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HMS *Suva*, Captain W.H.D. Boyle and the Red Sea Patrol 1916-1918: The Strategic Effects of an Auxiliary Cruiser upon the Arab Revolt


Dr Gregory P. Gilbert
RAN Sea Power Centre, Canberra

The Auxiliary Cruiser, HMS *Suva*

The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918 briefly mentions the war service of the auxiliary cruiser, HMS *Suva* where 'she played a not inconsiderable part in supporting the Arab Revolt'.¹

SS *Suva*, a 2229 ton passenger-cargo steamer, was built by Workman, Clark and Co. Ltd of Belfast in 1906 for the Australasian United Steam Navigation (AUSN) Co. Ltd.

Although built for the passenger/cargo service (the banana boat run) between Fiji and Sydney, Australia, she was also employed in the Queensland coastal trade. By early 1915 it became clear to the Admiralty that the Great War was going to be a long hard struggle and that British naval commitments required many more auxiliary vessels in addition to the available purpose-built warships. Hence, *Suva* was requisitioned by the Royal Navy in July 1915 and converted to an auxiliary cruiser at Garden Island, Sydney.



HMS *Suva*

Auxiliary Cruiser

Armament: three 4.7-inch guns (for war service 1915-1919)

Tonnage: 2229 tons (gross), 1159 tons (net)

Length: 300 feet 3 inches
 Breadth: 41 feet 1 inch
 Depth: 11 feet 8 inches (registered)
 Machinery: Triple expansion 3 cylinder, 414 horse power
 Speed: 14 knots (maximum at build)
 11 knots (cruising) with 25 tons of coal/hour
 Bunker: 700 tons capacity
 Built: Workman, Clark & Co. Ltd, Belfast, 1906

Suva's Service:

AUSN - April 1906 to July 1915
 Royal Navy - 19 July 1915 to June 1919²
 Royal Australian Navy - 23 June to 12 August 1919
 AUSN - August 1919 to 1928
 Renamed *Sirius* by Madrigal & Co. Manila 1928 to 1935?
 Renamed *Bohol* by Cia Maritima, Manila 1935? to 1947
 Deleted from Lloyds Register in 1947, but reportedly sunk by
 Japanese aircraft at Manila in December 1941

Armed with several 4.7-inch guns and carrying seaboats for armed boarding parties, HMS *Suva* was to be used for constabulary duties in the Red Sea. The main task was to prevent gun-running between Red Sea ports. However, upon her arrival in Aden, she was deemed unsuitable for such action and she was sent back to Colombo. But the need for patrol vessels only increased, so with a refit at Bombay and with British naval ratings replacing the Australian crew, *Suva* returned to Aden in December 1915. Now ready for operations in a war zone, *Suva* was to serve for almost three years in the Red Sea. A chronology of the wartime service of *Suva*, along with other principal events, may be found at Appendix A.³

Suva was an important element of the Red Sea Patrol under the command of Captain W.H.D. Boyle, RN.⁴ Between March 1916 and December 1918, *Suva*

1. bombarded seven Turkish garrison towns,
- 2 .helped occupy three towns with her naval landing forces,
3. transported troops at least nine times,
4. conducted four dhow interdiction operations, and
- 5 .survived two ship groundings and two ship fires.

Although seemingly in action almost constantly, the majority of *Suva*'s actions were more demonstrations than warfighting. For example, the operations against Qunfundah, south of Jiddah, during July and August 1916 involved the ship firing single rounds and shining the searchlight over the town at night. In addition, *Suva*'s officers visiting the important people of the town and Arab officials were invited to view firepower displays while on board the ship, (see extracts from the HMS *Suva* ship's log at Appendix B). Although, such low-spectrum warfighting activities have not received much attention from the battle-centric naval historians of the past, they are illustrative of how non-lethal methods

may be used to gain desired political results. They also provide insight into the difficulty of assessing the exact effects of such political operations. While some of the Arab population at Qunfundah sided with the Arab forces against the Turks, the majority remained essentially uncommitted, siding with the strongest power in their vicinity - either British or Turkish. By late 1916, it was clear to the coastal Arabs that British naval forces of the Red Sea Patrol predominated in the Red Sea littorals, at sea and ashore, and hence they did not openly oppose British influence in the region.

Suva also provided transport and communications to the military staff of the Arab Bureau, who helped precipitate the Arab Revolt in the Hejaz. Even the famous Lieutenant T.E. Lawrence was welcomed onboard *Suva* in early November 1916, following discussions with Prince Faisal ibn Hussein.⁵ *Suva* provided an essential service transporting political officers, armaments, supplies and gold in support of the Arab Revolt, but it performed invaluable duty by its presence. The political will and military power of the British people in support of the Arab Revolt was frequently demonstrated by the Red Sea Patrol. This ranged from demonstration firings of Maxim guns to the protection of the 'Holy Carpet' on its annual journey from Cairo to Jiddah.⁶

The ship returned to Australia in 1919 and was recommissioned as HMAS *Suva* for Admiral Jellicoe's eventful inspection of Australia and New Guinea. In December 1919 she was returned to her owners, the AUSN, where she operated in Australian coastal waters until 1928. The ship's demise came, under a new name the *Bohol*, when it was sunk by the Japanese aircraft at Manilla in December 1942.

