Introduction

The Spanish-American War’s dominant narrative is replete with tales of great naval victories, the smashing defeat of the Spanish navy at both Cuba and in the Philippines, and the heroic naval officers – like Commodore Dewey, referenced in the epigram – who achieved these great feats. The navy’s victories in the Spanish-American War helped place the United States firmly on the world stage as a great power and provided a set of overseas possessions that led to a period of “informal” empire. The war also vindicated Mahanian notions of seapower and accelerated the creation of a navy dominated by the battleship, both of which would come to have tremendous importance in the decades to follow. Yet there is an obvious, neglected piece missing from this story, that of the enlisted men who carried out these heroes’ orders and made their victories possible. The enlisted men who fought in the Spanish-American War were products of the so-called “new navy” set of reforms that rejuvenated the U.S. Navy in the 1880s and 1890s, creating an almost entirely new naval force structure and set of strategic doctrines. Around the time of the Spanish-American War, the new navy was also in the process of transitioning not just from an age of sail to an age of steam in the fleet, but also beginning...
to make significant changes to its personnel structure. The new, more technically complex ships acquired by the navy now required new skill sets for enlisted men and officers alike; enlisted personnel who could be retained for the length of their professional careers in order to inculcate the desired technical expertise, which also required language fluency for training and command purposes as well as loyalty to the United States; and the internal reforms necessary to make life in the navy desirable for enlisted personnel so that they would be willing to remain in naval service. These profound transformations took several decades to complete, but were in their earliest stages around the time of the Spanish-American War.

In an attempt to examine the identity, motivations, and experiences of enlisted personnel at this critical juncture in the navy’s history, this paper focuses on the navy’s mobilization for the Spanish-American War; recruitment, retention, and composition of the navy’s enlisted ranks; motivations for enlistment in the navy; the experiences of African-Americans in the navy; and a discussion of life in the navy for enlisted men. This approach will provide a more comprehensive context for life in the navy during the war; allow us to analyze who entered the navy, why they enlisted, and why they might or might not choose to remain in the navy; show some of the differences and similarities of the naval experience for minorities; and explore what the daily routine was for sailors of the new navy. In doing so, we may begin to come to a deeper understanding of the totality of the experience for enlisted sailors at a time when both the U.S. Navy and the United States as a whole were undergoing a profound set of changes that would ultimately lead both to play a significant role on the world stage in the twentieth century.

The Navy’s Mobilization for the Spanish-American War

In the wake of the sinking of the Maine, a veritable frenzy swept through the nation and the media agitating for intervention in Cuba. The rampant “yellow journalism” of the day exploited Spanish General Valeriano Weyler’s counterinsurgency methods to make sensationalistic attacks on Spanish military policy. Newspapers and those lobbying for U.S. intervention portrayed the war in Cuba as a struggle between Old World imperialism, as represented by “Butcher” Weyler and his authoritarian forces, and
the purportedly high-minded, pro-democracy Cuban rebels. On 25 March 1898, a naval investigatory commission announced its finding that the Maine had been sunk as a result of an external explosion. To many, this conclusion seemed to indicate malicious Spanish actions. In response, on 19 April Congress passed a resolution authorizing the use of force to secure Cuban independence, forcing McKinley’s hand. By 25 April, Congress had issued a formal declaration of war. The McKinley administration found itself forced to prosecute a war it had tried to avoid and was ill prepared to wage.

The United States Navy found itself better prepared to engage in combat operations than the Army, having been reinvigorated as a service in the decade prior to the start of the Spanish-American War. The Harrison administration’s Secretary of the Navy Benjamin F. Tracy (1889-93) is generally credited with spearheading the creation of the “new navy,” a significant set of reforms for the Navy, which had largely fallen into obsolescence after the Civil War. As part of the new navy initiative, Tracy and his successors oversaw a massive shipbuilding program; over the next fifteen years, the navy constructed a new fleet of twenty battleships, twenty coastal defense vessels, and sixty cruisers. One of Tracy’s key allies was naval theorist Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, a professor at the new Naval War College, founded in 1884 by Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, who also served as its first president. The Naval War College helped provide the Navy with a professional corps of naval officers, trained in naval strategy and steeped in Mahanian naval doctrine. Mahan’s theories, laid out in his 1890 book The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, supported a naval strategy focused on the offense rather than on coastal defense and commerce raiding and the construction of a “blue water navy,” one which could do battle on the high seas, supported by a global network of refueling bases, and aggressively protecting U.S. commerce. This new strategic doctrine of “command of the seas” had long been espoused by some U.S. naval strategists, but it gradually came to be accepted as the foundation of U.S. naval policy in the 1890s. The strategy would come to be vindicated by the navy’s successes against Spain in the Spanish-American War, laying the foundation for much of twentieth century naval doctrine. The goal of being able to achieve command of the seas was supported by the Harrison administration and Congress, which passed the Naval Act of 30 June 1890 authorizing construction of three
new armored battleships, a protected cruiser, a torpedo cruiser, and a light torpedo boat, the first of many additions to the fleet to come.9

By 1898, the battleship had become the core around which the U.S. Navy was building. The navy’s second-class battleships USS *Maine* and *Texas* had successfully completed their shakedown cruises in 1895 and the three new first-rate battleships USS *Indiana*, *Massachusetts*, and *Oregon* began active service in January 1897.10 They were supported by seven new cruisers and various smaller ships, including an armored ram, an experimental submarine, sixteen torpedo boats, and six gunboats.11 Five additional battleships were scheduled for completion in 1899.12

Prior to the destruction of the *Maine*, the United States Navy had an authorized strength of 1,232 officers and 11,750 enlisted personnel (including 750 apprentices or apprentice seamen).13 During the course of the war, the navy’s manpower levels temporarily doubled, increasing to 2,088 officers and 24,123 enlisted personnel.14 Of this increase, the naval militia accounted for 2,600 billets.15 An additional 1,800 naval militia served in the naval auxiliary service.16 The remainder of the billets – approximately 8,000 in all – was filled with newly enlisted volunteers.

