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The Royal Navy and the Interdiction of Aboriginal Migration to Newfoundland, 1763-1766

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Abstract

As a result of the Seven Years' War, France lost most of its territorial empire in North America, including Cape Breton Island. At the same time, France reacquired possession of the tiny islands of Saint-Pierre and Miquelon off the south coast of Newfoundland. This acquisition was intended to provide France with a toe-hold in the North American fisheries, but for the Mi'kmaq Indians, France's former aboriginal allies in Cape Breton Island, the islands of Saint-Pierre and Miquelon became the only means by which they could maintain contact with the French. During the period 1763–1766, a significant number of Mi'kmaq therefore attempted to move into the Bay d'Espoir-Hermitage Bay area of Newfoundland's South Coast, in close proximity to the French islands. This, however, was something that for various reasons neither the French nor the British desired, and so attempts were made to discourage the migration. Ships of the Royal Navy stationed in Newfoundland played a key part in patrolling the area, reporting on the movements of the aboriginals and attempting to enforce British policy restricting their presence in the region. This paper examines these efforts both as an expression of the Royal Navy's peacetime role as a projector of British power and as an agent in the process that eventually saw the aboriginals abandon their attempts to move to Newfoundland's South Coast, settling instead in Western Newfoundland. The paper is

based on research into the activities and procedures of the Royal Navy in Newfoundland after 1763, research that has already led to a number of papers and publications over the years.¹[1] The main source for the paper will be the documents in the Colonial Office 194 series and the Admiralty papers, held by The National Archives (Public Record Office) in England .

Introduction

Although the eighteenth-century Royal Navy is best known for its role and activities in time of war, there has been growing interest in the navy's activities during the several periods of peace which interrupted the wars of that era.²[2] As the late David Syrett explained, those activities were “for the most part . . . a constabulary role to aid and support British foreign policy and overseas trade.”³[3] This paper will focus upon the efforts of Royal Navy warships stationed in Newfoundland during the 1760s to carry out a number of responsibilities on the island's South Coast, including the unanticipated task of interdicting the movement of aboriginals from Cape Breton Island who were attempting to restore contact with the French in Saint-Pierre, a tiny island off the tip of Newfoundland's Burin Peninsula. For reasons that will be explained, that movement conflicted with both French and British priorities in the region, hence the attempt to discourage the migration and to enforce British policy restricting Mi'kmaq presence in the region. This paper examines these efforts both as an expression of the Royal Navy's peacetime role as a projector of British power and as an agent in the process that eventually saw the aboriginals abandon their attempts to move closer to Saint-Pierre, and to settle instead on the more remote coast of Western Newfoundland .

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The Context

The events that unfolded on Newfoundland 's South Coast between 1763 and 1766 were driven by the particular priorities and needs of three distinct parties; before proceeding

with an analysis of actual events, it is therefore necessary to explain the context to those events in terms of those three parties.

First, there were the French. The Seven Years' War which came to a conclusion in 1763 with the Treaty of Paris had decimated the French overseas empire in North America. Canada, Île Royale with the fortified town of Louisbourg, the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and the Labrador coast were all gone; the only territory left to France were the tiny islands of Saint-Pierre and Miquelon off the tip of Newfoundland's Burin Peninsula.⁴[4] British territory since 1714, they were now restored to France to support its offshore bank fishery with an *abri* or shelter. The islands would also enable a small residential fishery to revive. France also retained the privileges, first defined by the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, by which French crews were able to maintain a seasonal sedentary fishery in Newfoundland on the so-called "Treaty" or "French Shore," extending from Cape Bonavista to Point Riche.⁵[5] In short, and notwithstanding the enormous loss of empire in North America, France had managed to preserve access to the North American fishery.

This was an extremely significant achievement. France, like Great Britain, prized the fishery as an important economic and strategic asset that contributed to the wealth and power of the state.⁶[6] In negotiating an end to the Seven Years' War, French Minister of Marine the Duc de Choiseul had insisted that continued access to the Newfoundland fishery was a *sine qua non*.⁷[7] His decision in 1762 to continue a war that France had clearly lost, by sending the Chevalier de Ternay on a raiding expedition into the North Atlantic rather than surrender French access to the North Atlantic fishery, gave proof of the fishery's perceived importance to the state.⁸[8] Choiseul's determination after 1763 to rebuild the shattered French navy placed an additional premium on the preservation of the fishery in North America – the fishery was widely assumed to be a "nursery for seamen" – and it was therefore essential that every step and measure be taken to avoid jeopardizing the well-being of the migratory and sedentary fisheries in the northwest Atlantic. On the French Shore, this meant that the French became extremely protective and jealous of their right to fish within the territorial limits defined by the Treaty of Utrecht, with the result that French-English friction, never a problem in the past, became quite serious after 1763.⁹[9] For François-Gabriel d'Angeac,

the first governor of the newly restored islands of Saint-Pierre and Miquelon , this meant treading an exceptionally sensitive line between protection of French imperial interests and compliance with British interpretations of French rights and privileges in the fishery.10[10]

