The Ugly Duckling: The French Navy and the Saint-Domingue Expedition, 1801-1803

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In the fall of 1801, one of the largest fleets France ever assembled gathered in Brest. It included the 120-gun flagship *L'Océan*, fourteen French and Spanish *vaisseaux* (ships of the line), five *flûtes* (*vaisseaux* stripped of their guns to accommodate more passengers), and three frigates. For months, men, provisions, water, ammunition, and 83 fretful horses were led from the arsenal to the armada anchored in the port and 8,000 to 8,500 troops, 500 officers, as many civilians, and 8,000 French and 4,000 Spanish sailors had boarded the overcrowded men-o-war by November 25th.¹ Other squadrons were also readied in Cádiz, Lorient, Vlissingen (Flushing), Le Havre, Rochefort, and Toulon.²

The expedition was not aimed at invading England, Ireland, Egypt, or any foreign land. Instead, it was headed for the French colony of Saint-Domingue (modern-day Haiti). France’s most valuable overseas possessions, Saint-Domingue had been ruled since 1798 by the former slave Toussaint Louverture, who had insisted on his loyalty to France but had also expelled France’s agents and signed treaties with Britain.³ Considering him to be *de facto* independent, First Consul Napoléon Bonaparte thus decided in the spring of 1801 to remove him from power. Under Bonaparte’s plan, the French fleet was to appear simultaneously in all major ports of Saint-Domingue, publicize its peaceful intentions, and disembark its troops, by force if necessary. The captain general of the expedition, Lt. Gen. Victoire Leclerc, would then deport all leading officers of color. Not a word was said of slavery, but a quick victory could have incited Bonaparte to renege on the February 1794 law of emancipation.⁴

Taking place halfway between the expedition to Egypt (1798-1801) and the aborted invasion of England (1803-1805), the expedition was the most notable of the Consulate. No less than 32 *vaisseaux* and 22 frigates arrived in Saint-Domingue in the spring of 1802, or two thirds of the French navy.⁵ Sending reinforcements and protecting the coast of Saint-Domingue would keep one third of the French Navy employed over the next eighteen months, at a time when France was also readying expeditions to take over Guadeloupe, Louisiana, Réunion, Pondicherry, Mauritius, and Martinique.⁶ And yet, by 1804, Saint-Domingue had declared its
independence, marking the first major defeat of the Consulate and the only example of a successful slave revolt in world history.

Despite its historical significance, the Saint-Domingue expedition has been insufficiently studied, and its naval aspects even less. General histories of the Haitian Revolution typically dedicate a handful of chapters to the expedition and pre-occupy themselves almost exclusively with guerilla warfare on land. There is only one, short academic work that focuses on the naval aspects of the expedition. Archival sources, by contrast, are abundant. The French naval archives in Vincennes contain extensive records of the expedition (BB4 series), as do its army counterparts (BB7 series), while the French national archives (CC9 A, B, and C series) and the University of Florida (Rochambeau Papers) also include numerous pertinent documents. The British National Archives contain full records of the Jamaica squadron (ADM 1 series). Records on the U.S. Navy at the U.S. National Archives are rather limited, but private records of U.S. merchants supplying Louverture’s army, found at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, are informative. Information on the small Haitian rebel navy is harder to come by (Haitian archives were destroyed or sold in the nineteenth century).

The Leclerc expedition included Napoleon’s finest, yet was decisively defeated in eighteen months by an army of former slaves, so the cause for the Haitian victory is the main historiographical issue under debate. The rebels’ courage and dedication, their innovative use of guerrilla warfare, a yellow fever epidemic, and the resumption of hostilities with Great Britain have all been cited, with good reason, as deciding factors. Little attention, though, has been paid to the factors that undermined the expedition at sea. Why, one might ask, did a fleet that initially incorporated two thirds of the entire French Navy fail to tip the balance in France’s favor?

All four factors cited above (yellow fever in particular) played a role at sea, but to these causes must be added human agency—namely, the inability on the part of the expedition’s military leaders to make good use of the significant naval resources at their disposal. The French Navy generally performed its tasks courageously and professionally. It bombed rebel forts, ferried soldiers, landed sailors in support of land operations, and patrolled the coast for contraband and rebel barges. Some naval officers, like Louis-Thomas Villaret-Joyeuse, made occasional blunders, but others, such as Louis de Latouche-Tréville and Philippe Willaumez, stood out as dedicated. What plagued the French Navy was its inferior status as the ugly duckling of the Saint-Domingue expedition. In stark contrast with the Jamaica squadron, whose admiral acted independently of the desiderata of the Jamaican governor, the French navy was under the direct command of the French captain general (Leclerc, then Donatien de Rochambeau after November 1802), who had limited knowledge of, or respect for, the Navy and consistently misused it. A similar pattern could be observed in Paris, where Bonaparte, no matter how many resources he dedicated to shipbuilding, never seemed to fully understand naval matters. French ships were thus anchored in unhealthy regions, deprived of their crew, or employed for such distasteful missions as drowning the enemy, and by early 1803 the once-mighty force was reduced by mismanagement to a collection of ill-kept vessels manned by skeletal crews that was unable to prevent the British navy from blockading the colony when the Peace of Amiens came to an end.
Bonaparte’s planning for the expedition

The Saint-Domingue expedition’s goals were primarily political—to end Louverture’s rule—but they fit into a larger project aimed at restoring France’s maritime power. Bonaparte was the product of eighteenth-century mercantilist thought, according to which colonies played a central economic and military role as they gave an outlet to a merchant navy from which able seamen could be recruited in times of war. Saint-Domingue had fulfilled these two tasks so admirably before the revolution that by the late 1780s half of Europe’s tropical produce came from Saint-Domingue, whose commerce employed 15,000 sailors and over 1,500 ships.10

Conversely, France’s navy, trade, and colonial empire collapsed in tandem in the 1790s. All of France’s colonies were invaded by the British.11 Even after land forces in Guadeloupe and Saint-Domingue expelled the British, French merchants were excluded to the benefit of U.S. and British merchants.12 U.S. warships became more common than French ones along Saint-Domingue’s coast by the end of the Quasi-War.13 Deprived of colonial outlets, France’s trading centers shriveled while its navy became a shadow of its former self.14

Bonaparte thought repeatedly of sending a fleet to Saint-Domingue in 1799-1800, only to put such plans on hold due to technical difficulties and his evolving attitude toward Louverture, so the genesis of the Saint-Domingue expedition can be traced back to a 4 May 1801 order to prepare a 3,600-troop expedition in Brest under Villaret-Joyeuse.15 Getting past the British blockade was a major impediment, but war-weary Britain soon agreed to a ceasefire and on 7 October, just one day after he had approved the London Peace Protocols, Bonaparte gave the order to build up the small squadron already assembled in Brest to a force of 6,000 (an additional 5,600 men was scheduled to leave from other ports).16

Peace had come not too soon, Bonaparte explained, because France had “entirely lost its commerce” in the war.17 As always, Bonaparte thought big and envisioned a vast North American empire that would encompass not only traditional sugar powerhouses like Saint-Domingue but also Louisiana.18 French commerce would once again dominate the Caribbean trade, while training the next generation of sailors that would make the French Navy victorious should war with Great Britain resume.19 In true mercantilist fashion, Bonaparte’s secret instructions to Leclerc specified that foreign merchants should be driven out of Saint-Domingue shortly after the French takeover.20

Rather than wait for the permanent peace of Amiens, Bonaparte requested immediate British acquiescence to the expedition (the fleet had to leave in the fall so as to leave plenty of campaigning time before the deadly summer fevers of the Caribbean).21 The British agreed with Bonaparte’s policy of reining in former slaves, but they also expressed their “surprise and worry” when learning of the expedition’s vast size. The French, they feared, could easily redirect their fleet to attack Jamaica.22 The British asked Bonaparte to disarm his ships to alleviate their fears, but he refused as a matter of national honor.23 At any rate, he added with disarming frankness, the French “fleet was ill armed and weakly manned, even for a peace establishment… and that, upon the whole, they were incapable of fighting, and must run away from a very small force.”24 England eventually decided to send a squadron of its own to the Caribbean and match the French fleet ship for ship.25
Bonaparte was simultaneously finalizing the preparations for the expedition, though his interference in naval matters was not always for the better. Hopeful that Jérôme would become a Bonaparte of the seas, he sent his brother to the Caribbean repeatedly in 1802, but Jérôme showed little interest in naval matters and eventually absconded and eloped in Baltimore. The large Brest squadron was entrusted to Villaret-Joyeuse, who was known mostly for his role in losing seven vaisseaux during the First of June (1794), another four in a storm during the winter of 1794-1795, and another three in a 1795 engagement off Lorient. Adm. Ganteaume, a survivor of the disaster of Aboukir (Battle of the Nile), took charge of the Toulon squadron and Bonaparte appointed another unhappy veteran of Aboukir, Denis Decrès, as Minister of the Navy.