In addition to this significant personnel increase, the navy acquired 103 vessels during the course of the war, spending over $21 million for the purchases, much of which was made available in the Fifty-Million-Dollar Bill, which became law on 9 March 1898.17 Most of these vessels were obtained in Europe or were chartered or purchased merchant vessels, but the navy also took control of 28 additional U.S. revenue cutters, lighthouse tenders, and vessels owned by the Fish Commission.18 All told, the 131 new vessels added to the existing navy force created a fleet of 73 fighting ships and 123 auxiliaries, roughly tripling the size of the fleet.19

**Recruitment and Composition of the Navy’s Enlisted Ranks**

By the end of the nineteenth century, the Navy found that in good economic times, it had trouble recruiting a sufficient number of men to fill its authorized billets through traditional means. Foreign-born men and those lacking in maritime-related skills were often recruited to fill the gap during these boom times.20 By 1897, the United
States had largely recovered from the economic depression of 1893-96 and it found itself in need of a significant number of enlisted men. The navy decided to expand its recruitment efforts – which were mainly restricted to port cities on the East Coast – across a wider geographic area to fill its manpower gaps and begin seeking sailors in the Great Lakes area and along the Mississippi River in June 1897.21 This proved to be successful, with a trial recruiting run in Chicago netting 224 new enlisted men and apprentices, all of whom were U.S. citizens, most having been born in the United States.22 Despite this early success, the Department of the Navy responded hesitantly and by fall of 1897, it had decided not to open a permanent recruiting station in Chicago. Instead, it would merely allow the Branch Hydrographic Office to provide recruitment information to individuals who requested it.23 By spring of 1898, with war with Spain seemingly imminent, the navy once again sent its recruiters to Chicago.24 After the war, the navy undertook a fundamental change in its decision to recruit from across the nation rather than just from port areas.25 These new recruits eventually altered the character of the enlisted force, bringing with them an identity as Americans, rather than as sailors, and eventually naval service became a truly national institution with a career enlisted force.26 By 1903, the navy was already praising the qualities of the new enlisted force:

The character of the enlisted men of the Navy has changed in the last few years, and the Navy is now drawn largely from the farms of the interior states….They are of a higher degree of intelligence than the old sort….The same rigid discipline and other treatment which in years past has been necessary to restrain the sea rover, usually of foreign birth and training, and often of questionable antecedents, is no longer necessary….27

Many of these new recruits also contributed the various technical and mechanical skills – some gained through experience in the increasingly technologically sophisticated agricultural sector – required by a modernizing navy.28

In the late nineteenth century, the navy preferred to recruit enlisted men who were already familiar with the duties they would be assigned aboard ship; indeed, such skilled
seamen dominated the force. Sampling the muster rolls for the decades prior to the Spanish-American War provides evidence that approximately two-thirds of all enlisted men had occupational backgrounds employable aboard navy ships. More than a third listed “mariner” as their prior occupation; another ten percent were noted as having skilled backgrounds useful in the engine room, with firemen and machinist as the most common occupations among this group; and another twenty percent listing occupations that were useful aboard ship, including cook, steward, waiter, carpenter, painter, sailmaker, and musician. A slight, gradual shift in occupations took place from the 1870s to the 1890s, with mariner falling from 38.3% in 1870 to 34.7% in 1890. Likewise, the number of men with occupational backgrounds of use in the engine room increased from 8.3% in 1870 to 13.0% in 1890. These changes reflect a gradual retirement of older sailing ships throughout the 1880s and the initial stages of fleet modernization. Not all newly enlisted men possessed skills directly related to naval service, of course, and 17-25% of enlisted men listed their previous occupation as “laborer” or “none.”

Officers’ complaints about the type of enlisted men recruited centered around two main areas: the high desertion rate and the prevalence of foreigners in the navy. Desertion was a significant problem; in the 1890s, roughly 1,200 enlisted sailors deserted every year, out of a total enlisted force of 8,250 – roughly 15% annually. Desertion was a particular problem when ships docked in American ports – sailors were much less likely to desert while visiting foreign ports, if only because most had little desire to be abroad with little income, far from home, in a place where they were unlikely to speak the native language. Most apprehended deserters cited a variety of personal issues, e.g., family or women-related problems, alcohol, and inability to adapt to naval discipline, as the reason for their desertion. The navy favored these explanations for the high desertion rate because they were caused by problems inherent in the deserter rather than in the naval service. Some deserters did, however, cite additional reasons for their desertion, notably poor leadership by officers, bad food, and injustices in promotion or discipline decisions. The navy was never able to definitively identify the main causes for the high desertion rate, but poor working and living conditions aboard ship, discipline-related issues, and better paying civilian opportunities were likely the primary
reasons. When asked why they believed their shipmates had deserted, some navy veterans of the Spanish-American War cited “the rations and lack of shore leave.” Officers often attributed the desertion rate to the low quality of enlisted men attracted to the service as well as the overly rosy picture of life in the navy painted by recruiters, particularly at times when the navy was having a hard time filling its enlisted billets. The navy did little to correct or mitigate the quality of life issues cited by deserters.