Today, after more than 60 years of warship construction driven by high-end warfighting requirements, it is opportune to reconsider the careers of low-end vessels such as HMS *Suva*.⁷ The need for large numbers of ships capable of fighting at the lower end of the conflict spectrum, and with the flexibility to perform wide ranging diplomatic and constabulary tasks, similar to the auxiliary cruisers of the World War I (WWI), has been highlighted in recent years. Perhaps the need for modern 'auxiliary cruisers' follows from our current unipolar naval system, where political effects are often as important, if not more important, as warfighting capabilities.⁸

Captain William Boyle and the Political Naval Officer

The career of Captain William Boyle, later Admiral of the Fleet and Earl of Cork and Orrery, is one of a consummate political naval officer. His autobiography is replete with examples of how 'good fortune' helped his career. 'My good fortune has been great, for I have spent my life in doing work which at the same time was my hobby.'⁹ But when his biography is examined, there is clearly an underlying pattern to the Admiralty's decisions that impacted on his career. Although it may have appeared somewhat haphazard to Boyle, the Admiralty purposely developed certain naval officers for the political and constabulary roles.

From an early age, William Boyle was treated as one of the select few of the British aristocracy who could be groomed by the Royal Navy for senior political appointments. His early service emphasised the basic sea duties of the times, including pulling and sailing boat experience, but also included extensive experience overseas where Boyle began to understand other cultures. Before being promoted to Commander, Boyle spent nine years in the Pacific, either with the China squadron or with the Australia squadron. As a junior officer in the Pacific his responsibilities were generally much broader than those of his peers in Britain, and as a result he developed leadership and negotiation skills of a high order. Boyle's anecdote describing the King of Samoa's visit to HMS *Lizard* in 1897, is one of many examples that illustrate this point. The *Lizard*'s crew fired a 21 gun Royal Salute, after the departure of the Samoan King, but unfortunately some of the King's Court lingered too much and fouled the range for the salute. Despite injuring a number of the ministers with slow-burning powder, Boyle was able to avoid a diplomatic incident. Indeed, Boyle suggests in his understated manner that the Samoan King 'was delighted, the incident put him into a good temper and a great diplomatic success resulted'.¹⁰ During 1913, Boyle was appointed as the Naval Attaché in Rome, a position he held until late September 1915. During the early part of WWI, Boyle's political skills were clearly of more value to the Admiralty than his warfighting skills. When he managed to use his political influence to become unofficially attached to Rear Admiral Rosslyn E. Wemyss' staff during the Gallipoli Campaign, the Admiralty sent a signal message, 'Captain Boyle is to return to his post in Rome', and Boyle arrived back in Rome just prior to the Italian declaration of war against Austria on 23 May 1915.¹¹

But Boyle was determined to leave his comparative idleness in Rome, and again using political influence; in September 1915 he was given command of the second class cruiser HMS *Fox*, which was stationed in the Red Sea. When Admiral Wemyss assumed command of the station, he amalgamated what was previously the Northern and Southern Patrols into a single Red Sea Patrol squadron, under the command of Captain William Boyle.¹² This appointment was one of the right man at the right time and in the right place. Between January 1916 and November 1917, Captain Boyle conducted one of the most influential maritime campaigns of WWI. His operations helped generate the Arab Revolt in the Hejaz, and then helped sustain the Arab Revolt until the time when the main Turkish threat to the Red Sea area had been removed by the advances of a large British Army under General Edmund Allenby into Palestine. Boyle's diplomatic experience helped him to use the Red Sea Patrol to influence events ashore with the minimum use of force. The effects achieved were in line with those desired by Admiral Wemyss and the other commanders responsible for military and naval operations in the Middle East at the strategic level, that is;

1. security of Egypt, the Suez Canal and the Red Sea,
2. projection of maritime power in the Red Sea littoral in support of the Arab Revolt, as a means to wear down Turkish military forces, and
3. promotion of Britain's image as a friend of the Islamic peoples, both within and outside the British Empire.

Unfortunately, the longer term political effects of the policy to support the Arab Revolt, and the consequent division of the Ottoman Empire, were not foreseen by these commanders, or if they did predict the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire they placed greater importance on 'winning the war' than 'winning the peace'. This should not be taken as a criticism of Admiral Wemyss and his colleagues, but rather as a warning regarding human decision-making processes and our inability to predict the full consequences of specific human actions.

Of course, Captain Boyle's career did not end in 1917. He was fortunate, and some would say well-connected enough, to hold a number of senior commands and diplomatic appointments during the interwar years. At the height of the Great Depression he was retained as President of the Royal Naval College at Greenwich. He was promoted Admiral and appointed Commander in Chief of the Home Fleet in 1933-1935. He also inherited the title Earl of Cork and Orrery from his cousin, and after departing the Home Fleet took his place in the House of Lords. Promoted to Admiral of the Fleet before World War II, Boyle, now known as Admiral Lord Cork, commanded the Combined Expedition to Norway in early 1940, and in many ways was made a scape-goat for mistakes made by the Admiralty and the then First Lord, Winston Churchill.¹³ After the event, Admiral Lord Cork held discussions with the First Lord of the Admiralty and the First Sea Lord, and he later suggested 'the position in Norway had never been really understood, but [I] did not think this surprising under the circumstances.'¹⁴ Such is the typically subtle and understated rebuke of this political naval officer.