For the British, the situation after 1763 in North America generally, and within the fishery in particular, also posed significant challenges. The territories which France had lost were territories that Great Britain gained, with all the administrative, legal, jurisdictional, and regulatory headaches that would entail. Moreover, by 1763 a major redirection of policy had begun to occur towards British overseas trades and possessions. According to Jack Greene, the change “amounted to a shift on the part of imperial authorities from a posture towards the colonies that was essentially permissive to one that was basically restrictive.”11[11] Newfoundland at the time was perceived more as a fishery than as a developing colonial society, yet by the middle of the eighteenth century, the island’s transformation into a colony had clearly begun to manifest itself. Government responded to these developments by playing a more determined role in affairs at Newfoundland , a trend that became both significant and persistent after the Seven Years’ War.12[12]

One expression of this trend was the increase in the number and the responsibilities of warships stationed in Newfoundland, from an average of two or three per year during the 1720s and 1730s to as many as eight or nine in the 1760s. Where Newfoundland station ships were once content to remain moored in St. John’s or Placentia harbours for much of the season, leaving patrol work to hired boats and vessels, warships after 1763 were increasingly stationed in the remote parts of the fishery, including the island’s West and South Coasts as well as Labrador. Ships even began to over-winter in Newfoundland for the first time.13[13]

A second expression of greater British determination to protect its interests in the fishery after 1763 was the cartographic work undertaken by James Cook between 1763 and 1767.14[14] The recent war and the events that contributed to the outbreak of hostilities in North America as early as 1754 had given British authorities a heightened appreciation for the importance of clarity in defining with precision the boundaries and boundary markers between the British and French empires in North America. Cook’s

cartography was an exercise in asserting sovereignty over stretches of coast with which the British were not yet very familiar.

A third expression of British efforts to assert their interests in Newfoundland was the appointment of Hugh Palliser as governor and commander-in-chief of Newfoundland in 1764.¹⁵[15] Palliser would be vigorous in the execution of his civil and naval authority and responsibilities. As he explained to Admiralty Secretary Phillip Stephens, these responsibilities included the preservation of order within the fishery, the suppression of illicit trade in the region between Anglo-American colonials and the French, and finally “To keep the French within the Limits prescribed by Treaties, and thereby prevent them rivaling us in y^e valuable Fish Trade, and from raising so great a Marine from the Fishery as in late times they did.”¹⁶[16] His interpretation of French rights and privileges in the fishery was therefore particularly strict.

Caught in the middle of French and British determination to protect and preserve their respective imperial interests in the fishery was a group of people who were just as determined to look after their own interests. For 150 years, the Mi’kmaq Indians had been friends, trading partners, and allies of the French in Acadia . That relationship persisted even after much of Acadia fell under British jurisdiction following the seizure of Port Royal in 1710 and the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. The Mi’kmaq remained loyal allies of the French as late as the Seven Years’ War. Only with the French defeat in 1758 did the Mi’kmaq sign treaties with the British ending centuries of hostility.

The Mi’kmaq were a maritime-adapted people with a seafaring capability sufficient to extend their territorial range as far as the Magdalen Islands in the Gulf of St. Lawrence . It is moot whether that range included a sustained presence in Newfoundland or whether the Mi’kmaq came to Newfoundland only sporadically until they acquired European shallops. What is clear is that by the eighteenth century, the Mi’kmaq were hunting and trapping in southern and southwestern Newfoundland fairly frequently and that, from 1763 on, their presence in Newfoundland had become both substantial and persistent.¹⁷[17]

The reasons for this had less to do with the Mi’kmaq subsistence economy than with cultural concerns emerging out of their traditional relationships with the French. The Mi’kmaq who migrated to southwestern Newfoundland from Cape Breton Island had a

strong association with Mirligučche, the site of a mission established by the French in 1724.¹⁸[18] Sustained contact with the French had made the Mi'kmaq increasingly dependent upon French arms, ammunition, cloth, and food presented in ceremonial gift exchanges. These gifts had their origins as “a matter of protocol to cement alliances and trade agreements” but gradually evolved into essential means of Mi'kmaq subsistence.¹⁹[19] Such dependency worked both ways, for the French came to rely upon the gifts as a relatively inexpensive means of maintaining their influence in the region. The cost of the gifts was certainly cheaper than such alternatives as encouraging immigration and settlement, or greatly increasing the French military establishment.²⁰[20]

During the eighteenth century the Mi'kmaq, like native people elsewhere in North America, took as much advantage of this situation as they could. Wherever they were in a position to influence the balance of power between the French and the English, natives were able to increase their demands upon the French for presents.²¹[21] Failure to comply led to threats that they would turn to the English. This was an empty threat, since local British officials who tried to play this diplomatic game never seemed able to convince their superiors in London that gift-giving was more than a sort of unreciprocated generosity.²²[22] Nevertheless the French were careful to ensure that gift-giving occurred at regular intervals in recognition of the great importance that natives generally, including the Mi'kmaq, placed on the process of renewing such relationships.

British military authorities who were stationed in Cape Breton Island following its capture in 1758 may not have fully approved of the principal of gift-giving – the military commander and governor of Cape Breton between 1758 and 1761, General Edward Whitmore, predicted that “this will be a Constant Annual Expence” – but they recognized that the tradition was so deeply entrenched that it would be in England's best interests to maintain it.²³[23] However, their superiors in London concluded that the elimination of the French from North America had also eliminated the power balance which the natives had so cleverly exploited, so that giving them gifts on a regular or frequent basis was no longer necessary.²⁴[24] In short, the English assumed that their relationship with the natives in Nova Scotia could be based on treaties, which need only to be arranged once, rather than on the renewal of relations through regular gift-giving ceremonies.²⁵[25]

While some Mi'kmaq bands deferred to this approach, for others the expectation of gifts died hard. This appears to have been the case with the Mirligučche Mi'kmaq, led by Jeannot Pequidalouet (hereafter referred to as Jeannot), who negotiated a treaty with local English military authorities some time in late 1759 or early 1760, after news of the fall of Québec reached his people.²⁶[26] Yet the treaty did not address all of the needs of Jeannot's people, with the result that they attempted to renew contact with the nearest available French, namely those in Saint-Pierre.