Contrary to Europe, where Napoleonic armies foraged as they campaigned, the troops sent to Saint-Domingue would have to be supplied by sea. French commerce was too weak to provision such a large overseas army in 1802, so Bonaparte requested that the British send the requisite supplies from Jamaica. The reply was predictably negative. He obtained Thomas Jefferson's reassurances that U.S. merchants would help supply the expedition, but these merchants had profited greatly under Louverture and many eventually supplied the rebels as well. Securing vital sea lanes should have been the French navy's priority, and Bonaparte's failure to adequately plan for provisioning proved deadly when war with England renewed and French troops found themselves blockaded and starving in Saint-Domingue's ports.

Bonaparte received increasingly threatening reports in late 1801 that Louverture's army was large, well trained, and determined and he significantly enlarged the expedition in response. He relied primarily on vaisseaux as transports, but their 600-man crew left little room for passengers. Civilian troop transports could have transported more men at a lesser cost but were not employed, apparently because they could not be mobilized as fast and Bonaparte was eager to give the navy some much-needed sea time. The ensuing logistical problems were daunting. The Toulon squadron received 3,000 troops when it expected 500. Villaret's Brest squadron of 12 vaisseaux, already overloaded with supplies, artillery, and 6,000 troops in addition to its regular crew, was asked to accommodate another 1,600 men, with a few more thousand on the way. Even though Bonaparte had insisted to the British that he would not disarm his ships, Villaret had to strip some ships of their guns and reduce the rest to their peacetime crew. The mighty three-deck Océan, for one, was sent without naval gunners. The change freed some space, but it also annihilated the ships' value as weapons platforms.

After weeks of delays due in part to contrary winds, the Brest squadron only left on December 14th. The Brest fleet transported 8,000 soldiers and was followed in the days and weeks to come by another from Rochefort (with 3,000 troops), Lorient (1,200), Toulon (3,000), Cadiz (1,700), Le Havre (1,000), and Vlissingen (1,600). No one understood it at the time, but the delay was highly significant. Had the expedition reached Saint-Domingue in late November 1801, it would have landed in the midst of the Moyse rebellion, which pit Louverture against his nephew and would have prevented him from mounting an effective defense. An early arrival would also have given French troops more time to fight before they were decimated by summer fevers.

At Bonaparte's urging, Decrès had devised a complex route whereby the squadrons of Brest, Lorient, and Rochefort would rendezvous off Belle Ile or the Canary Islands, then at Cape
Sámana. The plan was designed to allow the fleet to attack en masse and achieve complete surprise, but it was so cumbersome in the age of sail that it achieved the opposite result.\textsuperscript{39} The three squadrons failed to rendezvous because a winter gale, accompanied by thick fog, soon broke out. Determined to follow orders, Villaret grimly held his station in the awful weather, but to no avail since Latouche-Tréville’s Rochefort squadron had bypassed the first stop to avoid the storm.\textsuperscript{40} After waiting for seven days and sending the *Duquesne* and *Neptuno* away to repair persistent leaks, Villaret headed west.\textsuperscript{41} A second stop in the Canary Islands, which Latouche had already left, proved just as pointless.\textsuperscript{42} The Brest fleet only reached Sámana on 29 January 1802, where the Rochefort squadron and fast small units had been waiting for 11 days.\textsuperscript{43} In retrospect, Leclerc and Villaret wrote, the rendezvous system had been a failure.\textsuperscript{44} No tactical surprise was achieved: Louverture actually witnessed the arrival of the main fleet in Sámana.\textsuperscript{45}

The other squadrons arrived even later. The Havre squadron left on 8 January, but was forced to stop in Cherbourg due to bad weather.\textsuperscript{46} The Cadiz squadron arrived on 14 February.\textsuperscript{47} The Toulon squadron, scheduled to leave on 11 December, only got under way on 9 January and arrived on 12 February after a horrendous crossing marked by constant storms.\textsuperscript{48} Adm. Hartsinck, who commanded the Dutch squadron, insisted on stopping for a month in the Canaries and reached Saint-Domingue a full 57 days after the fighting began.\textsuperscript{49}

Leclerc and his successor Rochambeau insisted repeatedly that only large, massed reinforcements would allow them to launch coordinated attacks on all points of the colony, but Decrès never found an effective way to ship many men at a single time.\textsuperscript{50} Ten of the vaisseaux needed extensive repairs after their return and Decrès concluded that using large warships as transports was too costly.\textsuperscript{51} He thus shifted to smaller merchant ships accompanied by one or two military units—including, in some cases, converted slave traders.\textsuperscript{52} These were cheaper, but also unreliable and they brought a constant trickle of small detachments that were progressively eaten away by disease.\textsuperscript{53} The 3\textsuperscript{rd} Polish demi-brigade, for example, embarked from Livourne in May 1802 on a flotilla of 14 Danish, Russian, U.S., and British vessels ranging from 170 to 400 tons. One ship was lost in a storm and the survivors only reached Saint-Domingue in September, some troops having spent the entire crossing outside for lack of room below decks. They arrived in the midst of a yellow fever epidemic and were decimated within a month.\textsuperscript{54} By 1803, when defeat seemed likely and Bonaparte lost interest in the expedition, Decrès over loaded tiny vessels with deserters, invalids, and foreign troops and the last ship to reach Saint-Domingue, *L’Auguste*, reached its destination on 24 June 1803 after losing 102 of its 350 troops—a death rate of 29 percent that topped that typically found on slave ships.\textsuperscript{55}

**Military role (February 1802-May 1802)**

Leclerc, concluding that speed was essential if he was to catch Louverture unprepared, decided not to wait for stragglers when he reached Sámana and immediately headed for his main objective, Cap Français, but the French demi-brigades had been loaded so haphazardly that he wasted two days transferring troops from one ship to another to constitute coherent units.\textsuperscript{56} He reached Cap a few days later, only to realize that the black commander Henri Christophe had taken out all buoys and that Villaret had somehow forgotten to bring a single pilot familiar with Cap and other ports.\textsuperscript{57} Villaret refused to negotiate the pass under fire and
Leclerc, to his great annoyance, had to stage his main landing west of Cap. Leclerc compounded Villaret’s mistakes by selecting Port Margot, a distant and impractical spot, as his landing site. In all, the slow transfer from Sámana, the preparations for a landing, and the land attack consumed over a week, leaving ample time for Christophe to burn Cap. As the city burned, Villaret (who had stayed off Cap with the larger units) noticed that the forts of Cap were unmanned, entered the port, and French sailors captured the city hours before Leclerc’s forces arrived by land. The exploit helped restore the navy’s professional pride after the pilot fiasco, but most of Cap was already in ashes. The shortage of pilots, which had done so much to undermine the landing in Cap, remained a problem in later weeks and the Desaix, the San Genaro, and the Foudroyant were all lost or damaged on reefs for lack of pilots.

Other landings were better organized. On 3 February, Rochambeau’s division assaulted the city of Fort Liberté while Capt. Charles Magon’s vaisseaux silenced the main forts with two broadsides. The attack was conducted so vigorously that Louverture’s officers had no time to burn the town. Latouche-Tréville and Gen. Jean Boudet were as effective in taking Port-au-Prince, the colony’s second largest city. Troops landed early on 5 February under covering fire from the frigates. Meanwhile, the vaisseaux attacked Fort Bizoton and the entire city was captured before it could be burned.

The vaisseaux, useful in the initial landings, otherwise proved unsuited for the mountain guerilla warfare that characterized the subsequent phase of the war. Louverture’s naval units had been captured by the Jamaican squadron for fear that he planned to invade Jamaica, so there was no significant naval engagement until 1803. Leclerc and Villaret, concerned that large units like the three-deck Océan, cost a fortune in rations, proposed to keep only 5 to 7 vaisseaux to overawe their enemies, a number Decrès later pared down to two as tensions in Europe raised fears of a renewed war with England.