The Red Sea Patrol and its Effects

In early 1916, the Red Sea Patrol consisted of two old cruisers, four Royal Indian Marine ships, two sloops, six armed boarding steamers, an armed tug and a launch.¹⁵ With this small fleet, Boyle not only protected the sea communications through the Red Sea and maintained an open blockade of the Turkish Red Sea coast; he was able to decisively project maritime power ashore in the Red Sea littoral. During the early part of 1916, the Red Sea Patrol was utilised for the transportation of arms, munitions, provisions and money from Suez and Port Sudan to the Arabian coast, and to carry secret agents back and forth. These tasks brought Boyle's diplomatic and constabulary experience to the fore.¹⁶

The first action occurred on 21 March 1916, when *Fox* and *Suva* destroyed the Turkish forts at Umlejh and Wejh in the Hejaz district. 'Turkish truculence on the coast ceased.'¹⁷ During the next few months, the presence of Boyle's Red Sea Patrol was a symbol of the Royal Navy's ability to project power in the Red Sea littoral. They were a significant factor underpinning the negotiations in Cairo and onboard vessels of the Patrol, which led to the Sharif of Mecca, Hussein ibn Ali's decision to lead the Arabs in Revolt against the Turks in the Hejaz.¹⁸ Sharif Hussein's negotiations with Sir Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner in Egypt, led to an understanding on the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire after the war, which still remains contentious in the Arab World today.

On 6 June 1916 Sharif Hussein's irregular Arab forces attacked the Turkish garrisons at Mecca, Ta'if and Medina, but without artillery they made little headway. The situation at Jiddah on the Red Sea coast was different. Ships of the Red Sea Patrol, under Boyle, anchored off Jiddah and commenced an intermittent bombardment of the Turkish positions. After five days, the Red Sea Patrol off Jiddah was joined by the seaplane carrier *Ben-my-Chree*, and her planes joined in the bombardment.¹⁹ Despite poor coordination with the irregular Arab forces, Jiddah fell on 9 June 1916. Some 1500 Turkish troops and 16 guns surrendered to the Arab forces. The capture of Jiddah was essential to the success of the Arab Revolt. It was through this seaport that British supplies were sent to the interior, unrestricted communications with Cairo (Egypt) and Suakin (Sudan) were opened, a leavening of Egyptian officers was dispatched to join the irregular Arab forces, and an artillery unit of the Egyptian Army was sent to support the Arab attack on Mecca. The victory at Jiddah was a significant morale boost for the Arab forces that captured Mecca on 10 June.

The campaign now turned the Asir region, south of Lith, and its principal port of Qunfundah. The inland area was ruled by Seyyid Mohamed of the Idrissi family, but the coastal towns remained largely independent under Turkish rule. Seyyid Mohamed, although openly favourable to the British, was both suspicious and jealous of Sharif Hussein and hence was inclined to 'sit on the fence' rather than join Hussein's Arab Revolt. The Red Sea Patrol was ordered to seize Qunfundah on behalf of the Idrissi, to ensure their support, and subsequently after a short bombardment on 8 July, the Turkish garrison of the town surrendered. The attacking force included the *Fox*, *Suva*, *Minto* and *Enterprise*. The Idrissi flag was hoisted, but the inhabitants were frightened that Bedouin would loot their town before the Idrissi Arabs arrived, so a small landing party from *Fox* were landed to temporarily garrison the place. *Suva*'s ship log (Appendix B) shows that after several weeks the inhabitants of Qunfundah still did not welcome the loss of their relative independence under the Turks and being used as a gift for the Idrissi. However, such was the will of the British and that will was demonstrated by the Red Sea Patrol's ability to project power ashore. The coastal cities of Yembo and Rabugh were captured with the assistance of the Red Sea Patrol, while the Arab forces accepted the surrender of the Turkish garrison at Ta'if on 22 September 1916. Thus control of the country south of Medina passed into Arab hands.²⁰

After their initial victories, British efforts were centred upon the creation and maintenance of a strong Arab military force. The irregular Arab forces were reinforced with Arab troops recruited from Turkish prisoners in Egypt and the Sudan. Specialist troops from the Egyptian and Sudanese Armies, and a scattering of British political officers from the Arab Bureau in Cairo were shipped to the Hejaz.²¹ Lieutenant Colonel C E. Wilson, the Governor of the Sudan Red Sea province, took up his quarters in Jiddah. In addition to the troop movements, ships of the Red Sea Patrol transported water, provisions, guns, munitions, uniforms, saddlery, and forage for horses and camels. They also transported large amounts of gold to essentially bank-roll the revolt.

During October 1916, Turkish forces under Fakri Pasha advanced against the Arab forces and pushed Prince Ali back to Rabugh and his brother Prince Feisal back to Yembo.

Consideration was given to sending a British Army brigade to defend Rabugh, but was ultimately rejected, largely due to the sensitivities of landing a large body of British troops in what was Islamic Holy territory.²² Once again, the Red Sea Patrol and Egyptian troops, held back the Turks. A flight of planes from the Royal Flying Corps helped to defend Rabugh, while aircraft from the seaplane carrier *Anne* assisted in the defence of Yembo. In addition, Prince Abdullah, another of Sharif Hussein's sons, led a successful raid on the Hejaz railway, which alarmed Fakri Pasha sufficiently to convince him to withdraw the Turkish forces back towards Medina to protect his overland communications. The importance of the naval forces in defending the Arab forces, at this critical time, should not be overlooked, for it was clearly the Royal Navy's ability to protect the Red Sea littoral that kept the Arab Revolt alive.