One of the more pressing Mi'kmaq concerns was their inability to secure the services of a Roman Catholic priest to attend to their religious needs.²⁷[27] By the eighteenth century Catholicism had become “an integral part” of Mi'kmaq identity, according to Upton , so that the death in 1762 of their only priest, Abbé Maillard, made the appointment of a replacement a matter of great urgency.²⁸[28] A despatch to the Board of Trade would later stress, “The want of means to exercise their Religion they complain much of, and is the cause of a communication they keep up with the Islands of Saint-Pierre & Miquelon, where they have recourse for Priests.”²⁹[29]

Yet the British were not particularly sympathetic to this need. In part this reflected the prevailing anti-Catholicism of eighteenth-century British officialdom; in part it reflected persistent suspicion that Catholic priests had kept Anglo-French friction in Acadia active between 1713 and 1760.³⁰[30] The situation had been exacerbated further during the war, when news of Ternay's capture of St. John's in 1762 had triggered rumours of a Mi'kmaq revolt in support of a French military resurgence.³¹[31] Whatever the reason, the English in Nova Scotia were in no mood to be assured by Mi'kmaq oaths of allegiance and signatures on treaties into providing the natives with presents and priests.

Rebuffed or ignored in this way by British authorities in Nova Scotia , Chief Jeannot by 1763 had begun to regard Newfoundland and Saint-Pierre as the solution to his people's needs. The Mi'kmaq already had some experience at hunting, trapping, and fishing in Newfoundland – particularly on that part of the coast west of Fortune Bay where relatively few European fishermen were found.³²[32] The restoration of Saint-Pierre and Miquelon to the French in 1763 would permit the Mi'kmaq to resume contact with their former benefactors, allies, and spiritual advisors. Yet this was not something

that their former allies, the French, were willing to encourage; the last thing they needed in the 1760s was another irritant in the delicate relationship they had with the British.³³[33] It was certainly not something that the British were willing to permit, for they viewed the Mi'kmaq as a threatening element in a region where imperial authorities were anxious to nurture a British fishery – a perception reinforced in part by a number of incidents that had occurred in earlier decades.³⁴[34] They also suspected that the Mi'kmaq would provide the French with an opportunity to test the limits of British patience in the region near Saint-Pierre. Imperial authorities were therefore inclined to discourage the Mi'kmaq from establishing themselves as a permanent fixture in the region. The task of carrying out this objective fell to the only instrument of authority at their disposal – the officers and crews of the British warships stationed in Newfoundland

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The Events of 1763-1765

The first hint that the Mi'kmaq were relocating to Newfoundland came during the summer of 1763. Capt. Samuel Thompson, HMS *Lark*, had been instructed to patrol the west coast of the island of Newfoundland. Thompson was primarily concerned with ensuring that French fishermen confined their activities to the Treaty Shore, which at that time extended no further south than Point Riche. However, when *Lark* appeared at the tiny settlement on Codroy Island off the coast of the extreme southwestern corner of Newfoundland, he discovered that the inhabitants had been greatly intimidated by the unexpected appearance of Chief Jeannot and a number of Mi'kmaq to hunt and trap in the region. Jonathan Broom, the principal merchant there, requested and received a small quantity of arms with which to defend the community.³⁵[35] Yet Jeannot assured Thompson that the Mi'kmaq meant no trouble to anyone, wishing only to buy a shallop with which to proceed to Saint-Pierre for the services of a priest. Jeannot used the opportunity of his meeting with Thompson to have a treaty of peace renewed – presumably the same treaty Jeannot had signed in 1759-1760 with the British military authorities in Cape Breton Island. He also gave Thompson a detailed request for cloth, kettles, gunpowder, shot, muskets, hatchets, shirts, hats, nets, fishing line, a boat compass, and other items, all of which he expected to receive as gifts. Thompson

affirmed the treaty and promised to pass the request for presents on to his superiors, but he was alarmed by their declared plans to head for Saint-Pierre. He therefore “forbad them positively” from establishing any contact with the French there, “under pain of being carried Prisoners to the Governour if they were taken in ye attempt.” Thompson conceded, however, that the Mi’kmaq would probably make the attempt anyway.³⁶[36]

Thompson’s scepticism that the Mi’kmaq would adhere to his instructions was more a recognition of their needs as Roman Catholics than a conclusion reached because they were natives. He was equally mistrustful of the inhabitants of Codroy who, he suspected, were trading with the French at Saint-Pierre.³⁷[37] It was this trade rather than Mi’kmaq plans to settle in Newfoundland which at this point most concerned Thompson and his immediate superior, Captain Thomas Graves, the commodore of the Newfoundland station in 1763.³⁸[38] Hugh Palliser, however, who succeeded Graves in 1764, was more alarmed by the implications of Mi’kmaq settlement in Newfoundland . He believed that their presence there not only placed British fishermen at risk, but close proximity to the French raised fears that a collaboration might ensue that would destabilize the region. In a despatch to the Board of Trade, he expressed his “Apprehensions of y^e danger of permitting any Indians getting footing in this Country, as thereby the Fishery’s will be in the same Precarious State as when the French and their Indians possess’d Placentia and the South Coast.”³⁹[39]