Few frigates and cruisers had been sent with the fleet, but they proved cheaper and much more effective than larger units for the most important mission facing the French navy in the following months: patrolling Saint-Domingue’s extensive coastline. Black rebels obtained many of their weapons and ammunition from U.S. and British merchants and armed small barges that preyed on French merchant ships. Piracy and contraband took place so close to the shore that Latouche-Tréville armed small merchant ships to replace the unwieldy vaisseaux that could not operate in shallow waters. By January 1803, the French fleet numbered 37 ships, only four of which were vaisseaux while the rest were a combination of cutters, brigs, converted merchants, and frigates. After these adjustments, the squadron was finally suited for the tasks it had been given and the navy scored some successes in denying supplies to the rebels.

Missing the Navy (June 1802-May 1803)

Despite Bonaparte’s initial mistakes when planning for the expedition, the navy could have provided significant help once it was transformed into a flotilla of cruisers. Villaret, whose relationship with Leclerc had gone from mediocre to stormy, returned to France with most of the vaisseaux and left Latouche-Tréville in charge in Cap and the northern coast. Both he and Philippe Willaumez, who commanded naval forces in the West and South of Saint-
Domingue, were competent individuals and could have provided superior leadership—had they been allowed to do so. But military leaders in Saint-Domingue insisted that they had full authority over the navy and routinely interfered with naval management, sometimes with disastrous consequences.

Inter-service rivalries stemmed largely from the army’s sense of superiority vis-à-vis naval forces whose recent record left much to be desired. Leclerc even refused to correspond with Decrès, even though the latter was his direct superior as minister of the navy and the colonies. Antipathy was reflected at lower levels as well. Naval officers complained repeatedly when the fleet was delayed in Brest that they had to pay to wine and dine the army’s staff. As pollywogs, soldiers enjoyed the novelty of life at sea, particularly the colorful coronation of King Tropics; but as landlubbers, they resented the sailors’ disdainful professional pride and fights often broke out during the Atlantic crossing. Financial feuds were common in Saint-Domingue, as Leclerc grumbled about the cost of the navy while naval officers complained that they received their salary months after army officers did.

French naval officers seemed to appreciate their colleagues in the British navy more than their own compatriots. The two navies had been bitter rival just months before, but to alleviate British fears that France might attack Jamaica Villaret sent lists of all French units to Adm. John T. Duckworth in Jamaica and treated British visitors to gun salutes and state dinners. The efforts did not pay off. Jamaica’s governor Georges Nugent regularly turned down French requests to obtain food or specie in Kingstown, while British captains snickered that French ships were “infamously dirty” and badly manned.

The colonial hierarchy normally called for a triumvirate consisting of a grand judge, a colonial prefect, and a captain-general, but continuous fighting allowed Leclerc and Rochambeau to impose martial law and claim dictatorial powers over civilian and naval authorities. In May 1802, Leclerc issued a decree specifying that “the general in chief is sole commander of the naval forces” and that the generals stationed in each port would have complete authority over local vessels. In practice, any army officer assumed immediate command over a ship when he came on board. One brig captain was even sent to jail for failing to report when he cast anchor. Typical of navy-army correspondence was a memo instructing Latouche-Tréville to transport 400 convalescents from Môle Saint-Nicolas to Saint-Marc. A detailed itinerary was included; Latouche-Tréville merely got to pick the name of the ship.

Naval morale sank accordingly and in September 1802 Latouche-Tréville asked Decrès if he could return to France. He cited health problems, but also bitterly noted that his “authority as squadron commander was so low that [he] acted as a chief of staff whose sole duty was to execute the orders [he] received.” He did not even know how many ships were under his command because Leclerc occasionally sent parliamentarians to nearby islands without informing him. “Given my age, my rank, and my career,” he added, “I cannot obey the orders of a general who could be my son.” Latouche-Tréville repeatedly asked for orders from Paris that would delineate the proper chain of command. He received no reply, so one can assume that Bonaparte shared his brother in law’s distrust for the navy.
The navy was thus reduced to the role of a deluxe cab service. Leclerc, then Rochambeau, sent numerous diplomatic missions to Jamaica, Cuba, Venezuela, Mexico, Grenada, France, and the United States to request funds, provisions, and purchase man-hunting dogs (for the army) and exotic animals (for Paris’ museum of natural history). Naval records show that in the month of October 1802, for example, the navy was asked to evacuate besieged troops four times, ferry reinforcements seven times, transport officers to their new assignments five times, send envoys and exiles to France three times, assist in two attacks, transport sick personnel twice, ferry weapons once, and carry Leclerc’s body back to France after he died of yellow fever.

The disgruntled naval officers used such occasions to supplement their salary, even though such sales could be politically sensitive. Some officers sold goods (including slaves) in Cuba, leading to Spanish recriminations that its French ally was importing contraband. When frigates transporting 1,500 black deportees from Guadeloupe landed in Cap, a rumor spread that the French intended to restore slavery in Saint-Domingue as they had done in Guadeloupe. Private commerce on state ships was nominally illicit, but Latouche-Tréville argued that officers could not be blamed for trying to make money when they were owed months of arrears.

Just as the black rebellion renewed in intensity due to fears that slavery would be restored, a yellow fever epidemic of unprecedented intensity and duration broke out and ravaged French ranks well into the fall months. The French army paid a heavy toll, but the epidemic made particularly horrifying progress when it broke out on the overcrowded, unsanitary ships. Capt. Zacharie Allemand of L’Aigle lost an average of one man a day when in Saint-Domingue; he returned to France with 341 sailors, half of the regular complement. Capt. Joseph Khrom, who had left for Havana to repair the San Genaro, reported that he only had 205 men left on board; only one of five surgeons remained. Half the crew of the Duguay Trouin died in a single month. Losses were magnified by desertion as fearful sailors enrolled on departing merchant ships.

It would be another century before doctors understood the mosquitoes’ role as carriers of yellow fever, but Leclerc failed to take basic prophylactic measures—isolating the sick, draining pools of stagnant water, and stationing troops in cool areas—that his health officers proposed. The doctors’ advice was based on the erroneous miasmatic theory, but would nonetheless have been effective against mosquitoes. Contemporaries also noted that losses abated when ships reached colder latitudes, so Decrès sent orders to get the ships moving and Latouche-Tréville begged Leclerc to send ships on cruises. But Leclerc—apparently to expose sailors to the same risks his soldiers were facing—ordered the navy to remain in port, no matter how heavy losses were, and ships often sailed only when the army needed transports to carry the sick to a hospital, thus helping to spread the epidemic.

The epidemic, compounded by Leclerc’s insistence that ships remain at anchor, soon destroyed the navy’s ability to function. As early as July 1802, Leclerc confessed to the Governor of Jamaica that he could not answer a letter in timely manner because his frigates were grounded for lack of sailors. By October 1802, the Cap squadron was down to three ill-maintained vaisseaux with a mere 160 to 220 sailors, too little to set sail, let alone fight.
Despite the losses, Leclerc tapped the navy as a ready source for reinforcements. Using sailors on shore was particularly wasteful considering that metropolitan France had an abundance of soldiers but a dearth of able seamen, but yellow fever had left gaping holes in army ranks and Leclerc felt that he could not afford not to draft sailors. Already operating with minimal crews when it left France, its ranks depleted by the epidemic, the French Navy was thus stripped of its last healthy men to pursue rebels in the hills. In a typical case, an aspirant (midshipman) of the Intrépide spent months guarding a river near Cap until rebel attacks and bouts of fever killed 14 of 16 fellow aspirants.

To address the navy’s resulting manpower shortage, Leclerc ordered that black rebels earmarked for deportation be used as crew members on the return trip to France. Such biracial crews were considered an obvious security threat, so regulations specified that ships could not be captained by men of color and that colored sailors could not constitute more than a third of a crew. Such rules were largely ignored due to pressing circumstances; one white captain commanded six white and two hundred black or mixed-race sailors. Another requested black prisoners to complete a crew that was down to seven white survivors.

The navy was also employed as an instrument of political repression. Bonaparte had ordered that Louverture’s main associates be deported and at least 640 officers of color were exiled to France (the most famous was Louverture himself, who left onboard the Héros in June 1802). A few white officers were also exiled for pursuing the enemy with insufficient ardor, or pursuing Pauline Bonaparte with too much vigor. At first, prominent officers were deported while common soldiers were spared, but as the war grew bitterer deportation and mercy became rare and warships, which had shifted from gun platforms to transports, then hospitals, then floating prisons, now turned into extermination camps. Drowning prisoners surreptitiously in the harbor seemed more astute politically than public executions, which frequently put the rebels’ courage on display. It was also considered a cheap, effective method of execution (some prisoners were also suffocated with sulfur inside the hold of ships).