The role of the Red Sea Patrol remained politically sensitive. In late 1916, Captain Boyle's ships were used to convey the Holy Carpet (presented annually from Cairo to Mecca) with its escort from Suez to Jiddah. In 1916, the Turks had vowed that then would get their own Holy Carpet to Mecca from Medina first. But the Turkish effort was stillborn. 'The attention paid to this religious festival gave much gratification, and the whole pilgrimage passed off most satisfactorily.'²³

Working with the irregular Arab forces was not easy, and at times the British found that their Allies were more dangerous than the Turks. T.E. Lawrence describes one such incident.

'There was a fight three days ago between 300 Ageyl and 400 Hadheyel over a question of camels. About 1000 rounds were fired, and two men were killed and six wounded. The fight was checked by Feisal himself, who went out bare-headed and bare-footed, as he happened to be and made peace at once. Some bullets struck the Monitor (M.31) in the harbour, and narrowly missed wounding or killing some of her crew. Sharif Feisal came off, when the matter was pointed out to him by Captain Boyle, and expressed his regret.'²⁴

A manoeuvre to the northern coastal town of Wejh followed. A squadron consisting of the *Fox*, *Suva*, *Anne*, *Espiegle* (sloop), and the *Hardinge* (loaded with Arab troops), were used to occupy Wejh on 24 January 1917, after most of the Turkish garrison had fled during the night. The occupation of Wejh paralysed the Turks at Medina by its threat to the Hejaz railway, but it also allowed Prince Feisal to get in touch with the northern Arabs and encourage them to join the rebellion. This formed part of the newly developed British strategy to encourage the Arab Revolt to expand outside the Hejaz and into Syria, which is indeed what happened from late 1917 until the end of the war. The Arab forces would then contribute towards the efforts of General Allenby who, during late 1917, was advancing across the Sinai towards Palestine and Syria. But for the Arab Revolt to move into Syria, it was first necessary to seize the port city of Akaba, (located in the north at the head of the gulf of Akaba). On 19 April 1917, three warships raided Akaba and naval landing parties demolished mine-laying facilities. Following this raid, Admiral Wemyss planned for a combined attack to capture Akaba, using Prince Feisal's Arab troops marching overland, supported by Huweitat irregulars, acting with Arab troops embarked

on RN ships landing from the sea. After a series of sharp actions, Feisal's troops, with T.E. Lawrence, entered the abandoned port of Akaba on 6 July 1917. Apparently Feisal had jumped the gun, as the British had planned the combined land and sea assault at Akaba for 15 July. In order to gain reinforcements before a Turkish counter-attack Lawrence set out across the Sinai to alert the British command of Akaba's capture and in response *Dufferin* arrived on the 13 July with food and supplies.²⁵

The capture of Akaba secured the northern Red Sea, and Boyle's ships had little to do in the north beyond carrying stores. The Arab Revolt lost 'its amphibious character, and developed into land warfare pure and simple.'²⁶ But the Red Sea Patrol was still in high demand, as operations in the Southern Red Sea were now given priority. It is not possible to examine the southern operations of 1917 and 1918 in this paper, although there were many more examples of the utility of this credible naval force in the Red Sea.²⁷

One of the difficulties with operations in the Red Sea littoral was the need to defeat the Turkish troops without occupying the Islamic Holy Lands and without harming the local Arab population. The British remained politically sensitive to the Arab desires and avoided actions that might inflame Islamic communities across the world. With 100 million Muslims in the British Empire, 20 million under French rule and 20 million within the Russian Empire, the Allied commanders were cautious not to act in any manner that would incite rebellion by their Muslim subjects. Despite a call for Islamic holy war by the Turkish Sultan, the Sheik el-Islam, in November 1914, the Muslim communities by and large remained loyal to their respective empires, and many contributed troops and material that helped the Allies gain victory in 1918.²⁸

Lessons Learnt from a Side-Show

Although the Red Sea Patrol, which included HMS *Suva*, operated in a theatre that has frequently been called a side-show, there are a number of lessons that can be learnt from her experiences. Between 1916-1918 the British were able to project power ashore in the Red Sea physically and culturally with surprising flexibility and economy of effort. Even the auxiliary cruiser, *Suva*, contributed significantly to influence events ashore, and it did so using minimal force. Having gained sea control in the Red Sea littorals, a good political naval officer, such as Captain Boyle, was able to achieve effects that far exceeded the material effort involved. It was more effective to 'fire a Lawrence of Arabia' than to indiscriminately destroy parts of the Red Sea littoral with lethal force. Using modern terminology, the Red Sea Patrol was used to support information operations, with the desired outcomes achieved using non-lethal means. Non-kinetic targeting was the preferred option during the Arab Revolt.