Palliser’s concerns were heightened by the discovery, shortly after his arrival in Newfoundland , that Jeannot and his companions had remained in southwestern Newfoundland , trapping furs through the winter. Though they returned to Cape Breton Island in the spring, Palliser was convinced that a permanent liaison was developing between the Mi’kmaq and the French at Saint-Pierre, and that this relationship would only intensify if allowed to continue.⁴⁰[40] Yet any attempt to deal with the Mi’kmaq was frustrated by the British authorities in Nova Scotia and Cape Breton Island, who seemingly encouraged the Mi’kmaq into migrating to Newfoundland . Those Mi’kmaq who came to Newfoundland in 1764 carried passes provided by British military authorities on Cape Breton Island .⁴¹[41] Despite Palliser’s complaints, the practice persisted through 1765.⁴²[42]

It is possible that some officials in Nova Scotia viewed Mi'kmaq migration to Newfoundland as a solution to one of their more troublesome problems. The Mi'kmaq were becoming restive in the face of British refusal to help them secure the services of a Catholic priest, and in response to British rejection of gift-giving traditions long practiced by the French.⁴³[43] Some senior officials, however, were convinced that Mi'kmaq contact with the French posed a security threat to Nova Scotia and shared Palliser's wish to have such contact cease.⁴⁴[44] Yet what could they do? As Governor Wilmot explained to the military commander at Louisbourg:

. . . thro' a decent Submission to the Authority of Government, [Jeannot] Applied for my leave to go over . . . for the purpose of trading and hunting; had I refused my Consent . . . he might have taken that liberty with impunity, nor indeed can I find out the Law which prevents any of the King's subjects passing from any part of this Dominion to the other. . . .⁴⁵[45]

Wilmot was therefore not indifferent to Palliser's dilemma. If anything, he felt just as frustrated as Palliser by the persistence of Mi'kmaq movement across the Cabot Strait . He blamed the problem on the parsimony of the imperial authorities in London , who continued to deny the Mi'kmaq the presents they demanded. Wilmot warned the Board of Trade that "terms cannot be kept with the Indians . . . without incurring an expence to gratify their wants, and to prevent any disgusts arising from a neglect of them."⁴⁶[46] London 's intransigence over the issue of gifts was driving the Mi'kmaq to Newfoundland and into renewing their old relationship with the French.⁴⁷[47]

Ironically, if anyone was more concerned than the British authorities in Newfoundland and Nova Scotia by the appearance of the Mi'kmaq in Newfoundland waters, it was the French. Even before the islands of Saint-Pierre and Miquelon were restored to the French in July 1763, the Duc de Choiseul warned Governor d'Angeac not to permit the Mi'kmaq to visit the islands.⁴⁸[48] For one thing, the French had more pressing concerns on their mind as they re-established themselves in the fishery. Among the issues which subsequently generated a lively dialogue between d'Angeac and his British counterpart, Hugh Palliser, were French rights to send their warships to patrol the

fisheries, the precise location of the boundaries between French and English fisheries, French trade with British colonials in America, and French contact with the Newfoundland coast to cut wood, hunt, and trade.⁴⁹[49] Many of these issues were inescapable consequences of the condition in which the French found the islands of Saint-Pierre and Miquelon upon their restoration in 1763. As one British naval officer explained, the islands were left “barren and desart . . . , destitute of all the Necessarys of Life, without Materials for building Houses, or Provisions to support them thro the Winter.”⁵⁰[50] The French really had no choice but to steal over to Newfoundland’s South Coast, particularly the more remote stretches of western Placentia Bay, the Burin Peninsula, and Fortune Bay, where they hoped to trade with British settlers while avoiding notice by the authorities at Placentia.⁵¹[51] Such trade, though illegal, was essential to the French if they were to re-establish themselves quickly on Saint-Pierre. Governor d’Angeac did not need the additional aggravation of Mi’kmaq visitors from Cape Breton to draw the attention of the British to the region – as one of the French military officers explained, Mi’kmaq contact with the French could cause trouble that “could extend to us, given the disputes we had had before with our neighbours.”⁵²[52]

But Mi’kmaq behaviour was guided by their own needs, not those of the French. Despite being rebuffed in Saint-Pierre, the pressure of changing circumstances in Cape Breton Island compelled the Mi’kmaq to begin moving in significant numbers to Newfoundland’s South Coast. By 1765, Chief Jeannot, together with roughly 130 to 150 of his people, were settling within the inner recesses of Bay d’Espoir, a body of water with several arms that extended deep into the Newfoundland interior. Palliser found this very disturbing. James Cook’s survey work that year had suggested that Placentia Bay, Fortune Bay, and Bay d’Espoir “terminate near each other, and almost in the center of the Island, from whence it’s not above 2 or 3 days march down to the sea coast on either side of the island.” Should the Mi’kmaq succeed in establishing themselves there, they would be able to command much of the island’s interior.⁵³[53] Palliser therefore arranged for two of the smaller warships in his command – HM Sloop *Spy* and HM Schooner *Hope* – to overwinter in Newfoundland, one at Placentia, the other at the mouth of Bay d’Espoir. Thus, rather than escaping scrutiny, the Mi’kmaq had managed only to attract it.