In the 1890s, roughly half the enlisted force was foreign-born (49.7% in 1890), see Table 1 below. From the Civil War to the Spanish-American War, an average of 28% of U.S. Navy enlisted men were not citizens of the United States. By 1897, 54% of the enlisted force was U.S.-born, and 74% were U.S. citizens. Another 12% indicated that they intended to seek U.S. citizenship. As can be seen from the data in Table 1, the navy recruited its enlisted force almost exclusively from the East Coast in the 1890s. Of the U.S.-born enlisted men, nearly all were born in New England, the Middle Atlantic, and the South Atlantic states. Lesser numbers of U.S.-born men were born on the West Coast or in the East North Central portion of the country (the Great Lakes area). The interior of the country – the West North Central (Midwest), East South Central (interior South), West South Central, and the Mountain states – provided almost no enlisted men, reflecting the navy’s recruiting bias.
Table 1: Place of Birth of the U.S.-Born Enlisted Force, by State and Region, 1890

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Force</th>
<th>Percentage of Total U.S.-Born Force</th>
<th>Percentage of National Male Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New England (CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT)</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Atlantic (NJ, NY, PA)</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>36.2%</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East North Central (IL, IN, MI, OH, WI)</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West North Central (IA, KS, MN, MO, ND, NE, SD)</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Atlantic (DC, DE, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV)</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>26.0%</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East South Central (AL, KY, MS, TN)</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West South Central (AR, LA, OK, TX)</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain (AZ, CO, ID, MT, NM, NV, UT, WY)</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific (CA, OR, WA)</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total United States Born</td>
<td></td>
<td>50.3% of Total Enlisted Force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Foreign Born</td>
<td></td>
<td>49.7% of Total Enlisted Force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The number of foreign-born and non-U.S. national sailors was even higher among ships permanently stationed in Asia (China, primarily), which relied on foreign sailors to fill open billets (see Table 2 below for additional details).46[46] When the USS Ashuelot sank in the South China Sea in 1883, only 19 of her 111-man crew had been born in the United States, with men of twenty different nationalities filling the crew.47[47] The USS Monocacy, another gunboat stationed in China, had men of twenty-one nationalities, and only 20 men of its 105-man crew were U.S. citizens.48[48] These ships are obviously extreme examples, but they illustrate the significant number of foreign-born and non-U.S. citizen enlisted personnel aboard navy ships in the late nineteenth century.

Table 2: Ethnic Composition of U.S. Warship Crews, 1880s49[49]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>East Coast Enlistments, 1880</th>
<th>West Coast Enlistments, 1880</th>
<th>USS Enterprise, 1887</th>
<th>USS Monocacy, 1883</th>
<th>Adult Males in U.S. Population, 1890</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.-born</td>
<td>48.5%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>53.0%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>74.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign born</td>
<td>51.5%</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
<td>47.0%</td>
<td>81.0%</td>
<td>26.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Foreign Born by National/Regional Origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National/Regional Origin</th>
<th>East Coast</th>
<th>West Coast</th>
<th>USS Enterprise</th>
<th>USS Monocacy</th>
<th>Adult Males</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scandinavia</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
<td>26.2%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Europe</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td>29.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>24.7%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Officers’ chief complaint about foreign-born sailors was their lack of fluency in English, and a slightly lesser concern was the potential for disloyalty during wartime.50 Analysis of the detailed data on the place of birth for the navy’s non-native-born force available for 1890 (see Table 3 below) indicates that 31.7% of the total enlisted force was born in a foreign country where English was not a native language. Undoubtedly many of these individuals did speak at least enough English to understand officers’ commands and work alongside native English-speaking peers, but it is clear that language proficiency aboard ship was an area of concern.51 Sailors on the Asiatic Station (subsequently called the Asiatic Squadron and the Asiatic Fleet) even developed a kind of pidgin English as a lingua franca to facilitate communication among the multi-ethnic crew.52

Table 3: Place of Birth of the Non-Native-Born Enlisted Force, by Country, 1890

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Force</th>
<th>English a Native Language in Home Country?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country</strong></td>
<td><strong>%</strong></td>
<td><strong>No</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Japan</strong></td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Philippines</strong></td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Foreign Born</strong></td>
<td><strong>49.7% of Total Enlisted Force</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Enlistment and Retention in the Navy**

Motives for enlistment in the navy varied tremendously, of course, but certain common themes emerge. The appeal of travel and adventure for young men was irresistible – many veteran sailors of the Spanish-American War cited this as their primary or sole motivation for enlisting in the navy.\(^{54}\) Navy recruitment posters emphasized the fact that sailors would get to see the world, glamorizing and romanticizing the prospect, and sailors eagerly toured the various ports their ships visited. One veteran sailor noted that the sole reason why he had enlisted in the navy at the age of fifteen was “pictures I seen of battleships.”\(^{55}\) A life in the navy offered the possibility of escape from home and a transition to a new life as an adult. Some sailors, however, found that a life of travel in the navy was not what they had imagined it might be. One sailor noted that, “Experience had shown me by that time that your liberty time ashore didn’t give much of an idea of the world. It would be better to join the merchant marine.”\(^{56}\)