Targeted drowning of prisoners turned into mass murder in October 1802, when most officers of color defected to the rebel side, Cap was besieged, and Leclerc advocated a genocidal policy aimed at killing virtually the entire black population. In Cap, up to 4,000 Blacks, including civilians and the entire 6th colonial demi-brigade, were summarily drowned. After Leclerc died of yellow fever, command fell momentarily in the hands of Colonial Prefect Hector Daure, who insisted that Francois-Marie Kerversau, the head of Santo Domingo’s French occupation forces, send his entire force of 140 black troops on a corvette. Kerversau was under no illusion as to their fate and wrote in a sad postscript that “by tomorrow morning no black troops will remain.... Some of the duties one must fulfill are very cruel.”

Mass drowning was a policy designed locally. Bonaparte and Decrès favored targeted deportation, not large-scale massacres, if anything because they destroyed a valuable labor force. To their credit, several local captains also balked when asked to become mass executioners. Willaumez was willing to execute rebels caught conspiring but stopped short of race-based mass murder. In October 1802, he wrote to Cap asking for instructions regarding a shipload of “Blacks who were arrested during the night in Port-au-Prince.” Latouche-Tréville obliquely answered that “war has become very simplified and now pits White against
Black; I took measures to assure that prisoners don't bother us, and I advise you to do the same." Willaumez did not, or would not, understand the innuendo and wrote again to ask for food for his prisoners. Other captains secretly released prisoners earmarked for drowning in other parts of the colony.

When Rochambeau took over as captain general and a batch of reinforcements arrived from France, he organized a series of amphibious operations similar to those of February 1802. The *Duquesne* and the *Intépide* helped retake Port-de-Paix (though the *Intépide* was damaged on a reef due to poor seamanship) and the navy provided covering fire for an attack on Léogane. Smaller units continued to patrol the coast against rebel barges and smugglers, though France had again sent an overabundance of *vaissaeux* with the last reinforcements. The burst of optimism petered out in March 1803, when an attack on Petit Goave failed miserably and the yellow fever epidemic resumed. Rochambeau had tried to enlist his son in the navy and promised to pay sailors more regularly, but overall he continued to treat the navy as a secondary branch, assigned white sailors to shore duty, replaced them with black prisoners, and gave orders to “débouquer” (drown) captured rebels.

**Downfall (June 1803–December 1803)**

The Saint-Domingue expedition had only been made possible because of a lull in hostilities between France and England and it was particularly ominous when Decrès wrote Rochambeau in March 1803 that war was imminent. Upon learning this, Rochambeau and Latouche-Tréville answered that, without a powerful naval force, Saint-Domingue’s ports would be blockaded, the rebels would obtain supplies from Jamaica, and the colony would be lost. With the latest recent reinforcements, the Saint-Domingue squadron amounted to 3 *vaissaeux*, 5 frigates, and 31 smaller units. The *vaissaeux* could finally have found some use against the Jamaica squadron, but Decrès ordered most large units back to France. Recalling large units meant that British mastery of the Caribbean was inevitable and that the expedition was doomed, but Decrès glossed over such inconvenient truths. When faced with Rochambeau’s increasingly hostile requests, Decrès and Bonaparte simply stopped writing altogether and Rochambeau learned of the resumption of the war from Jamaica.

In the absence of definite news from France, some colonial officers hoped that war had not broken out despite all evidence to the contrary. The British eagerly contributed to this wishful thinking and insisted that war had not begun even as they blockaded Cap and seized passing ships. Uncertain as to the status of hostilities in Europe, Rochambeau did little aside from telling the officers commanding each port to prepare for a long, hopeless blockade. He even sent wine, vegetables, and fruit, to Capt. John Loring as he blockaded Cap. Latouche-Tréville’s leadership was no more forceful. He tried to gather what military vessels he had in Cap, but his health deteriorated so much that he soon had to leave the colony and naval forces were left in the hands of a fairly minor officer, Capt. Henri Barré.

Such cautious leadership was in stark contrast with England’s aggressive posture. The Admiralty ordered Duckworth to seize all French ships in Saint-Domingue; by the time the orders reached Duckworth, he had already anticipated them. Prizes fell into British hands like ripe fruit. They included the frigate *La Créole*, taken after a short, inglorious fight near Port-au-Prince, the corvette *Mignonne*, the brigs *Lordy*, *Aiguille*, and *Vigilant*, and the cutters
Amitié and Terreur. The frigate Embuscade, her commander unaware that a war was on, was taken on her way back to France. In a two-week period in June-July 1803, the British captured 45 civilian and military vessels. In addition to the windfall in prize money, the easy victories could not have come at a better time for the British. Duckworth, who had repeatedly complained to the Admiralty that he needed more small units, selected the best French prizes and incorporated them in his fleet.

The navy’s strategic outlook in Saint-Domingue was bleak given the departure of most of the vaisseaux, but military authorities worsened the situation by continuing to interfere with naval affairs. It would have made sense to allow naval units to leave for France before the British blockade tightened, but army officers refused to let ships go, apparently because they needed them as transports to carry the fortune they had made in Saint-Domingue in the likely event of an evacuation. The enseigne Dubuisson, one of the few captains to bring his ship safely back to France, was even accused by Rochambeau of desertion and cowardice.

Such orders cost the French navy dearly. Capt. Pierre Quérangal of the 74-gun Duquesne asked to leave Cap as soon as he heard of British hostilities on 21 June 1803. Rochambeau refused, so the vaisseau was trapped with the rest of the Cap squadron when the British set up their blockade on 1 July. When an evening storm on 24 July forced the British squadron away, the Duquesne, the Duguay Trouin, and the frigate Guerrière, cut their cables and left the port (it is unclear whether they had Rochambeau’s approval), but a change of weather left them facing head winds while the British returned. The Duguay Trouin and the Guerrière were quick and skillful enough to evade the pursuit, but the poorly manned Duquesne was captured after a one-day chase. Pierre Mausin, one of the 23 cabin boys onboard the Duquesne, performed the only heroic act in the otherwise pointless loss of a fine vaisseau. As soon as the prize was brought into Jamaica, he dove overboard and escaped through the shark-infested waters of Port Royal.

After over a year in Caribbean waters, French crews and ships were in poor shape to fight, but as often during the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars a dearth of combative officers compounded the French navy’s underlying weaknesses. French naval archives contain numerous lengthy reports in which captains exculpated themselves for the supposedly ineluctable loss of their ship. Few of them seem to have spent much time thinking of ways they could have won the battle and instead planned to hold out for a few hours, then strike their flag when enough men had died for the defeat to be honorable.

Only Willaumez rejected the ambient defeatism. Willaumez had been stationed in the south of Saint-Domingue since the beginning of the expedition, first as captain of the 74-gun Duguay Trouin, then on the frigate Poursuivante. His ship, her keel damaged during a prior incident, was as defective as any and manned with a mere crew of 120, half of them convalescents, the rest partly composed of black sailors of dubious loyalty. When the British began hostilities in June 1803, Willaumez left for Cap to join the main fleet. Off Môle on 28 June, the Poursuivante and smaller units encountered the Jamaican convoy bound for England and the escort, composed of five ships of the line, immediately gave pursuit. Willaumez, chased by the Hercules and the Goliath, hugged the coast to make maximum use of his ship’s speed and shallow draught, then maneuvered to rake the Hercules and sneak into Môle. For a frigate to stand up to two ships of the line was an exceptional feat; yet the modest Willaumez apologized because his frigate was badly damaged—having been hit 135
times—and because he had failed to save the corvette *Mignonne* from the other three British ships of the line.152

Willaumez's action was a rare French triumph in an otherwise one-sided series of British victories (a large painting immortalizing the event subsequently hung in Decrès' office).153 He added to his personal reputation by again breaking through the enemy blockade of Môle to reach Santiago in Cuba.154 Having failed to recruit sailors there, he left for Charleston, capturing two prizes on the way.155 U.S. authorities refused to let him enter the port, so he continued for the Chesapeake and Baltimore.156 Having stopped there to repair his sinking ship, he once again eluded a British squadron and left for France, finding enough during the Atlantic crossing to inspect 11 neutrals and capture two British merchants.157 Breaking through one last British blockade, he finally reached Rochefort in May 1804.158 All this was achieved on a leaky ship below its full complement, thus proving the importance of the human element.