To be sure, the decision to station *Spy* and *Hope* on the South Coast through the winter was an expression of Palliser's concerted effort to crack down on a number of illicit activities in the region.⁵⁴[54] In 1765, the ships of Palliser's squadron – comprising Palliser's flagship *Guernsey*, frigates *Pearl* and *Niger*, and *Egmont* in addition to sloop *Spy* and schooner *Hope* – all converged on the west side of Placentia Bay, not far from Saint-Pierre. The *Grenville* brig also served that summer in the region, supporting the cartographic survey of the South Coast under the direction of James Cook. *Hope* and *Niger* soon left for Labrador, as eventually did *Spy* and *Guernsey*, but not before Palliser had held court in Great St. Lawrence Harbour, hearing a number of cases involving illicit trade between local residents and the French.⁵⁵[55]

Yet as winter approached, the *Spy*, Capt. Thomas Allwright, and *Hope*, Lieut. Stanford, returned to the South Coast and made ready to over-winter there. It was a remarkable measure, for warships had never before wintered on the South Coast. *Spy* arrived at Placentia in mid-November and resumed active patrolling in the vicinity of Saint-Pierre the following April, well before warships usually took station in Newfoundland.⁵⁶[56] This was consistent with the attention Palliser had been giving the French since 1764. *Hope*, however, took up station three hundred kilometres to the west of Placentia, in the shelter of Great Jervis Harbour, located at the mouth of Bay d'Espoir.⁵⁷[57] The distance from there to Pass Island on the far side of Hermitage Bay was about twenty kilometres. *Hope* was therefore to monitor movement in and out of Hermitage Bay, to discourage French visits to the area for timber and trade with Newfoundland residents, and to inhibit communication between the Mi'kmaq and the French at Saint-Pierre. Occasionally this entailed a short cruise, though given the season this was not without some risk.⁵⁸[58] Moreover, the abundance of fjords, inlets, and coves of Bay d'Espoir and Hermitage Bay made it more sensible and effective to send patrols out in shallows – the workhorses of the fishery, which could be rowed or sailed, and which could therefore easily penetrate even the deepest recesses of Newfoundland's irregular coast.⁵⁹[59]

The merits of both the location and these activities were demonstrated almost immediately. *Hope*'s encounters with the natives began literally the day the vessel moored in Great Jervis Harbour – a shallop was found there with several Mi'kmaq men,

women and children. Similar encounters occurred in the days that followed as *Hope's* crew began to construct winter quarters on shore. In mid-December, a shallop with seventeen Mi'kmaq men, women and children was sighted, another was spotted shortly thereafter with twenty-nine on board, while two shallows with fifty men, women, and children were sighted on 18 December.⁶⁰[60] In many instances, the natives came to the schooner, possibly drawn by curiosity, possibly by an expectation of trade. On at least one occasion, in mid-January, a child was brought to the ship to be baptized, though it is not clear who would have performed the ceremony, as there is no evidence that *Hope's* complement included a chaplain. Most likely the Mi'kmaq would have preferred that the child be baptized by a proper priest in Saint-Pierre – a Mi'kmaq shallop had appeared at Saint-Pierre on Christmas Eve, in search of religious services, provisions, and other forms of assistance.⁶¹[61] But the French did not welcome the natives, and Governor d'Angeac's official posture remained decidedly cool to their visits.

It also quickly became apparent that others were in the area besides the Mi'kmaq. Several log entries reported shallows owned or manned by Englishmen – on one occasion, two natives appeared in English boats crewed by English men. North Arm (or North Bay) in particular appeared to be a bustling hive of activity, with almost daily reports of shallows coming and going, both native and Englishmen, presumably for trade. Thus, at one point *Hope's* crew were the recipients of some venison, while on another occasion *Hope* sent its shallop into North Bay to secure a supply of nails. It is not clear who these English were, or what drew them there – the opportunity to trade with the Mi'kmaq or the opportunity to trade with the French. Whatever reason applied, what *is* clear is that all this activity conflicted with Commodore Palliser's determination to discourage completely any interaction between Newfoundland and the French islands of Saint-Pierre and Miquelon . And the natives who had gravitated to Hermitage Bay and Bay d'Espoir were only making the situation more difficult.

Certainly by 1766 Commodore Palliser used the Mi'kmaq presence in the region to paint an exceedingly black picture of the future of the fishery in order to secure support for his efforts from his superiors in London :

. . . those Indians . . . dispers'd themselves about the Country to the great terror of all our People in those parts, so that before the arrival of the

Kings Vessels, they had begun to retire, & had determin'd to Abandon the whole Fishery to the Westward of Placentia Fort, for the Indians had already begun to insult and Rob them on pretence of want of Provisions; but under the protection of the Kings Ships, our People return'd and remain. The Chiefs of the Indians were Summon'd, and had deliver'd to them my Orders to quit this Country. . . .62[62]