Recruiting efforts emphasized the potential for a career and educational opportunities in the navy nearly as much as it did foreign travel. Relatively few enlistees, however, chose an enlistment period longer than two years, and overall retention was a problem in the enlisted force.\(^{57}\) Ambitious enlisted sailors who sought advancement to the ranks of the commissioned officer corps found impediments in their path, as reported by a former enlisted man:

> …at that time, the only way an enlisted man could get a commission was by an act of congress. An enlisted man was recognized for a commission for gallantry in action. The recommendation was signed by a number of high officers, among them Commodore Schley, but Admiral Sampson
declined to endorse it saying that he did not think that the enlisted personnel was recruited from a class that would do the navy social honor abroad.58[58]

Additionally, the educational opportunities offered by the navy may not have been exactly what some recruits were looking for; as one veteran sailor put it, “they promised I’d get an education and schooling. They meant one thing, I, another. I meant book learning. They meant seamanship.”59[59] For young men not interested in pursuing the navy as a lifelong career – and this would appear to be the majority of new recruits – the navy’s educational benefits may ultimately have been of little interest.

Patriotism was undoubtedly a motive for some enlistees prior to the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, but relatively few remarked on it as their primary motivation.60[60] It was often mentioned along side other reasons for enlisting, as one veteran sailor noted as his reasons for enlisting: “love of travel and love of country.”61[61] For many of those who enlisted in the navy once war was declared, patriotism was a primary motivation, differentiating them in some ways from those who enlisted during peace time.62[62] Most of these men served for the duration of the war and then left navy service, returning to civilian life and not considering the navy as a career option. Clearly, not all who enlisted for naval service during the war conceived of themselves as – or wanted to be – sailors, but rather considered themselves to be Americans performing a temporary military duty.

The youngest potential recruits – those who required their parents’ permission to enlist or enter the apprenticeship program – were sometimes discouraged by the traditional public perception of sailors of the “old navy.” One mother was reluctant to allow her son to enlist because of her perception of sailors “taken from the rough and oily clothed swearing men she had seen on the decks of a steamer twenty years before.”63[63] Of particular concern was the use (and abuse) of alcohol, particularly while on leave. One sailor reminisced about one of his comrades: “Jack…was a jovial sort of fellow. He was ‘one of the boys,’ and went ashore in his turn, returning in the morning a little under the weather, as any old sailor in those days would.”64[64] One congressman described the “previous generation” of sailors as “Old Jack, with his rough
exterior, with language largely of profanity, sitting and smoking his pipe – perchance squirting tobacco juice with greater accuracy than the trained gunner of today can his shot or shell….”65[65] This perception was exacerbated by judges who offered an opportunity to enlist in the navy as an alternative to a jail or prison sentence.66[66] “Every now and then,” the Army and Navy Register complained in 1902

some police justice who has it in his power to punish an offender turns to the Navy as a means of ridding the community of some culprit. There is evidently still…the notion that the Navy…is an asylum for incorrigibles….The Navy…calls for a class of youth and young men which is not, by inheritance or deed, eligible to the reform school or penitentiary. 67[67]

The navy made a conscious effort to address the perceived coarseness of the working-class life of enlisted sailors in its recruiting efforts to persuade middle class recruits (and their mothers) that not all sailors of the new navy were of dubious moral character, but the stereotypes persisted well into the twentieth century.

Finally, the state of the U.S. economy must also be taken into account when examining the fluctuating naval enlistment numbers. While not all applicants who attempted to enlist during economic slumps were motivated by the lack of civilian job opportunities, the number of applicants visiting naval recruiters unmistakably increased during economic downturns.68[68] A lack of job opportunities at home had a marked effect on naval recruitment, as part of the broader trend toward migration from small towns and rural areas to urban areas. As one sailor noted on why he joined the navy at the age of sixteen, “To get away from environment where there was no opportunity and to see the world. I was born in a little country town, i.e. Youngstown , NY .”69[69]

Service in the navy during the Spanish-American War very well may have provided an ideal situation for at least some young men, allowing them to receive steady pay, an opportunity to serve their country, and the chance to see the world.

Retention of trained enlisted personnel was a serious issue for the navy in the 1890s. Many sailors would serve for a term and then depart; career enlisted personnel were few in number. Promotion potential was limited and slow; it was not until 1904 that
enlisted men became eligible to receive a commission.\textsuperscript{70} The benefits of serving an entire career in the navy as an enlisted man were likewise limited, as retirement after twenty years of service at half pay was not implemented until 1925.\textsuperscript{71} When asked why he did not reenlist in the navy, one veteran sailor of the Spanish-American War stated that he left the service because there was “no future in sight and [I was] ready to settle down and stay put…a long time before advance in rates, many did not reenlist on that account.”\textsuperscript{72} Another noted that “navy promotion in those days was a slow process and the pay low”\textsuperscript{73} and yet another veteran stated that “two years fighting the Filipinos was just about enough.”\textsuperscript{74} One simply wanted to “marry [his] girl friend.”\textsuperscript{75} Clearly, the life of a sailor in the late nineteenth century with its frequent, long duration overseas deployments and limited potential for advancement was not for everyone.

Some sailors were turned against the navy almost from the beginning when they discovered the somewhat fraudulent conditions under which they had enlisted. Recruiting officers promised new recruits a free set of clothing upon enlistment; this was true only in the sense that sailors did not have to pay for their uniform in advance. Sailors were required to pay for the cost of their initial uniform and gear, which took at least three to four months at the base pay of $15-22 per month, with all of their pay automatically deducted to eliminate the debt.\textsuperscript{76} To compound the difficulty for sailors, liberty was denied until the amount had been repaid in full.