Another example of inadequate leadership was the failure to pursue alternative goals more conducive to French interests, namely, an attack on Jamaica. Land forces in this valuable colony were less than 5,000 men, far below France's massive contingents in Saint-Domingue.159 The existing Jamaica squadron was so weak in January 1802 that Leclerc could have more easily landed in Port Royal instead of Cap, especially since British cruisers stationed along the northern coast of Saint-Domingue somehow managed to miss the squadrons as they arrived (the British only learned of the fleet's arrival when Villaret sent a frigate to notify them).160 To match Villaret's fleet and forestall such an invasion of Jamaica, Great Britain had planned to send a large fleet of its own, but it left late due to bad weather and only reached its destination long after Villaret did.161

The fall of 1802, when the British sent the entire Jamaican squadron to Halifax for fear of hurricanes, presented another missed opportunity.162 As the military situation in Saint-Domingue grew desperate, Latouche-Tréville suggested that French troops should be employed in a glorious death ride to ravage Jamaica, but his plan was never implemented and the British fleet returned a month later.163 In May 1803, Rochambeau also mused that an attack on Jamaica would be his best option should war resume, but he thought the plan impractical for lack of ships.164 He did not even act on a valuable tip informing him of the departure of a large British merchant convoy from Jamaica.165 The fall of 1803 offered one last opportunity. Gen. Jean Sarrazin convened a war council in Port-au-Prince and proposed to gather all remaining troops and attack Jamaica, but he was rebuked by his own inferiors.166 Such plans might have worked, since several thousand French troops made it to Cuba during the evacuation despite a British blockade.167

The departure or capture of most large units meant that the French navy in Saint-Domingue was reduced by the summer of 1803 to a collection of small vessels while British squadrons captured neutral merchants trying to provision the besieged ports.168 Complete mastery of the seas allowed the British to sell ammunitions and powder to the black rebel army, starve French garrisons, and assist the rebels by sea as they seized one French-held port after another.169 The French Navy’s only notable contribution was to create a small flotilla that destroyed rebel barges and opened a supply route between Cap and Montechristi.170
In November 1802, after France lost control of most ports and the land battle at Vertières brought the rebel army to the outskirts of Cap, Rochambeau concluded that it was time to evacuate and loaded the 3,900 troops that remained from the once-mighty expedition onboard a flotilla of civilian and military ships, including the frigates \textit{Surveillante}, \textit{Clorinde}, and \textit{Vertu}. He apparently hoped to break through the British blockade to safeguard his considerable loot, but the winds were weak and the entire fleet was captured by the British.\footnote{The survivors were sent to Jamaica, where they joined 4,200 French prisoners already enduring horrendous conditions aboard pontoon boats.} Môle fell a few days later, though its commander, Louis de Noailles, cleverly joined the British convoy returning from Cap and escaped in the dead of night (he died shortly thereafter off Cuba while boarding a British ship).\footnote{The evacuation of Môle brought an unfortunate chapter of French naval history to an end, but the French remained present in the region for years as they hoped to retake Saint-Domingue (renamed Haiti in 1804). Many survivors found refuge in Cuba (particularly Santiago), where they armed numerous privateers.} The French were also present in Santo Domingo, which the Haitians failed to capture in 1805 and which remained a nest of privateering operations until French forces were finally expelled from Hispaniola in 1809.\footnote{Conclusion}

The Saint-Domingue expedition proved costly to the French navy. Ten ships of the line were lost or severally damaged: the \textit{Banel} (part of the Toulon squadron, sank off Algeria, 1802), the \textit{Desaix} (sank off Cap after hitting a reef, 1802); the \textit{San Genaro} (damaged off Cap, 1802); the \textit{Intrépide} (damaged off Port-de-Paix, 1803); the \textit{Duquesne} (captured off Cap, 1803). To these, one may add the \textit{Jupiter}, \textit{Alexandre}, \textit{Brave}, \textit{Impérial} and \textit{Diomède}, which were captured or burned off Santo Domingo in 1806 when they came to re-supply the remnants of the Rochambeau expedition still in Hispaniola and a squadron led by Adm. Duckworth attacked them.\footnote{Dozens of smaller units were also taken by the British war in the summer and fall of 1803.} Ships could be replaced; men could not. Hospital records were poorly kept due to the violence of the yellow fever epidemic, but an incomplete register lists at least 32,000 dead (soldiers and sailors) in 1802-1803 and reliable accounts put the total death toll on the French side at 50 to 60,000.\footnote{The navy alone lost 8,000 sailors; when taking into account normal death rates in the navy, the expedition directly led to the loss of 6,000 sailors.} There were only 80,000 sailors in all of France during that period, so the expedition diminished France’s seafaring population by up to ten percent, an incredible amount for a single expedition (by comparison, French and Spanish losses at Trafalgar totaled 4,400).\footnote{The poor condition of many units after months in tropical waters also forced many ships of the line into inaction in 1803.} When defending their poor record, Leclerc and Rochambeau were quick to point to the ravages of tropical fevers and to Bonaparte’s lack of support. These played a significant role in France’s loss; but humans, then as always, had the ability to shape their own destiny. By and large, they failed short of the daunting challenges they faced. Willaumez excepted, naval officers envisioned any encounter with the British Navy with such terror that they foresaw
defeat before a shot was even fired and seemed more intent on preserving their honor than their ship. Well aware of their country’s proud record on land and poor record at sea, French army leaders treated the naval service as a junior one and made a bad situation worse. Bonaparte made organizational decisions—such as assigning multiple rendezvous points—when his grasp of naval affairs showed none of the genius he displayed on the battlefields of Europe. Leclerc and Rochambeau commandeered, immobilized, and looted units at their disposal instead of trusting them with independent cruises that could have crippled U.S. and English commerce and even threatened Jamaica. The navy was deemed incapable of making a significant military contribution and was reduced to the thankless task of ferrying troops and drowning prisoners. In this context, it should not be surprising that the demoralized crews of the French Navy eventually conformed themselves to the low expectations invested in them and contributed to the French defeat and, eventually, Haiti’s independence.
Endnotes

AN: Archives Nationales (Paris).
BNA: British National Archives (Kew).
CAOM: Centre des Archives d’Outre-Mer (Aix-en-Provence).
NARA-CP: U.S. National Archives II (College Park, MD).
RP-UF: Rochambeau Papers—University of Florida (Gainesville, FL).
SHD-DM: Service Historique de la Défense—Département de la Marine (Vincennes).

2 Bureau des Ports, “Extrait d’un état adressé par le commissaire en chef de l’armée navale de Saint-Domingue au ministre de la marine” (1 Ventôse 10 [20 February 1802]), CC9B/23, AN.
4 Napoléon Bonaparte, “Notes pour servir aux instructions à donner au Capitaine Général Leclerc” (31 October 1801), in Gustav Roloff, Die Kolonialpolitik Napoleons I (Munich: Dru and Berlag von R. Didenberg,


13 For example, see Capt. of USS George Washington Patrick Fletcher to Sec. of the Navy Benjamin Stoddert (14 August 1799), RG 45, Microfilm M625/199, Capt. of USS Boston George Little to Stoddert (19 March 1800), RG 45, Microfilm M625/200, NARA-DC.


15 On early, aborted plans, see Bonaparte to Ganteaume (19 Dec. 1799), Bonaparte, “Arrêté” (25 Dec. 1799), Bonaparte to Contre-amiral Lacrosse (4 Jan. 1800), Bonaparte to Forfait (22 Apr. 1800), Bonaparte, “Arrêté” (10 Sept. 1800), Bonaparte to Forfait (22 Dec. 1800), Bonaparte to Forfait (26 Jan. 1801), in Vaillant,

506, Otto to Talleyrand (17 Brumaire 10 [8 November 1801]), in Cornwallis to Hawkesbury (12 November 1801), reproduced in Howard, Letters and Documents of Napoleon vol. 1, 500, 506, Auguste and Auguste, L’expédition Leclerc, 49.

16 Bonaparte to Talleyrand (6 Oct. 1801), in Howard, Letters and Documents of Napoleon vol. 1, 715, Bonaparte to Decrès (7 Oct. 1801), in Vaillant, Correspondance de Napoléon vol. 7, 351.

17 Quoted in Baron Charles Cornwallis to British Sec. of State Robert Banks Jenkinson Lord Hawkesbury (3 December 1801), PRO 30/11/264, BNA. See also Bonaparte, “Note to be handed to Lord Hawkesbury” (23 July 1801), reproduced in Howard, Letters and Documents of Napoleon vol. 1, 498, Hawkesbury and French Commissary Louis Guillaume Otto, “Preliminary articles of peace…” (1 October 1801), FO 93/33/3, BNA, Robert B. Mowat, The Diplomacy of Napoleon (1924; reprint, New York: Russell and Russell, 1971), 101, 140.