It was therefore with renewed vigour that the ships, vessels, and shallops of the Royal Navy resumed their efforts in the spring and through the summer and fall of 1766 to monitor shipping in and out of Saint-Pierre, seizing any vessels suspected of trading with the adjacent coasts of Newfoundland . Though *Spy* remained moored at Placentia until the beginning of April, she had three shallops under her wing that were constantly in and out of harbour, cruising, inspecting, and occasionally seizing vessels accused of violating trade restrictions. By the time *Spy* added her weight to these patrols, *Hope* had also begun to cruise out to Saint-Pierre and Miquelon . Finally, in May, the rest of the station ships began making their appearance. As far as the Mi'kmaq were concerned, all this activity appears to have had the desired effect. By the time vessels were again stationed at Placentia and Great Jervis Harbour as winter approached, the better “to drive away the Indians and to keep the French off,” as Palliser put it in a despatch, Mi'kmaq were no longer sighted or reported in Bay d'Espoir.63[63] Instead, Palliser learned that they had moved over to the West Coast of Newfoundland.64[64] While some Mi'kmaq occasionally still made their way to Saint-Pierre, by 1767 they were no longer a disruptive presence in the region.65[65]

Conclusion

Do the efforts of Commodore Palliser and the ships and vessels of the Newfoundland station deserve credit for discouraging the Mi'kmaq from restoring their link with the French through Saint-Pierre? Had the navy been successful in interdicting the migration of Chief Jeannot's band of Mi'kmaq from Cape Breton Island to Newfoundland ? Strictly speaking, the answer must be no. The Mi'kmaq did settle on Newfoundland, though they appear to have avoided Bay d'Espoir, at least for a while, after the false start between

1763 and 1766; instead they moved to Bay St. George, far from Saint-Pierre, far from the commercial activity that centred on the French island, and therefore posing far less disruptive an element in Anglo-French relations. The decision to station HM Schooner *Hope* almost certainly served as a disincentive to a continuing Mi'kmaq presence in Bay d'Espoir. While *Hope*'s crew took no steps to drive the natives away, the constant naval presence in the area did disrupt trade in the area to such an extent that any contact between Saint-Pierre and the Mi'kmaq in Bay d'Espoir was sporadic at best. Contributing to Mi'kmaq frustration would have been French reluctance to welcome them at a time when the need to re-establish a French presence in Saint-Pierre required a more circumspect relationship with the English. In the final analysis, the Mi'kmaq found themselves in a region where English and French imperial friction was sufficiently intense to interfere with their efforts to pursue their own priorities.⁶⁶[66]



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Notes

1[1]. “Hugh Palliser, the Royal Navy and the Projection of British Power in Newfoundland Waters, 1764-68,” presented at the XIXth International Congress of Historical Sciences, meeting of the International Commission of Maritime History, Oslo, Norway, August 2000; (with Dennis Bartels) “Micmac Migration to Western Newfoundland,” *Canadian Journal of Native Studies* 10, No. 1 (1990), pp. 71-94;

“Showing the Flag: Hugh Palliser in Western Newfoundland, 1764,” *The Northern Mariner/Le Marin du Nord* 3, No. 3 (July 1993), pp. 3-14. An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the Fourth International Congress of Maritime History in Corfu, Greece (June 2004) under the title “The Navy and the Natives: The Royal Navy and the Attempt to Interdict Aboriginal Migration to Newfoundland, 1763-1766.”

2[2]. See, for instance, the essays in Jeremy Black and Philip Woodfine (eds.), *The British Navy and the Use of Naval Power in the Eighteenth Century* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 1989), particularly Julian Gwyn, “The Royal Navy in North America, 1712-1776,” pp. 129-147.

3[3]. David Syrett, “A Study of Peacetime Operations: The Royal Navy in the Mediterranean, 1752-5,” *The Mariner’s Mirror* 90, No. 1 (February 2004), pp. 42-50. Syrett was looking at the squadron commanded by Commodore Hon. George Edgcumbe in the Mediterranean during the brief peace between the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years’ War.

4[4]. For Saint-Pierre and Miquelon, see Jean-Yves Ribault, “La pêche et le commerce de la morue aux Îles Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon de 1763 à 1793,” in *Congrès National des Sociétés Savantes, Actes du 91e congrès à Rennes 1966* (Paris, 1969), Tome I, pp. 251-292, and Jean-Yves Ribault, “La population des Îles Saint-Pierre et Miquelon de 1763 à 1793,” *Revue française d’histoire d’outre-mer* 53 (1966), pp. 5-66. The Treaty of Paris also saw France turn Louisiana over to Spain.

5[5]. James K. Hiller, “Utrecht Revisited: The Origins of French Fishing Rights in Newfoundland Waters,” *Newfoundland Studies* 7, No. 1 (Spring 1991), pp. 23-39.

6[6]. The British Board of Trade maintained that “the Newfoundland Fishery as a means of wealth and power is of more worth than both of the aforementioned provinces . . . ;” Gerald Graham, “Fisheries and Sea Power,” *Canadian Historical Association Annual Report 1941*, reprinted in G. A. Rawlyk (ed.), *Historical Essays on the Atlantic Provinces* (Ottawa, 1967), p. 8. At almost the same time, the French Minister of Marine, the Duc de Choiseul, insisted that “the codfishery in the Gulf of St. Lawrence is worth infinitely more for the realm of France than Canada or Louisiana.” Cited in Max Savelle, *The Origins of American Diplomacy: The International History of Anglo-America, 1492-1783*

(New York, 1967), p. 475n. See also Jean-François Brière, “Pêche et politique à Terre-Neuve au XVIIIe siècle; la France véritable gagnante du traité d’Utrecht?,” *Canadian Historical Review* 64, No. 2 (June 1983), pp. 168-170.