Likewise, efforts to train young men to be career sailors met with little success. The apprenticeship program was designed to train boys aboard ship to become professional sailors. Seven hundred and fifty apprentices were enlisted in the navy each year in the 1890s with the exception of 1894 when the authorized strength was doubled. Few apprentices, however, chose to reenlist in the navy when their terms expired. An analysis of the muster rolls for 1890 shows that only 170 sailors (out of 7,500, or 2.3% of the total) were former apprentices.\textsuperscript{77} Some apprentices who left the navy at the end of their first term may have had an unrealistic view of potential career opportunities that awaited them outside the navy. One former apprentice who did not reenlist when his term was up at the age of twenty-one said that not reenlisting “was the biggest mistake of my life, when the commanding officer asked me to re-enlist and I said no.”\textsuperscript{78}
African-Americans in the Navy

While it did prefer to recruit skilled men, the navy placed few other restrictions on the types of men it was willing to enlist in the decades leading up to the Spanish-American War, a practice in sharp contrast with those the navy would come to adopt in the twentieth century. For example, the navy in the last few decades of the nineteenth century did not – officially at least – racially discriminate in selecting enlisted men, and African-Americans constituted roughly ten percent of the total enlisted force. Though the level of African-American enlistment remained fairly constant throughout the period, the occupational background and place of birth for African-American sailors shifted over time, perhaps as a conscious policy. In 1870, 13.1% of African-American enlistees had been previously employed as a mariner, but by 1890, this proportion had decreased to 5.9%. At the same time, the percentage of African-Americans who had been employed as cooks and waiters increased from 28.9% to 49.3%. African-American enlistees also increasingly hailed from the Upper South – from 38.1% to 56.1% – rather than from the North. By the 1890s, the navy appears to have been much more interested in recruiting African-American sailors to function as domestic servants rather than as seamen.

African-American served as seamen, firemen, “jacks-of-the-dust” (storekeepers), carpenters, water tenders, oilers, and naval apprentices. The main employment aboard ship for African-Americans, however, was as cooks, stewards, and landsmen, accounting for more than 75% of all African-American enlisted men in the 1870s and 1880s, despite the fact that these ratings made up less than a third of all enlisted billets. By 1890, however, the proportion of African-American enlisted men employed in these capacities dropped to half, due in part to an increase in the number of African-American coal heavers and apprentices. Because shipmates performing similar duties bunked and messed together aboard ship, this produced an integrated messing and berthing situation in sharp contrast with both army policy and with the navy’s early twentieth century policies. The increase in the number of African-American apprentices – from 3.2% in 1880 to 13.6% in 1890 – is interesting because the hope for
apprentices was that they would become the core of the navy’s enlisted force, perhaps indicating that the navy was willing to consider the permanent addition of at least a small number of African-Americans to the overall force.87[87]

Though the navy prior to the Spanish-American War was a relatively open institution for African-Americans, it did not entirely escape the prejudice of its era. Racially-motivated fights among white and African-American enlisted men are known to have occurred on the Boston, the Charleston, the Independence, and the Rhode Island and likely occurred on other ships as well.88[88] The engine room may have been the site of the greatest inter-racial tensions, since African-American sailors regularly advanced to the rank of fireman and were therefore in charge of white coal-passers, which at least some white sailors sorely resented.89[89] Yet not all whites resented working, messing, and sleeping alongside African-Americans. As one white sailor noted, he “toiled at hard manual labor beside colored men, sat at table with them and found no fault whatever….Give me a ship with a sound hull, good strong engines and proper steering gear, and I’ll not grumble at the paint on her.”90[90] The promotion potential for African-Americans was extremely limited as well, with a mere handful rising to second- and third-class petty officers.91[91] While the navy had not yet institutionalized racial discrimination in 1898, it allowed individual commanding officers to advance or restrict the career opportunities for African-American sailors based on the needs of their commands and the officers’ personal prejudices. After the war, with the expansion of naval recruitment across the nation, the navy found itself able to exclude, in large part, African-Americans and foreigners, both groups having made up a significant proportion of the enlisted force before and during the Spanish-American War.92[92]

Life in the Navy for Enlisted Men

Despite the significant interest in the transformation of the U.S. Navy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there is a surprising lack of information of life in the navy for enlisted men.93[93] Late nineteenth-century sailors were a rough and tumble lot; their work aboard ships often required demanding physical labor, even on ships equipped with steam engines, and was generally performed without the benefit of
mechanical assistance. Coal passers, for example, are said to have routinely hauled 40-45 buckets of coal during a watch, each of which weighed nearly 150 pounds, in engine room temperatures well into the triple digits.94 Conditions of life aboard ship were, to say the least, unpleasant.95 Water, grease, and filth collected in the bilges, creating noxious odors. Ventilation and temperature control was poor belowdecks, quarters were often overcrowded, and sleeping conditions (hammocks in almost all cases) were uncomfortable.96 The complete lack of privacy was a factor with which many new sailors struggled.97 The navy was not unaware of the lot of its enlisted force, but it did little to improve conditions, either aboard ship or in terms of reenlistment bonuses, though an enlisted retirement program was eventually created after the Spanish-American War.98 Daily operations aboard ship took place according to a rigid schedule, with each enlisted man’s specific duties depending on his rating, watched over carefully by the petty officers.99