20 Bonaparte, “Notes pour servir aux instructions à donner au Capitaine Général Leclerc” (31 October 1801), reproduced in Roloff, Die Kolonialpolitik, 245.

21 Bonaparte to Charles de Talleyrand (17 September 1801), Bonaparte to Talleyrand (30 October 1801), reproduced in Howard, Letters and Documents of Napoleon vol. 1, 500, 506, Auguste and Auguste, L’expédition Leclerc, 49.


23 Talleyrand to Otto (12 November 1801), in Cornwallis to Hawkesbury (12 November 1801), PRO 30/11/264, BNA.

24 Quoted in Cornwallis to Hawkesbury (12 November 1801), PRO 30/11/264, BNA.


29 Bonaparte to Talleyrand (30 October 1801), reproduced in Howard, Letters and Documents of Napoleon vol. 1, 506, Otto to Talleyrand (17 Brumaire 10 [8 November 1801]), in Cornwallis to Hawkesbury (12 November 1801), PRO 30/11/264, BNA.

30 Gordon S. Brown, Toussaint’s Clause: The Founding Fathers and the Haitian Revolution (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 2005), 195-216, James Madison to Tobias Lear (8 January 1802), 208 MI/2, AN.


32 Monaque, “Les aspects maritimes,” 5-13. By comparison, the British Navy used ships (typically old, small ships of the line) that were specifically earmarked as troop transports. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean, 423.

33 Nemours, Histoire militaire, 26-37.

34 Villaret-Joyeuse to Decrès (25 Vendémiaire 10 [17 October 1801]), BB4 161, SHD-DM. See also Villaret-Joyeuse to Decrès (1 Brumaire 10 [23 October 1801]), BB4 161, SHD-DM.
35 Villaret-Joyeuse to Decrès (5 Brumaire 10 [27 October 1801]), BB4 161, SHD-DM. See also (in Cádiz) Adj. Cdt. Urbain Devaux to Berthier (8 Frimaire 10 [29 November 1801]), B7/2, SHD-DAT.
38 Auguste and Auguste, L'expédition Leclerc, 73.
39 Lacroix, La révolution de Haïti, 283, Auguste and Auguste, L'expédition Leclerc, 73.
40 Lemonnier-Delafosse, Seconde campagne de Saint-Domingue, 26-27, Latouche-Trévillon to Decrès (15 Pluviôse 10 [4 February 1802]), CC9A/36, AN, Norvins, Souvenirs d'un historien, 334.
41 Capt. of Vaisseau Pierre Quérangal to Decrès (18 Nivôse 10 [8 January 1802]), BB4 164, SHD-DM, Louis Bro to Jean-Louis Bro (18 Nivôse 10 [8 January 1802]), 82AP/1, AN, Federico Gravina to Decrès (30 December 1801), BB4 161, SHD-DM, villaret-Joyeuse to Decrès (21 Pluviôse 10 [10 February 1802]), CC9/B20, AN.
42 Norvins, Souvenirs d'un historien, 335.
43 Lemonnier-Delafosse, Seconde campagne de Saint-Domingue, 28-29.
44 Leclerc to Decrès (20 Pluviôse 10 [9 February 1802]), CC9B/19, AN, Villaret-Joyeuse to Decrès (21 Pluviôse 10 [10 February 1802]), CC9/B20, AN, Villaret-Joyeuse to Bonaparte (21 Pluviôse 10 [10 February 1802]), AF/IV/1325, AN. See also Latouche-Tréville, “Tableau de la route faite par l’escadre…” (c. February 1802), CC9A/36, AN, Div. Gen. Charles Dugua to Berthier (19 Pluviôse 10 [8 February 1802]), B7/2, SHD-DAT.
45 Louverture, Mémoires, 92, Lacroix, La révolution de Haïti, 283, Monte y Tejada, Historia de Santo Domingo vol. 3, 215.
47 “État général de situation des équipages et troupes passagères à bord des bâtiments de la division aux ordres du Contre-amiral Linois” (28 Nivôse 10 [18 January 1802]), BB4 162, SHD-DM, Contre-Amiral Linois to Min. of Navy [Denis Decrès] (28 Pluviôse 10 [17 February 1802]), reproduced in Moniteur Universel no. 182 (2 Germinal 10 [23 March 1802]), 729.
48 Berthier to Bonaparte (19 Frimaire 10 [10 December 1801]), B7/2, SHD-DAT, Contre-Amiral Gantheaume to Decrés (28 Pluviôse 10 [17 February 1802]), reproduced in Moniteur Universel no. 182 (2 Germinal 10 [23 March 1802]), 729.
51 Decrés, “Rapport” (22 Prairial 10 [11 June 1802]), BB4 161, SHD-DM.
53 Decrés to Rochambeau (19 Pluviôse 11 [8 February 1803]), CC9/B22, AN, Rochambeau to Decrés (11 Ventôse 11 [2 March 1803]), CC9A/34, CC9B/19, AN.
54 Ordonnateur de l’armée Michaux, “3ème ½ Brigade polonaise—État nominatif” (28 Floréal 10 [18 May 1802]), B7/4, SHD-DAT, Bat. Chief Junge to Berthier (12 Fructidor 10 [30 August 1802]), B7/6, SHD-DAT, Capt. Sangoroski, “Rapport” (4 Vendémiaire 11 [26 September 1802]), B7/7, SHD-DAT. The 1st battalion had

55 Armée de Saint-Domingue, “État général des troupes arrivées dans la colonie depuis l’expédition du Gén. Victoire Leclerc jusqu’à ce jour” (c. July 1803), CC9/B23, AN. Also arriving that month were the *Théodald* (134 dead, 188 survivors, 42 percent death rate) and the *Bonne Mère* (63 dead, 227 survivors, 22 percent death rate).

See also Quérangal to Decrès (24 Prairial 11 [13 June 1803]), BB4 182, SHD-DM.


59 [French officer in the Leclerc expedition], “Mémoire succint sur la guerre de SD” (1804), 5-16, IM598, SHD-DAT.


66 “Extrait des pièces déposées au contrôle de la marine du Cap” (19 Vendémiaire 8 [11 October 1799]), WO 1/72, BNA, Hugh Cathcart to Gov. of Jamaica Earl of Balcarras (17 November 1799), CO 137/103, BNA, Cathcart to Adm. Sir Hyde Parker (c. December 1799), WO 1/74, BNA, Parker to Cathcart (2 December 1799), WO 1/74, BNA, Louverture to Cathcart (28 Frimaire 8 [19 December 1799]), WO 1/74, BNA, Louverture to John Wiggleworth (16 January 1800), WO 1/74, BNA, Balcarras to Parker (5 February 1800), WO 1/74, BNA.

67 Dugua to Leclerc (10 Floréal 10 [30 April 1802]), Box 4/293, RP-UF, Latouche Tréville to Villaret-Joyeuse (14 Ventôse 10 [5 March 1802]), Villaret-Joyeuse to Decrés (15 Ventôse 10 [6 March 1802]), Villaret-Joyeuse to


70 Latouche Tréville to Decrés (3 Pluviôse 11 [23 January 1803]), BB4 181, SHD-DM.

71 “Rapport d’espionnage” (13 Floréal 11 [3 May 1803]), 135AP/3, AN.

72 Villaret-Joyeuse to Bonaparte (30 Floréal 10 [20 May 1802]), AF/IV/1325, AN, Leclerc to Bonaparte (17 February 1802), Box 12/1095, RP-UF.

73 Latouche-Tréville was a veteran of the American Revolution, who had the rare honor of defeating Nelson during an attack on Boulogne in August 1801. Humbert and Ponsonnet, Napoléon et la mer, 81, Rodger, The Command of the Ocean, 471.

74 Leclerc to Decrés (4 Vendémiaire 11 [26 September 1802]), Box 12/1094a, RP-UF, Leclerc to Bonaparte (4 Vendémiaire 11 [26 September 1802]), Box 12/1095, RP-UF. Villaret-Joyeuse to Decrés (17 Frimaire 10 [8 December 1801]), BB4 161, SHD-DM. See also Quérangal to Latouche-Tréville (3 Germinal 11 [24 March 1803]), BN08269 / lot 103, RP-UF.

75 Fréminville, Mémoires, 30-35, Norvins, Souvenirs d’un historien, 335-337, Villaret-Joyeuse to Decrés (15 Vendémiaire 10 [7 October 1801]), BB4 161, SHD-DM.

