deserves the wider audience that it
will reach in paperback. Valley of Decision is the product of
two scholars examining the same topic from different vantage points. Stubbe, the Lutheran chaplain of the 1st
Battalion, 26th Marines, collected the records and
reminiscences of soldiers and Marines who fought at Khe Sanh, while Prados drew upon archival material to illuminate
the operational, strategic and political backdrop to the siege. The
result is a study that provides numerous insights into the aims and
conduct of US operations as well as the experiences of the many
individuals who participated in them.
The book recounts events
from the arrival of the first Special Forces detachment at Khe Sanh in July 1962 until
the decision to abandon the American base there in June 1968. It
focuses in particular on the period from late 1967 until the spring
of 1968, as North Vietnamese pressure progressively intensified into
an outright siege of Khe Sanh. The bulk of the narrative is constructed
around the personal accounts of ordinary soldiers and Marines who
participated. These accounts are a goldmine of information on the
Vietnam War at the tactical level. While the reminiscences of
individuals seldom shed significant light on the higher conduct of
the war, they effectively portray the anxiety that pervaded
operations for American troops around Khe Sanh, as routine patrols could erupt suddenly
into violent clashes with elusive enemy forces that remained largely
unseen. Anxiety often became
terror as the siege intensified and troops faced heavy North
Vietnamese artillery bombardments as well as the awesome spectacle of
US
airpower wreaking havoc on enemy units in close proximity to American
positions. While in many ways the book is a testament to those who
fought at Khe Sanh,
it is also a valuable source of information on the experience of the
Vietnam War for ordinary soldiers and Marines.
Rather than simply
providing an oral history of Khe Sanh, however, Valley of Decision
also includes careful analysis of the motives of each side. While acknowledging the lack of
concrete evidence regarding North Vietnamese intentions, Prados and Stubbe
contend that the communists did not see Khe
Sanh as a decisive confrontation modeled after
their defeat of French forces at Dien Bien Phu
in 1954. Instead, they argue, it was William Westmoreland who
remained fixated on Dien
Bien Phu. The American
commander hoped to create the conditions for a similarly climactic
battle at Khe Sanh,
using superior American firepower to exact a crippling defeat on the
North Vietnamese Army. Ultimately, US forces inflicted heavy
casualties on enemy forces during the siege, but the extent to which
this thwarted Hanoi’s
strategic and political objectives in 1968 was limited. According to Prados and Stubbe, Khe Sanh was not the
real prize for the communists. In their words: “Khe
Sanh was Westmoreland’s battle. Tet was Hanoi’s.”
(p.455.)
Beyond
explaining a particular episode of the Vietnam War, Valley of Decision
also addresses themes that remain resonant decades after the end
of the conflict. The near obsession of Westmoreland and other
American decision makers with Dien Bien Phu
raises questions about how and why leaders use certain historical
analogies to inform their decisions. In discussing the use of
American airpower at Khe Sanh, Prados and Stubbe’s study also highlights the bureaucratic
and cultural barriers that can undermine inter-service cooperation.
Moreover, the book provides a case study relevant to US and allied
armies in Iraq and
Afghanistan today,
as it illustrates the problems facing American forces in Vietnam
as they struggled to maintain effective relationships with indigenous
groups who were often suspicious of one another and compromised by enemy
infiltration. Overall, Valley
of Decision
is not a light read. Indeed, it is sometimes easy to lose the
thread of the narrative amid the detailed descriptions of individual
engagements. Nonetheless, Prados and Stubbe’s work is unsurpassed as a study of Khe Sanh, and it will
provide the careful reader with numerous insights into the nature of
the Vietnam War as well as some of the enduring problems of modern
warfare.
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