There was a vast, insurmountable distinction between officers and enlisted men; the two nearly constituted entirely different naval societies, with differing class and occupational backgrounds and standards of discipline, quarters, and rations aboard ship.100 On board the USS Saratoga, for instance, officers were allotted 324 cubic feet of space for their staterooms, while sailors were allotted 58 cubic feet per man.101 Many of the divisions were class-based; but at least some officers perceived the enlisted naval volunteers during the Spanish-American War differently from their comrades who had enlisted prior to the outbreak of war. The naval volunteers were, as one commander stated, “from the same class of people from which officers are taken and [their] average intelligence is equal to the average intelligence, less the superior education, of the officers of the navy.”102

Discipline was harsh aboard ship for enlisted men and punishment frequent. Flogging had been outlawed in 1851 in the United States Navy, and branding and tattooing were not abolished until 1872.103 Other forms of corporal punishment were still in use in the 1890s, including hanging men by their thumbs behind the back and placing men inside “sweat-boxes,” a practice that was adopted from Asia.104 As late as 1897, at least some naval officers advocated a return to flogging.105 Confinement to the brig for thirty days with only bread and water was a common
punishment for relatively minor offenses. In 1882, Secretary of the Navy William Hunt had complained of excessive use of solitary confinement in General Order 287, but use of the punishment persisted. In a single year, the USS Minneapolis, with a crew of 477, reported one general court martial and sixty-eight summary courts martial, as well as 114 men spending a total of 668 days in double irons, sixty men spending 250 days in solitary confinement, and 188 men receiving extra duty. The battleship USS Massachusetts, with a crew of 561, reported nine general courts martial, 159 summary courts martial, and 2,559 “petty punishments.” Additionally, standards of discipline for officers and enlisted were different; for example, officers returning from liberty while intoxicated were generally not punished, while enlisted men were. Officers were permitted to drink beer and wine aboard ship, while enlisted men were not, an inequitable situation that caused considerable resentment until 1914, when alcohol was banned aboard ships for officers and enlisted men alike.

The food provided aboard ship was a common complaint among enlisted men. Rations were described by one sailor as

Salt pork, ‘salt horse’ (salt beef [preserved in brine]), hard tack…beans, dried peaches, dried prunes, coffee. Water was produced from a small still, piped into a small brass-bound barrel with a couple of porcelain cups chained to the barrel, which everyone drank out of. Water was always warm, ill-tasting, so we drank coffee whenever it was available. Breakfast – beans. Dinner – beans and tomatoes. Supper – Beans and macaroni. No condiments of any kind (no salt, pepper, catsup, etc.).

Another sailor noted that during his service in the war “they opened a barrel of beef put up in 1876.” A number of sailors noted that they supplemented navy-supplied food with privately purchased food, some contributing a third or more of their monthly pay to do so. When ships were resupplied (the time between resupply could vary tremendously), sailors often commented that the rations improved markedly.
In response to questioning about the morale of enlisted sailors during the war, one veteran stated that

I believe that word [morale] was coined or came into use after I left the service. We had very few ‘cry babies’ and no chronic complainers to speak of. My mother wrote to me every week but sometimes they couldn’t get mail to us for a month or over. I got ten days furlough to go home to Indiana from N. Y. city and shore leave (liberty) maybe 25 times in my 4 ½ yr. enlistment.115

However, given the navy’s chronic retention problems during this period, there were undoubtedly morale problems for many sailors. And, it should be noted, the sailor who stated that there were no morale problems or complainers did not himself reenlist in the navy at the end of his initial term. In fact, complaints about the lack of liberty – the average liberty may have been roughly one day of liberty every two months – abounded.116 Even when in port for lengthy periods, the navy’s policy was to sharply limit the amount of liberty permitted to sailors.

Life was not, of course, entirely dreary for sailors. They had significant blocks of time when they were off-duty. Boredom was a problem, and many sailors filled at least some of their time by writing diaries, personal logs (a number of outstanding examples survive including meticulously drawn pictures and diagrams), and letters home. Mail was, however, slow to arrive.117 Reading and studying for promotion tests also consumed some sailors’ off-duty time.118 Larger ships often had well-stocked libraries for his purpose,119 though the quality of the enlisted men’s library varied significantly by ship; on some ships, no reading matter was furnished.120 Small crafts, like knotwork and splicing and needlework, also helped pass the time.121 Athletic activities, including football, baseball, and swimming when in port; 122 board games like checkers or backgammon; 123 and musical and occasionally theatrical performances (band concerts, plays, and the like)124 were also popular. Many ships’ crews also contained a resident tattoo artist who would provide tattoos for interested parties.125 Tattooing was apparently very common among sailors in this period – one survey of 3,500 sailors from 1901-08 indicated that 23% of men enlisting
for the first time had tattoos, 53% of men reenlisting had tattoos, and over 60% of men with ten years service had tattoos.126

Favorite activities, we may not be surprised to learn, also included drinking and gambling. Drinking was prohibited for sailors aboard ship, and penalties for being drunk or being found with alcohol were severe.127 Sailors returning drunk from a port call faced the loss of their shore leave privileges for several months and sailors caught attempting to smuggle alcohol aboard ship could be court martialed.128 Even so, drinking – perhaps even occasionally to excess – was often a major component of liberty calls and sometimes caused problems with the local police when in port.129 Many veteran sailors reported that drinking to excess while in port was more prevalent among older, career sailors than young enlistees, many of whom were serving in their first term.130 While smuggling alcohol aboard ship was difficult, some sailors particularly desperate for a drink at sea might extract the alcohol from shellac.131