76 Norvins, Souvenirs d’un historien, 332.

77 For lists of French units, see Decrés to Gen. Bouvet (28 Ventôse 10 [19 March 1802]), CC9/B24, AN, Latouche-Tréville to Rear Adm. John Thomas Duckworth (29 Germinal 10 [19 April 1802]), ADM 1/252, BNA. For British visitors, see Capt. R. Mends to Duckworth (1 April 1802), ADM 1/252, BNA.

78 For the refusal to help the French, see Nugent to Leclerc (17 October 1802), CO 137/109, BNA, Nugent to Lord John Sullivan (5 March 1802), CO 137/107, BNA, Nugent to Hobart (29 March 1802), CO 137/108, BNA. For negative assessments of French ships, see Mends to Duckworth (1 April 1802), ADM 1/252, BNA, Capt. McNamara to Duckworth (26 April 1802), ADM 1/252, BNA.

81 Gazette Officielle de Saint-Domingue no. 1 (7 Messidor 10 [26 June 1802]), CC9A/30, AN, Grand Judge Ludot to Decrés (22 Pluviôse 11 [11 February 1803]), CC9/B21, AN.

82 Leclerc, “Service militaire de la marine” (26 Floréal 10 [16 May 1802]), CC9/B22, AN. A later decree posited that the colonial prefect would have financial authority over the navy, but this was probably designed to let civilian authorities foot the bill for the navy. Gazette Officielle de Saint-Domingue no. 111 (11 Messidor 10 [30 June 1802]), BB4 161, SHD-DM.

83 Nugent to Sullivan (12 November 1802), CO 137/109, BNA.


85 Boyé to Latouche-Tréville (3 Frimaire 11 [24 November 1802]), no. 744, CC9B/11, AN. See also Chief of Staff of Clausel division to Latouche-Tréville (19 Prairial 10 [8 June 1802]), CC9/B10, AN.

86 Latouche Tréville to Decrés (23 Fructidor 10 [10 September 1802]), BB4 161, SHD-DM, Latouche Tréville to Decrés (23 Fructidor 10 [10 September 1802]), BB4 161, SHD-DM.


90 Latouche-Tréville to Decrés (18 Brumaire 11 [9 November 1802]), CC9/B20, AN.
91 Jean Vermonnet to Decrès (20 Thermidor 11 [8 August 1803]), CC9/B22, AN, Daure to Decrès (19 Frimaire 11 [10 December 1802]), CC9A/33, AN, Daure, “Instructions pour le Gén. Boyer” (c. May 1803), CC9/B20, AN.
93 Latouche Tréville to Decrès (25 Messidor 10 [14 July 1802]), BB4 161, SHD-DM.
95 Div. Chief Zacharie Allemand to Decrès (18 August 1802), BB4 163, SHD-DM.
96 Krohm to Decrès (6 Messidor 10 [25 June 1802]), BB4 164, SHD-DM.
97 “Etat nominatif des officiers, sous-officiers et soldats morts au dit hôpital [la Providence] pendant le mois de Vendémiaire an XI [September-October 1802]” (c. October 1802), HOP/72, CAOM.
99 Colonial Health Council to Leclerc (23 Prairial 10 [12 June 1802]), BN08270 / lot 141, RP-UF, Dr. Gilbert, “Rapport du conseil de santé colonial au général en chef” (11 Prairial [10] [31 May 1802]), BN08270 / lot 141, RP-UF.
100 For the link between latitude and disease, see Capt. of Vaisseau Malin to Decrès (4 Fructidor 10 [22 August 1802]), BB4 163, SHD-DM, Allemand to Decrès (18 August 1802), BB4 163, SHD-DM. For Decrès' orders, see Decrès to Leclerc (27 Prairial 10 [16 June 1802]), CC9/B24, AN. For Latouche’s demands, see Latouche Tréville to Decrès (11 Messidor 10 [30 June 1802]), BB4 161, SHD-DM, Latouche Tréville to Decrès (16 Vendémiaire 11 [8 October 1802]), BB4 161, SHD-DM.
101 “Répartition faite par le général en chef Leclerc des différents bâtiments composant la station de Saint-Domingue” (28 Floréal 10 [18 May 1802]), BB4 161, SHD-DM, Latouche Tréville to Decrès (30 Fructidor 10 [17 September 1802]), BB4 161, SHD-DM, Latouche Tréville to Decrès (16 Vendémiaire 11 [8 October 1802]), BB4 161, SHD-DM.
102 Leclerc to Duckworth (28 Messidor 10 [17 July 1802]), ADM 1/252, BNA.
103 Latouche Tréville to Decrès (14 Vendémiaire 11 [6 October 1802]), BB4 161, SHD-DM. See also “Station de Saint-Domingue – etat de situation des batiments…” (1 Nivôse 11 [22 December 1802]), BB4 181, SHD-DM.
104 Latouche Tréville to Decrès (30 Fructidor 10 [17 September 1802]), BB4 161, SHD-DM, Latouche Tréville to Decrès (16 Vendémiaire 11 [8 October 1802]), BB4 161, SHD-DM.
106 Leclerc to Decrès (3 Thermidor 10 [22 July 1802]), CC9B/19, AN, Capt. of Vaisseau Garreau to Decrès (23 August 1802), BB4 164, SHD-DM.
108 Capt. of Frigate Greban to Willaumez (29 Germinal 11 [19 April 1803]), BB4 183, SHD-DM.
109 Lt. of Vaisseau Gurin to Willaumez (26 Vendémiaire 11 [18 October 1802]), BB4 163, SHD-DM.
111 Augustine and Auguste, L’expédition Leclerc, 57, 181.
112 Nugent to Sullivan (12 November 1802), CO 137/109, BNA.
114 Leclerc to Bonaparte (7 October 1802), reproduced in Henry Adams, History of the United States of America During the Administrations of Thomas Jefferson (NY: Library of America, 1986), 280. See also Rochambeau to Decrès (16 Frimaire 11 [7 December 1802]), CC9B/19, AN, Bureau des Colonies (Ministry of Navy), ‘Extrait de différentes lettres écrites…’ (3 Floréal 11 [23 April 1803]), CC9A/34, Rochambeau to Decrès (25 Nivôse 11
The French often spoke of atrocities indirectly or metaphorically. “Hanging” was referred to as “going up in the ranks,” “shooting” as “washing one’s face with lead,” and “mass drowning” as “catching a lot of fish.” Louis Boisrond-Tonnerre, “Mémoire pour servir à l’histoire d’Hayti” (22 June 1804), CC9B/27, AN.

The gun batteries of the vaisseau Duguay Trouin and the frigate Franchise were so overwhelmed with casualties after the attack on Petit Goave that the captain could not even give an account of his losses. Capt. Lhermitte to Rochambeau (8 Germinal 11 [29 March 1803]), BN08269 / lot 103, RP-UF. On the 1803 epidemic, see Quérangal to Decrès (27 Germinal 11 [17 April 1803]), BB4 182, SHD-DM.


Daure to Decrès (10 Prairial 11 [30 May 1803]), CC9B/20, AN. The governor and admiral of Jamaica were notified by their own government around the same time. Duckworth to First Secretary to the Admiralty Evan Nepean (27 April 1803), ADM 1/253, BNA, Nugent to Hobart (30 April 1803), CO 137/110, BNA, Duckworth to Nepean (17 May 1803), ADM 1/253, BNA.

[Latouche Tréville], “État des bâtiments de la station de Saint-Domingue (1 Floréal 11 [21 April 1803]), BB4 181, SHD-DM, Latouche-Tréville to Nugent (2 May 1803), CO 137/110, ADM 1/253, BNA. A British captain sent to spy on the French mentioned 14 vaisseaux, but much of the report was inaccurate. Capt. Henry William Bayntun to Duckworth (15 May 1803), ADM 1/253, BNA.

Rochambeau to Decrès (21 Floréal 11 [1 May 1803]), CC9A/34, CC9B/19, AN.

Daure to Decrès (10 Prairial 11 [30 May 1803]), CC9B/20, AN, W. L. Whitfield to Nugent (10 June 1803), CO 137/110, BNA.