7[7]. The refusal of the British Prime Minister, William Pitt, to bend in the matter contributed to the emergence within the British cabinet of more moderate voices and the eventual resignation of Pitt as Prime Minister; Jonathan R. Dull, *The French Navy and the Seven Years’ War* (Lincoln, NB, 2005), Chapt. 8, “1761”; James K. Hiller, “The Newfoundland Fisheries Issue in Anglo-French Treaties, 1713-1904,” *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 24, No. 1 (January 1996), pp. 1-23.

8[8]. Olaf Janzen, “The French Raid Upon the Newfoundland Fishery in 1762 – A Study in the Nature and Limits of Eighteenth-Century Sea Power,” in William B. Cogar (Gen. Ed.), *Naval History: The Seventh Symposium of the U.S. Naval Academy* (Wilmington, DE, 1988), pp. 35-54.

9[9]. Jean-François Brière suggests that this friction was deliberate, encouraged by the French in hopes of getting the British to re-define the limits of the French Shore ; see Brière, “Pêche et politique à Terre-Neuve.”

10[10]. A detailed account of d’Angeac’s efforts is provided in Frederick J. Thorpe, “The Debating Talents of the First Governor of Saint-Pierre and Miquelon, François-Gabriel d’Angeac, 1764-1769,” *Newfoundland Studies* 18, No. 1 (Spring 2002), pp. 61-83.

11[11]. Jack P. Greene, “An Uneasy Connection; An Analysis of the Preconditions of the American Revolution,” in Stephen G. Kurtz and James H. Hutson (eds.), *Essays on the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1973), p. 72.

12[12]. For a thorough treatment of the evolution of government policy and administration in Newfoundland , see Jerry Bannister, *The Rule of the Admirals: Law, Custom, and Naval Government in Newfoundland , 1699-1832* (Toronto , 2003). For Newfoundland ’s emergence as a settled society, see Stephen J. Hornsby, *British Atlantic, American Frontier: Spaces of Power in Early Modern British America* (Hanover , NH , 2005), Chapt. 3, “Atlantic Staple Regions: Newfoundland , the West Indies, and Hudson Bay .”

13[13]. Olaf Janzen, “Hugh Palliser, the Royal Navy and the Projection of British Power in Newfoundland Waters, 1764-68,” paper presented at the meeting of the International Commission of Maritime History during the XIXth International Congress of Historical Sciences, Oslo, Norway (August 2000); see also Janzen, “Showing the Flag.”

14[14]. The best overall study of Cook remains J.C. Beaglehole, *The Life of Captain James Cook* (Stanford, CA, 1974), but for Cook in Newfoundland, see William Whiteley, *James Cook in Newfoundland 1762-1767* (St. John’s, 1975); William Whiteley, “James Cook and British Policy in the Newfoundland Fisheries 1763-7,” *Canadian Historical Review* 54 (1973), pp. 245-72; and William Whiteley, “James Cook, Hugh Palliser, and the Newfoundland Fisheries,” *Newfoundland Quarterly* 69, No. 2 (October 1972), pp. 17-22.

15[15]. See William Whiteley, “Governor Hugh Palliser and the Newfoundland and Labrador Fishery, 1764-1768,” *Canadian Historical Review* 50, No. 2 (June 1969), pp. 141-163; see also Whiteley’s essay on Palliser in the *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, IV, ed. Frances G. Halpenny (Toronto, 1979), pp. 597-601 (hereafter, *DCB*).

16[16]. Palliser (St. John’s) to Admiralty Secretary Phillip Stephens, 18 October 1767, The National Archives (PRO) [hereafter cited as TNA (PRO)] Admiralty 1 series [hereafter Adm 1], vol. 470, 13v. Palliser was true to his word. In contrast to his predecessors, he personally visited the more remote coasts of his jurisdiction – with most of his squadron to the West Coast one year, to the South Coast in the vicinity of the French islands in 1765, as well as the northernmost part of the island, where the French retained fishing privileges by treaty, as well as Labrador.

17[17]. Charles A. Martijn refers to the Gulf of St. Lawrence as a Mi’kmaq “domain of islands”; see “An Eastern Micmac Domain of Islands,” in William Cowan (ed.), *Actes du vingtième congrès des Algonquistes* (Ottawa, 1989), pp. 208-31. See also his “Les Micmacs aux îles de la Madeleine: visions fugitives et glanures ethnohistoriques,” in C.A. Martijn (ed.), *Les Micmacs et la Mer* (Montréal, 1986), pp. 163-94, and his “Voyages des Micmacs dans la vallée du Saint-Laurent, sur la Côte-Nord et à Terre-Neuve,” *op. cit.*, pp. 197-224, as well as Olive Patricia Dickason, “Louisbourg and the Indians: A Study in Imperial Race Relations, 1713-1760,” (Ottawa, 1976), p. 46. For

scepticism that Newfoundland was part of the Mi'kmaq domain, see Ingeborg Marshall, "Beothuk and Micmac: Re-examining Relationships," *Acadiensis* 17, No. 2 (Spring 1988), pp. 52-82; Leslie F.S. Upton, *Micmacs and Colonists; Indian-White Relations in the Maritimes, 1713-1867* (Vancouver, 1979), p. 64. Significantly, archaeological work in the vicinity of Burgeo suggests there was no Recent Indian presence (including Mi'kmaq) in southwestern Newfoundland until after a seasonal European occupation introduced the attraction of "iron and other European materials"; Tim Rast, M.A.P. Renouf, and Trevor Bell, "Patterns in Precontext Site Location on the Southwest Coast of Newfoundland," *Northeast Anthropology* No. 68 (Fall 2004), pp. 41-55, esp. p. 51.