When enlisted men went ashore on liberty in U.S. ports, they often received a somewhat cool reception and “uniform discrimination” was not uncommon in U.S. ports and occasionally overseas.132 The exception to this was the period immediately following the defeat of the Spanish in Cuba when many navy ships returned to port; sailors reportedly received a warm welcome in New York City following the war.133 Sailors had a reputation for hard drinking, carousing, and brawling and civil authorities often worked to limit the activities of sailors to specific neighborhoods near the docks. The infamous signs reading “no dogs or sailors allowed” were sometimes posted at establishments not desirous of sailors’ business.134 A number of veteran enlisted men noted that sailors in uniform were denied entrance to theaters and were not permitted to rent hotel rooms in San Diego, California and Norfolk, Virginia.135 Another noted that relations with the civilians were “fine at the start of the war but after soldiers and sailors began to collect at Calif. [ornia] coast, had so many rough characters that hotels etc. began to refuse to let any man in uniform in.”136 Near ports – at least while their money lasted – sailors were welcome in waterfront bars and boardinghouses. One veteran sailor noted that sailors were “very popular…due to free spending….”137 Other coastal communities may have even seen shore leave as a revenue generating opportunity. One sailor noted that “in Pensacola, Florida where we
had target practice, they would try and get the sailors drunk and hold them in jail and collect $10 a person from the commander to get them back.”138[138]

Gambling (poker, craps, acey deucey, and the like) was more common aboard ship, particularly on pay days – though still prohibited – as playing cards and other gambling supplies were easily concealed aboard ship, though sailors had to be careful to avoid the attention of the master-at-arms (often called the “jimmy legs”).139[139] Some ships’ crews also contained what might be called professional cardsharps who would enlist for the purpose of extracting sailors’ money through gambling, then desert and reenlist on another ship under a fictitious name when no one else aboard ship would gamble with them.140[140] All in all, we begin to have a picture of what life in the navy for enlisted sailors was like around the time of the Spanish-American War. It was – by contemporary standards – a harsh existence with few amenities and difficult living and working conditions. It is perhaps little wonder that relatively few enlistees made the navy a life-long career choice.

**Conclusion**

The United States Navy underwent profound changes as a result of the Spanish-American War. Its personnel numbers doubled – at least temporarily – and it added over 130 new vessels, roughly tripling the size of the pre-war fleet. After the war, the navy completed a series of internal reforms that transformed the naval experience for enlisted men and officers alike. It was also during this time that the navy was modernizing the fleet, creating a world class navy by the early twentieth century. This modernization effort culminated in 1907 when President Theodore Roosevelt – a former Assistant Secretary of the Navy before he resigned to fight in the Spanish-American War – ordered the “Great White Fleet” to circumnavigate the globe, in an effort to showcase the navy’s new global reach. This modernization effort required significant changes in the training and types of enlisted personnel required to man the modern fleet. Prior to the Spanish-American War, the navy primarily recruited men in coastal areas and ports, and placed its primary recruitment emphasis on men with prior maritime service. As a result of the navy’s modernization efforts and augmented fleet after the war, the navy began recruiting
nationally, reaching first into the Great Lakes area and then into the rest of the country, as it sought to increase the level of technical expertise required by its modernized ships. The navy sought to improve the quality and retention of its enlisted personnel in other ways. For example, it sought to enlist greater numbers of U.S. citizens – native-born or naturalized – for whom English was a native language, a change made necessary by the increasingly complex shipboard operations. The navy also (slowly) sought to foster an environment where enlisted men would want to make the navy a life-long career choice. While some programs in this direction (e.g., the apprenticeship program) did not greatly enhance retention, eventually, improvements in training and retirement benefits in the early twentieth century had the desired effect.

The young men who volunteered for service in the United States Navy prior to and during the Spanish-American War did so for a variety of reasons – travel, adventure, fame, glory, financial gain, and patriotism, to name just a few. The navy consciously sought to appeal to the desire of many for travel and adventure – the opportunity to see the world. This seems to have been an effective recruiting tactic, though the reality of naval life undermined this to a certain extent, and relatively few men who had sought travel and adventure stayed in the navy beyond their first term of service. The navy of the last few decades of the nineteenth century, to its credit, permitted African-Americans to enlist and serve along side shipmates of other races. While providing some career opportunities for them, African-American sailors were channeled into certain ratings and types of duties aboard ship, and their career progression was sharply limited. It was only after the Spanish-American War, with the expansion of naval recruitment across the nation, that the navy found itself in a position to exclude, in large part, both African-Americans and foreigners, both groups having made up a significant proportion of the enlisted force before and during the Spanish-American War.

In many ways, it is no wonder that the United States Navy faced recruiting and retention problems among its enlisted force in the late nineteenth century. Life aboard ship was profoundly uncomfortable, with poor food, harsh discipline, long periods of boredom, and long deployments away from home, and few benefits to staying in the service. It would be many decades after the Spanish-American War before enlisted
personnel in the navy would experience substantially improved quality of life aboard ship and be able to comfortably make a life-long career in the navy.
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2[2] The exact cause of the explosion, and whether the Maine was destroyed as a result of an explosion occurring inside or outside the vessel, are still not conclusively known. A 1976 study commissioned by Admiral Hyman Rickover, benefiting from knowledge gained during World War II on analyzing ships damaged by internal and external explosions, concluded that the cause of the explosion did not originate outside the ship. An investigation by the National Geographic Society in 1999, using computer modeling techniques not previously available, concluded that a mine likely caused the explosion.