Sea power not only supported the Arab Revolt with gold, arms and supplies, but the very presence of Royal Navy ships helped sustain the political will of those leading the Arab Revolt against the Turks. In many ways the effects of Boyle's Red Sea Squadron exceeded the expectations of those responsible for the strategic direction of the war. The subsequent disintegration of the Ottoman Empire was not necessarily foreseen by the military strategists at the time. The Foreign Office was probably wary of the influence

that military and naval victories would have on the post-war political environment, but they were not able to prevent decisions taken to gain military advantage in the war. The decisions made in 1916, reinforced by the efforts of the Red Sea Patrol, have had a resonating effect on the modern world far beyond what anyone could have imagined.²⁹

Acknowledgements

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Picture Credits

*The image of HMS Suva is from the Imperial War Museum UK, SP2072.
<http://www.telstudies.org.uk/telstudies.org.uk/legacy1/gallery/photos/1914-18/r107.htm>*

Appendix A: Chronology of HMS *Suva*'s War Service 1915-1918

(Related principal events are in bold.)³⁰

1914

- 29 October - Ottoman Empire enters war against Russia, France and Britain.
1-8 November - British bombardment of Akaba.
14 November - Turkish Sultan declares Islamic holy war against Britain, France, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro.

1915

- 3-11 February - Turkish attack on the Suez Canal defeated.
19 July - HMS *Suva* requisitioned by the Admiralty at Brisbane, Australia.
Aug/Sep - On transit to Aden via Colombo with Australian crew, but the ship was considered unsuitable and ordered to return to Colombo.
Oct/Nov - Refitting at Bombay. British naval officers and ratings replace the Australian merchant marine crew.
December - Steams via Aden to Suez.

1916

- 5 January - Commenced first patrol in northern Red Sea.
From 1916 until 1918 *Suva* operates with the Red Sea Patrol using Suez and Port Sudan as bases.
21 March - Bombardment of Wejh Fort.
5-6 April - Operations at Akaba.
19-20 May - Seizure of Dhow off Lith.

- 5 June**
- Sharif of Mecca, Hussein, enters into an alliance with the British and French. He begins the Arab Revolt against the Turks.
- 9-10 June**
- 8 July
 - 28 & 30 July
 - 1-3 August
 - 22 August
 - September
- Jiddah and Mecca captured by Arab forces.
 - Bombardment of Qunfundah and prisoners taken.
 - Bombardment of Qunfundah.
 - Maxim parties ashore at Qunfundah.
 - Fire in cold storage room put out.
 - Seizure of Dhows.
- 22 September**
- 5 October
 - 17 October
 - 1-4 November
 - 10-11 November
 - 22-24 December
- Ta'if captured by Arab forces.
 - Seizure of Dhow off Berbera.
 - Captain W.H.D. Boyle, RN takes command of *Suva*.
 - Patrol from Rabugh, via Yembo to Jiddah, including Commander in Chief's inspection and passage by T.E. Lawrence.
 - Transported troops from Port Sudan to Rabugh.
 - Transported Egyptian troops from Yembo to Rabugh.
- 1917**
- 10-11 January
 - 20 January
 - 24-25 January
 - 31 January
 - February to May
 - June/July
 - June
 - June
- Transported Arab troops from Yembo to Umm Lejh.
 - Captain Boyle transfers command and leaves *Suva*.
 - Occupation of Wejh.
 - Departs Aden for Bombay.
 - Refitting at Colombo.
 - Returns to Red Sea Patrol, operating in southern area.
 - Occupation of Salif.
 - Bombardment of Hodeida.
- 6 July**
- 2-8 September
 - 19-22 September
 - 22-26 September
 - 27-29 September
 - 30 September
 - 1 October
- Akaba captured by Arab forces.
 - Captain Boyle embarked from Port Sudan to Suez.
 - Transported troops from Suez to Akaba.
 - Transported Arab troops from Akaba to Jiddah.
 - Ship grounded on shoal off Jiddah and refloated.
 - Transported troops from Port Sudan to Jiddah.
- 27-31 October**
- Palestine.**
- 27-28 October
 - 30-31 October
 - 2-5 November
 - 8-26 November
 - 30 November
 - 2-3 December
- General Allenby defeats Turks at Gaza and Beersheba,
 - Took HMS *Pyramus* in tow.
 - Transported Arab troops from Yembo to Jiddah.
 - Transported Arab troops from Yembo to Akaba.
 - Refitting at Suez.
 - Depart with troops from Suez.
 - Disembark Egyptian troops at Wejh and French troops at Yembo.
- 1918**
- January-March
 - 19 January
 - 10 February
- On Perim Patrol.
 - Fire in bunker extinguished.
 - Perim bombardment and dhow actions.

April/May	- Refitting at Colombo.
4 June	- Arrived at Aden, again with Red Sea Patrol.
12-13 June	- Bombardment of Loheiya.
17-20 June	- Bombardment of Loheiya.
20-21 August	- SS <i>Cardian</i> in tow.
14 September	- Bombardment of Qunfundah.
19 September	- Bombardment of Loheiya.
23 September	- Ship grounded off Kamaran.
October/November	- On Perim patrol.
11 November	- Armistice day.
13-20 December	- Bombardment of Hodeida. (because the garrison refuses to acknowledge the armistice).