On Latouche, see Willaumez to Capt. of Frigate Gémon (5 Messidor 11 [24 June 1803]), BB4 183, SHD-DM, Latouche Tréville to Denis Decrés (10 Messidor 11 [29 June 1803]), BB4 181, SHD-DM, Latouche Tréville to Decrés (8 Thermidor 11 [27 July 1803]), BB4 181, SHD-DM, Latouche Tréville to Duckworth (22 July 1803), ADM 1/253, BNA, Duckworth to Latouche Tréville (10 August 1803), ADM 1/253, BNA, Latouche Tréville to Decrés (20 Vendémiaire 11 [13 October 1803]), BB4 181, SHD-DM, Rochambeau, “Aperçu général sur les troubles des colonies françaises de l’Amérique, suivi d’un précis de la guerre dans cette partie du monde” (c. 1805), 102, 1M593, SHD-DAT. On Barré, see Barré to Decrés (24 Thermidor 11 [12 August 1803]), CC9/B20, AN.

Duckworth to Nepean (3 July 1803), ADM 1/253, BNA.

Quérangal to Decrés (7 August 1804), BB4 182, SHD-DM.

Quérangal to Decrés (7 August 1804), BB4 182, SHD-DM, [Officers of the Duquesne], Untitled [Account of naval fight on board the Duquesne] (Thermidor 11 [July – August 1803]), BB4 182, SHD-DM, Duckworth to Nepean (13 August 1803), ADM 1/253, BNA, Capt. of Vaisseau L’Hermite to Decrés (16 Fructidor 11 [3 September 1803]), BB4 182, SHD-DM.

“Jamaica—French prisoners between 25 June and 30 September 1803” (November 1803), ADM 103/193, BNA.

Capt. of Frigate Taupier to Decrés (1 Complémentaire 11 [18 September 1803]), Capt. of Frigate Jean-Louis Bargeau and officers of the corvette Mignonne, “A bord de la corvette la Mignonne…” (9 Messidor 11 [28 June 1803]), Lt. Elie Barjeau and other officers of the frigate Franchise, [Account of the loss of the frigate] (c. 30 August 1803), Capt. of Vaisseau Jurien to Decrés (12 Fructidor 11 [30 August 1803]), BB4 182, Capt. of Vaisseau Garreau, “Rapport fait à son excellence le Ministre de la Marine…” (c. March 1806), BB4 251, SHD-DM.

Div. Gen. Jean Boudet to Willaumez (23 Pluviôse 10 [12 February 1802]), BB4 163, SHD-DM.

Willaumez to Decrés (25 Fructidor 10 [12 September 1802]), BB4 164, SHD-DM, Willaumez to [Latouche Tréville] (17 Floréal 11 [7 May 1803]), BB4 183, SHD-DM.

Willaumez to Decrés (26 May 1804), BB4 208, SHD-DM, Bureau of Military Officers, Ministry of Navy (15 Prairial 12 [4 June 1804]), BB4 208, SHD-DM. Dubuisson was court-martialed at the army’s insistence but eventually cleared of wrongdoing. Enseigne Dubuisson to Decrés (26 May 1804), BB4 208, SHD-DM, Bureau of Military Officers, Ministry of Navy (15 Prairial 12 [4 June 1804]), BB4 208, SHD-DM.

Quérangal to Decrés (7 August 1804), BB4 182, SHD-DM.

Willaumez to Decrés (20 Messidor 11 [9 July 1803]), BB4 183, SHD-DM.

156 Willaumez to French Consul in Charleston (1 Fructidor 11 [19 August 1803]), BB4 183, SHD-DM, Willaumez to French Consul in Georgetown (21 Fructidor 11 [8 September 1803]), BB4 183, SHD-DM.
158 Willaumez to Decrès (2 Prairial 12 [22 May 1804]), BB4 183, SHD-DM.
159 Nugent to [former] British Home Secretary William Cavendish Duke of Portland (17 August 1801), CO 137/106, BNA.
160 Nugent to Hobart (3 January 1802), CO 137/106, BNA, Duckworth to Nepean (19 February 1802), ADM 1/252, BNA, Duckworth to Nepean (13 February 1802), ADM 1/252, BNA.
162 Duckworth to Nepean (12 August 1802), ADM 1/252, BNA, Nugent to Sullivan (12 August 1802), CO 137/108, BNA.
163 Latouche-Tréville to Decrès (18 Brumaire 11 [10 October 1802]), CC9/B20, AN, Duckworth to Nepean (16 November 1802), ADM 1/252, BNA.
164 Rochambeau to Decrès (25 Floréal 11 [15 May 1803]), CC9/B/19, AN. See also “Information given by Evan Boulanger owner and supercargo of the schooner Poisson Volant, taken by HMS Elephant” (6 July 1803), CO 137/110, BNA, Daure, “Compte-rendu de l'administration générale de Saint-Domingue” (late 1803), III, 113-117, CC9/B/13, CC9/B/27, AN.
165 L. Pellissier to Rochambeau (15 May 1803), Box 18/1869, RP-UF.
166 Nugent to Hobart (8 October 1803), CO 137/110, BNA.
167 Nugent to Hobart (19 November 1803), CO 137/110, BNA.
168 Nugent to Hobart (9 August 1803), CO 137/110, BNA, Duckworth, “An account of vessels captured, detained, and destroyed by his majesty's ships…” (August 1803), ADM 1/253, BNA, Barré to Decrès (7 Vendémiaire 12 [30 September 1803]), CC9/B/20, AN.
169 Dessalines to Duckworth (13 August 1803), ADM 1/253, BNA, Laujon, Précis historique, 202, 207, 213.
170 Barré to Bonaparte (7 Vendémiaire 12 [30 September 1803]), AF/IV/1325, AN, Barré to Decrès (7 Vendémiaire 12 [30 September 1803]), CC9/B/20, AN, Barré to Decrès (9 Brumaire 12 [1 November 1803]), BB4 182, SHD-DM, CC9/B/20, AN, Barré to Rochambeau (24 Fructidor 11 [11 September 1803]), BN08269 / lot 103, RP-UF, “Journal de la flotille partie du Cap le 10 Vendémiaire an 12...” (c. 20 Brumaire 12 [12 November 1803]), BN08269 / lot 103, RP-UF.
171 Lt. Vaisseau Sabron, “Précis des opérations maritimes du mois de Brumaire, affaire du 26 [18 November 1803], évacuation du Cap, notes sur la position et les forces actuelles de Saint Domingue et de la Jamaïque” (Frimaire 12 [c. December 1803]), CC9A/36, CC9/B/20, AN.
172 For general comments on POWs, see Léon Vallée, ed., Memoirs of the Empress Joséphine vol. 1 (New York: Merrill and Baker, 1903), 241, Rodger, The Command of the Ocean, 501, Gunther E. Rosenberg, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoléon (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1978), 89-90, Humbert and Ponsonnet, Napoléon et la mer, 162-164. For conditions in Jamaica proper, see Nugent to Hobart (19 December 1803), CO 137/110, BNA, Lemonnier-Delafosse, Seconde campagne de Saint-Domingue, 96-101. Officers were paroled on shore or shipped to Europe. Rochambeau, “Aperçu général sur les troubles des colonies françaises de l'Amérique, suivi d'un précis de la guerre dans cette partie du monde” (c. 1805), 1M593, SHD-DAT, Duckworth to Nepean (15 December 1803), ADM 1/253, BNA. Regular troops were evacuated much more slowly due to a lack of ships and crew. As of March 1804, there were still 5,500 French prisoners in Jamaica. “An account of French Prisoners of War on Parole, at Kingston and Spanishtown, between the 29th February and the 6th March 1804” (c. 6 March 1804), CO 137/111, BNA, Duckworth to Nepean (9 March 1804), ADM 1/254, BNA. The numbers were down to 1,300 by July. “General entry book of French parole prisoners of war at Jamaica” (c. July 1804), ADM 103/575, BNA. All were gone by November. Nugent to Earl Camden (16 November 1804), CO 137/112, BNA.
174 Duckworth to Nepean (12 June 1803), ADM 1/253, BNA, Gov. of Cuba Someruelos to Gov. of Santiago Sebastián Kindelán (30 July 1803), Someruelos to [Kindelán?] (22 September 1803), in José Luciano Franco,
175 Lt. of Vaisseau Guillaume Martin Lefée to Decrès (20 Messidor 12 [9 July 1804]), BB4 208, SHD-DM.


178 Monaque, “Les aspects maritimes,” 13. The British Navy lost 19,000 to 24,000 sailors in the Caribbean during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, though it had a larger pool of trained sailors and could more easily endure such losses. Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean*, 436


180 Bureau of Ports of Min. of Navy, “Rapport au Premier Consul” (6 Ventôse 11 [25 February 1803]), BB4 181, SHD-DM.