10[10] Hagan, This People’s Navy, 209.
12[12] Ibid.

14[14] Long, 159 and Chadwick, 41.


16[16] Long, 159 and Chadwick, 41.


18[18] Trask, 34, 86 and Chadwick, 397-403.


22[22] Ibid.

23[23] Ibid., 36.

24[24] Ibid.

25[25] Ibid., 166.

26[26] Ibid., 166-167.


28[28] See, for example, the career path of Richard W. Konter, who enlisted as a Seaman, but was eventually trained as an Electrician and a Radio Operator during his time in the service; Richard W. Konter, USN Papers, USAMHI; Frederick T. Wilson, A Sailor’s Log: Water-Tender Frederick T. Wilson, USN, on Asiatic Station, 1899-1901, ed. James R. Reckner (Kent: The Kent State University Press, 2004), 178; and Ronald H. Spector, At War at Sea: Sailors and Naval Combat in the Twentieth Century (New York: Viking, 2001), 33-34.


30[30] Ibid.

31[31] Ibid., 204.

32[32] Ibid.

33[33] Ibid.

34[34] Ibid., 9.


36[36] Harrod, 118.

37[37] Ibid.

38[38] Ibid., 13-14.
For example, see Deane C. Bartley, USN Papers, Spanish-American War Collection, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA (hereafter USAMHI) and Wilson, 342.

Wilson, xxvii.


Karsten, 78.


Ibid.

Adapted from Harrod, 178-180 and *Abstract of the Eleventh Census: 1890*, 10.

Karsten, 78.

Karsten, 78 and Harrod, 16.

Karsten, 78.

Adapted from Karsten, 79.

Harrod, 15-16. Corroboration can be found in some of the writings of enlisted men as well; see for example, Harry M. Giles Papers, Naval Historical Center, Log-Book, USS *Oregon*, 1898, 6.

One example of language fluency problems is elaborated at length in Wilson, 59-60.

Wilson, xiii.

Adapted from Harrod, 178-180.

See, for example, Arthur J. Eddy, John C. Foley, and Nelson Garwood, all USN Papers, USAMHI, among many others.

John B. Laurey, USN Papers, USAMHI.

John C. Foley, USN Papers, USAMHI.

Harrod, 68.

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“A Mother’s Love,” *Our Naval Apprentice*, November 1901, 10.


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Complaints about this policy abound; see for example, Wilson, xvii, 21-22.

Harrod, 22, 174-175.

Fred H. Grabbe, USN Papers, USAMHI.

Harrod, 10.

Ibid., 11.

Ibid.

The “Upper South” is defined here as Maryland and Virginia.

Harrod, 11, 206.

Ibid., 10.

Ibid., 10, 205.

Ibid., 205.

Ibid., 10, 205.


Reckner, 44-49; Wilson, xv.

Ibid.

Harrod, 10.

Harrod, 168. African-Americans had their roles increasingly limited in the early twentieth century and were excluded from naval service altogether from 1919 to 1932, and from 1933-1942 were restricted to servant billets only. The navy’s manpower requirements in World War II forced the expansion of billets open to men of all races.

This dearth of available discussion is mentioned in Reckner, 44-49.

Wilson, xxii.

A discussion of life aboard ship can be found in Harrod, 11-12, 140-165. Longer personal narratives about life aboard ship during the Spanish-American War include the Harry M. Giles Papers, Naval

96[96] Paul E. Cramer, USN Papers, USAMHI.

97[97] Solomon B. Berkowich, USN Papers, USAMHI.


99[99] An example of a typical daily schedule can be found in Harrod, 200-201.

100[100] Karsten, 51-52 and Reckner, 44-49.


102[102] Reckner, 44-49.


104[104] Ibid.

105[105] Ibid.

106[106] See, for example, Charles J. Hauber and John B. Laurey, both USN Papers, USAMHI.


109[109] Ibid.

110[110] Reckner, 44-49.

111[111] Lyman P. Edwards, USN Papers, USAMHI.

112[112] Marius C. Van Epen, USN Papers, USAMHI.

113[113] See, for example, William Siegmayer, USN Papers, USAMHI.


115[115] John C. Foley, USN Papers, USAMHI.

116[116] See, for example, Wilson, xix.


118[118] A number of sailors noted reading and/or studying as their primary pastime; see, for example, Deane C. Bartley, Otto H. Darmsted, and Clarence G. Frick, all USN Papers, USAMHI.

119[119] Solomon B. Berkowich, USN Papers, USAMHI.

120[120] Lyman P. Edwards and Lee K. Strobel, both USN Papers, USAMHI.

121[121] Paul E. Cramer, USN Papers, USAMHI.

122[122] See, for example, Deane C. Bartley, Solomon B. Berkowich, and Claud Johnson, all USN Papers, USAMHI.

123[123] William Bitford, USN Papers, USAMHI.

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125[125] Tattooing is frequently cited; see, for example, Robert T. Goodlet, Fred H. Grabbe, and Thomas R. Knudson, all USN Papers, USAMHI.

126[126] Wilson, xxi.
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