Appendix B: Summary of HMS *Suva* Ship's Log Qunfundah Operations - 8 July, & 28 July to 3 August 1916

8 July 1916	The Surrender of Qunfundah
0000-0015	Searchlight shown on town and trenches.
0200-0215	Searchlight shown on town and trenches.
0400-0415	Searchlight shown on town and trenches.
0945	Action Stations.
1011	Warning gun fired by HMS <i>Fox</i> [a second class cruiser].
1014	Commenced bombardment of town.
1040	Ceased firing.
1049	HMS <i>Fox</i> hoisted White Flag as symbol.
1050	Man observed, with White Flag, to leave town and approach beach.
1400	Secured guns.
1640	Lowered lifeboats and whaler.
1717	Steam cutter with Maxim and armed party proceed to pier with lifeboats and whaler in tow to bring off Turkish prisoners.
1832	Idrissi flag hoisted at Qunfundah.
1850	Prisoners embarking.
2030	Last batch of prisoners embarked, hoisted whaler and life boats. Number of prisoners - 10 officers, 190 other ranks, and 2 children. Ammunition and rifles taken from prisoners dispatched to HMS <i>Fox</i> . Received one Petty Officer and twelve others from <i>Fox</i> as armed guard.

Despite the surrender of the Turkish garrison on 8 July 1916, elements of the Arab population did not support the pro-British Idrissi leadership at Qunfundah.

28 July 1916	At Qunfundah
0100	Fired one round of common shell from port foremost gun, over town.
0300-0320	Searchlight shown on town.

1040 Captain and party of officers left ship and proceeded to land to visit town.
1310 Captain and officers returned to ship.
2030 Steam cutter proceeded to shore for Sheikh and guard.
2230 Sheikh returned to shore.
2300 Fired one round of common shell over town, searchlight shown on town.

29 July 1916

0200-0220 Searchlight shown on town.
1030 Party of officers left ship to visit town.
1325 Officers party returned to ship.
1800-1900 [Ship proceeds to new position off reef SSE of Island]
2035 Steam cutter with whaler in tow proceeded to shore.
2100-2120 Searchlight shown on town.
2245 Steam cutter + whaler returns to ship.
2305-2320 Searchlight shown on town and surroundings.

30 July 1916

0015 Fired one round of common shell behind town.
0200-0220 Searchlight shown on shore and to rear of town.
1030 Held Divine Service.
1100-1127 [Ship proceeds to new anchorage SE of Island]
1715 Fired one round common shell from after gun, behind town.
1721 Fired second round from after gun.
2100 Fired one round common shell over town.
2217 Action stations. Fired two rounds common shell over town, searchlight shown on town.

1 August 1916

0400 Fired one 4.7 blank charge.
0405 Maxim parties left ship in steam cutter and whaler to take up station close in shore.
0735 Maxim parties returned to ship.
0930 Sheik + party arrived on board.
1000 Exercised landing party.
1030 Fired one blank charge No. 1 Gun and 150 rounds with Maxim.
1100 Landing party dispersed.
1140 Steam cutter and whaler proceed to shore with Sheikh.
1200 Fired one blank charge.
1520 Large dhow arrived + anchored.
1850 Fired one blank charge from after gun.
1920 Exercised night firing at target.
2030 Fired one common from after gun.

2 August 1916

At Qunfundah

Night	Searchlight shown every half hour for 10 mins throughout the night.
0405	Steam cutter and whaler left ship with two Maxim parties to take up station close in shore.
0700	Maxim Parties returned.
2025	Fired one round common shell.

3 August 1916

At Qunfundah

Night	Searchlight shown to the right of town for 10 mins every half hour.
0330	Steam cutter and whaler left ship and proceeded close in shore with Maxim parties.
two	
0725	Maxim parties returned to ship.
0940	Sheikh and party from town arrived on board to visit ship.
	Fired 150 rounds from Maxim fitted in steam cutter.
1145	Sheikh and party left ship.
	HMS <i>Lunka</i> arrived and anchored.
	Received 4 bags of mail from <i>Lunka</i> .
1300	Hands to make and mend clothes.
1400	Received one packing case containing pump from <i>Lunka</i> .
2100	Dispatched to HMS <i>Lunka</i> 2 bags mail 1 packet letters.

**Appendix C: Short Biography of
Admiral of the Fleet, the 12th Earl of Cork and Orrery,
William Henry Dudley Boyle, RN, GCB, KCB, CB, GCVO, (1873-1967)**

1887	Entered the Royal Navy as Naval Cadet on <i>Britannia</i> .
1888-1894	Served on <i>Monarch</i> , <i>Victoria</i> and <i>Colossus</i> in the Mediterranean.
1894	Commissioned as Sub-Lieutenant.
	Served on the gunboat <i>Crescent</i> in the China squadron.
1895	Promoted to Lieutenant.
1895-1897	Served on the gunboat <i>Lizard</i> in the Australia squadron. Including anti-'Blackbirding' patrols in the South West Pacific and patrols to Samoa, Fiji and New Zealand.
1898	Served with the Channel Fleet on the cruiser <i>Furious</i> .
1898-1901	Served in command of the sloop <i>Daphne</i> in the China squadron. Participated during the Boxer Rebellion.
1902	Married Lady Florence Keppel.
1902-1904	Commanded the destroyer <i>Haughty</i> in Scotland.
1904	Served as First Lieutenant (Gunnery) on the cruiser <i>Astrea</i> in the Mediterranean.
1905-1906	Commanded <i>Astrea</i> in the China squadron.
1906	Promoted to Commander.
1906-1908	Commanded the battleship <i>Hiberia</i> in the Channel Fleet.
1909-1911	Served with the Naval Intelligence Department of the Admiralty.
1911-1912	Commanded the armoured cruiser <i>Good Hope</i> , in the Atlantic Fleet.

1912	Commanded the destroyer <i>Skirmisher</i> with the Dover Patrol.
1913-1915	Appointed Naval Attaché in Rome.
1913	Promoted to Captain.
1913	Observer during the second Balkan War.
Feb-Apr 1915	Attached to Rear Admiral R.E. Wemyss' staff off Gallipoli, (although unofficially absent from Rome).
Oct 1915	Commanding the second class cruiser <i>Fox</i> in the Red Sea.
Dec 1915	Appointed Senior Officer Red Sea Patrol.
Oct 1916- Jan 1917	Commanding <i>Suva</i> (while <i>Fox</i> in dockyard hands)
Nov 1917	Left the Red Sea.
1917-1919	Commanded the battle cruiser <i>Repulse</i> .
1922-1923	Naval ADC to the King.
1923	Promoted Rear Admiral.
1923-1925	Commanded 2nd Battle Squadron of the Atlantic Fleet.
1926-1928	Commanded 1st Cruiser Squadron on the China Station.
1928	Promoted Vice Admiral.
1929-1933	President of the Royal Naval College, Greenwich.
1932	Promoted Admiral.
1933-1935	Commander in Chief, Home Fleet.
1934	Succeeded cousin as 12th Earl of Cork and Orrery.
1936-1937	First and Principal ADC to the King.
1937-1939	Commander in Chief, Portsmouth.
1938	Promoted Admiral of the Fleet (retires 1941)
1940	Commanded Combined Expedition in Norway.
1941-1942	Lieutenant Colonel with the Home Guard.



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¹ Arthur W. Jose, *The Royal Australian Navy, Official History of Australia in the War 1914-1918*, Volume IX, Angus and Robinson, Sydney, 1928, p. 494, see also pp. 238-239, 481 and 494-495.

² The HMS *Suva* Logs are retained in the United Kingdom (UK) National Archives, ADM 53/61865-61894. A summary of HMS *Suva* activities may also be found on Log Extract Cards at the Royal Navy's Historical Branch, Portsmouth, UK.

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- ³ Suva's groundings are somewhat understandable, given the Red Sea coast was essentially a coral formation with outlying reefs, with harbours mostly inlets between reefs that were only approachable at certain times of the day. Surveying was almost non-existent until 1917 and many of the buoys and beacons had been removed by the Turks in the early part of the war. 'Naval Operations in the Red Sea, 1916-17', *Naval Review*, Vol. 13, 1925, p. 652.
- ⁴ Captain William Boyle, RN was Senior Officer of the Red Sea Patrol between December 1915 and November 1917. His career is discussed elsewhere in this paper and his autobiography is Earl of Cork & Orrery, *My Naval Life, 1886-1941*, Hutchinson & Co., London, 1942.
- ⁵ HMS Suva is mentioned several times in Lieutenant Colonel Thomas E. Lawrence's (Lawrence of Arabia) books, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph, The Complete 1922 Edition*, Castle Hill, Fordingbridge, 1997; and the condensed version *The Arab Revolt*, Jonathon Cape, London, 1927. The Navy is often mentioned by Lawrence, particularly in T.E. Lawrence, 'The Arab Campaign: Land and Sea Operations: British Navy's help', *The Times* (London), 26 November 1918, reprinted in S. and R. Weintraub (eds.), *Evolution of a Revolt*, Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park Pennsylvania, 1967, pp. 33-39. The biography by Lawrence James, *The Golden Warrior, The Life and Legend of Lawrence of Arabia*, Abacus, London, 1995, is also valuable.
- ⁶ For the 'Holy Carpet' see Earl of Cork & Orrery, *My Naval Life*, pp. 101-102.
- ⁷ Here the terms 'high-end' and 'low-end' refer to positions on the spectrum of conflict that ranges from benign peace actions (low) to national wars of survival (high).
- ⁸ The proposed high/low mix of the future British sustained surface combatant capability recognises three levels of required capability, with the C3 general purpose corvette substituting for the WWI auxiliary cruiser. Paul Halpern highlighted the British capacity to source auxiliary cruisers 'that after conversion performed tasks scarcely dreamed of before the war', Paul G. Halpern, *A Naval History of World War I*, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1994, p. 8.
- ⁹ Earl of Cork & Orrery, *My Naval Life, 1886-1941*, p. 3.
- ¹⁰ Earl of Cork & Orrery, *My Naval Life, 1886-1941*, p. 29.
- ¹¹ Earl of Cork & Orrery, *My Naval Life, 1886-1941*, p. 92.
- ¹² For the role of Admiral Wemyss during the Arab Revolt see Lady Wester Wemyss, *The Life and Letters of Lord Wester Wemyss*, Eyre and Spottiswoode, London, 1935, pp. 275-280 and 317-360.
- ¹³ For an overview of the Norway Campaign see Stephen W. Roskill, *The War at Sea 1939-1945*, Vol. 1, The Defensive, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1954, pp. 169-204; and Correlli Barnett, *Engage the Enemy More Closely*, Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1991, pp. 97-139.
- ¹⁴ Earl of Cork & Orrery, *My Naval Life, 1886-1941*, p. 196.
- ¹⁵ The ships were Cruisers Fox, Minerva; R.I.M. Ships Northbrook, Dufferin, Hardinge, Minto; Armed Boarding Steamers Suva, Lunka, Lama, Perth, Scotia, Enterprise; Armed Tug Slieve Foy; Armed Launch Kameran. Refer to Earl of Cork & Orrery, *My Naval Life, 1886-1941*, p. 96.
- ¹⁶ There are few accounts of the activities of the Red Sea Patrol, although some material remains untouched in the UK National Archives and the Royal Navy's Historical Branch. The main sources for this paper are: 'Naval Operations in the Red Sea, 1916-17', *Naval Review*, Vol. 13, 1925, pp. 648-667; and 'Naval Operations in the Red Sea, 1917-18', *Naval Review*, Vol. 14, 1926, pp. 48-56, both of which were probably written by Captain Doyle as his autobiography is similar for this period. Despatches detailing military operations in the Hejaz were published in the Fifth Supplement to *The London Gazette*, dated 15 December 1919 (15605-15612), while more material on the military aspects of the campaign may be found in the numerous books relating to the life of T.E. Lawrence, see Note 5.
- ¹⁷ 'Naval Operations in the Red Sea, 1916-17', *Naval Review*, Vol. 13, 1925, pp. 653-654.

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- ¹⁸ Although Sharif Hussein's support was mostly localised in the Hejaz, he later proclaimed himself 'King of the Arabs' on 4 November 1916. It was the Allied recognition of Hussein as 'King of the Arabs' and the subsequent expectation that Hussein's family rule part of a dismantled Ottoman Empire, that ultimately led to much conflict later in the 20th century. The widely used phrase 'Arab Revolt' is used in this paper, although the 'Sharifian Revolt' is probably more accurate. See Efraim Karsh and Inari Karsh, 'Myth in the Desert, or Not the Great Arab Revolt', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 2, April 1997, pp. 267-312.
- ¹⁹ The important contribution made by naval aviation during the Arab Revolt is mentioned in R.D. Layman, *Naval Aviation in the First World War: Its Impact and Influence*, Chatham, 1996, pp. 153-155. Detailed accounts may be found in Henry A. Jones, *The War in the Air*, Vol. 5, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1935, pp. 218-224; and Cecil E. Hughes, *Above and Beyond Palestine. An Account of the Work of the East Indies and Egypt Sea Plane Squadron 1916-1918*, Ernest Benn, London, 1930.
- ²⁰ The Turkish force in Medina, numbering about 10,000 men under Fakri Pasha, managed to resist the Arabs until the end of the war. Their operations were handicapped by their need to protect their supply line from Syria and in particular the Hejaz railway between Ma'an and Medina.
- ²¹ General Reginald Wingate arrived with his staff to command the Hejaz Force on 4 October 1916. Of much less importance, Captain T.E. Lawrence did not arrive in Rabigh until 19 October.
- ²² The region south of Wejh is considered Islamic 'Holy territory into which no Christian prior to the war was allowed to penetrate.' From 'Naval Operations in the Red Sea, 1916-17', *Naval Review*, Vol. 13, 1925, p. 649. A small number of British officers were admitted into the region, although even Lawrence of Arabia was often mistakenly taken as a Syrian (due to his accent) when operating in the Hejaz. The use of Egyptian and Sudanese troops of the Muslim faith in the area was also not accidental, but a conscious decision by commanders with a sound cultural awareness of Islamic customs.
- ²³ 'Naval Operations in the Red Sea, 1916-17', *Naval Review*, Vol. 13, 1925, p. 658; see Earl of Cork & Orrery, *My Naval Life, 1886-1941*, p. 101.
- ²⁴ From a letter from T.E. Lawrence at Yembo to Colonel C.E. Wilson at Jiddah dated 19 December 1916 (Public Records Office FO882/6) reprinted in Malcolm Brown, *The Letters of T.E. Lawrence*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991, p. 97.
- ²⁵ This reconstruction of the events surrounding the capture of Akaba in 1917 is based upon that in James, *The Golden Warrior, The Life and Legend of Lawrence of Arabia*, pp. 180-188, and endnotes which refer to the relevant primary sources.
- ²⁶ 'Naval Operations in the Red Sea, 1916-17', *Naval Review*, Vol. 13, 1925, p. 662.
- ²⁷ The reader should consult 'Naval Operations in the Red Sea, 1916-17', *Naval Review*, Vol. 13, 1925, pp. 662-667; and 'Naval Operations in the Red Sea, 1917-18', *Naval Review*, Vol. 14, 1926, pp. 48-56, for an overview of the Red Sea Patrol's activities from July 1917 until the end of the war.
- ²⁸ For the war against the Ottoman Empire and the Muslim contributions, see Hew Strachan, *The First World War*, Simon & Schuster, London, 2003, pp. 97-124, and 315-316.
- ²⁹ A number of decisions taken during WWI influenced the development of the Middle East during the 20th century and continue to resonate in the Middle East today. Refer to William L. Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 2nd edn., Westview, Boulder Colorado, 2000, pp. 146-167.
- ³⁰ Based upon official records. Note that some of the important dates listed vary with the sources used, hence I have used the most generally accepted.