18[18]. Mirligučche was on the west coast of Lake Bras d'Or, Cape Breton Island. The mission never developed into a farming settlement but functioned instead as a Mi'kmaq assembly point on various occasions throughout the year, and sometimes as a place to leave the elderly, the women, and the children when the men went on hunting expeditions; see Dickason, "Louisbourg and the Indians," p. 72. In 1750 Abbé Maillard moved the mission to Chapel Island (Potloteg), near Port Toulouse. See Martijn, "Micmac Domain," pp. 220-221; Upton, *Micmacs and Colonists*, p. 34. Thereafter the Mi'kmaq congregated annually at Chapel Island to celebrate the day of their patron saint, Anne.

19[19]. Upton maintained that the gifts were initially a form of rent, an acknowledgement by the French that they were intruders in the region, and that later the French regarded the gifts as "a form of retainer for future services"; *Micmacs and Colonists*, pp. 36-38.

20[20]. Both Martijn and Dickason stress the degree of Mi'kmaq dependency upon French gifts, but Dickason also emphasizes the reciprocal nature of this dependency. Compare Martijn, "Micmac Domain," p. 221 with Dickason, "Louisbourg and the Indians," pp. 87-88.

21[21]. Upton, *Micmacs and Colonists*, pp. 31, 40. In 1768 General Thomas Gage, the Commander-in-Chief of British forces in North America, observed that "[the natives'] Jealousy of our increasing Strength, and their former Experience, when the French possessed Canada, have taught the Savages the Policy of a Balance of Power. They had

two Nations to Court them and make them Presents and when disgusted with one, they found the other glad to accept their offers of Friendship”; Gage to Secretary of State Lord Hillsborough, 12 March 1768, in Clarence Edwin Carter (ed.), *The Correspondence of General Thomas Gage with the Secretaries of State 1763-1775* (New Haven, CT, 1931; reprinted, Hamden, CT, 1969), vol. I, p. 166 (hereafter cited as *Gage Papers*).

22[22]. In a report on native trade in North America, Capt. Gordon, Chief Engineer of North America, observed that the French system of trading with the natives was far superior to all existing British systems, and recommended its adoption by the British. The report was forwarded by General Gage to Secretary of State Lord Shelburne on 22 February, 1767; *Gage Papers* I, p. 121. See also Upton, *Micmacs and Colonists*, pp. 36-39.

23[23]. General Whitmore to General Sir Jeffery Amherst, 14 November 1760, TNA (PRO) War Office 34 series, “Amherst Papers,” vol. 17, p. 98; Julian Gwyn, “Edward Whitmore,” *DCB* III (1741-1770), pp. 662-663.

24[24]. According to Dickason, General Amherst “ruled that Indians could no longer be supplied with arms and ammunition as it was no longer necessary to purchase their friendship or neutrality since the French had lost their footing in Canada. It would now only be necessary to keep the Indians aware ‘of our superiority, which more than anything else will keep them in Awe, and make them refrain from Hostilities’”; Dickason, “Louisbourg and the Indians,” pp. 88-89.

25[25]. Upton, *Micmacs and Colonists*, p. 37.

26[26]. In his letter to General Amherst of 1 December 1759, General Whitmore identified Jeannot as the chief of the Cape Breton Mi’kmaq; TNA (PRO) WO 34/17, pp. 46-47. Governor Montague Wilmot of Nova Scotia also referred to Jeannot as “chief of the Indians of the Island of Breton”; Wilmot to Board of Trade, 17 September 1764, TNA (PRO) Colonial Office papers (hereafter CO), series 217, vol. 21, p. 234, as did Samuel Holland, the Surveyor of Cape Breton Island in 1768; Holland, “A Description of the Island of Cape Britain,” 1 November 1768, TNA (PRO) CO 5/70, pp. 14-45.

27[27]. Upton emphasized that in the immediate aftermath of the Halifax treaties of 1761, “the Micmacs were more interested in priests and presents than in land”; Upton, *Micmacs and Colonists*, p. 68.

28[28]. Upton, *Micmacs and Colonists*, pp. 33, 65, 68; Martijn, “Micmac Domain,” p. 222.

29[29]. Benjamin Green to Board of Trade, 24 August 1766, TNA (PRO) CO 217/21, ff. 263.

30[30]. Gov. Francklin to Board of Trade, 3 September 1766, TNA (PRO) CO 217/21, p. 312; Gov. Wilmot to Board of Trade, 9 October 1765, *ibid.*, pp. 179-180 and same to same, 17 September 1765, *ibid.*, p. 234. General Amherst blamed the difficulty of negotiating a settlement with the Mi’kmaq on French priests. He complained to the Board of Trade in 1761 that the Mi’kmaq in the “north parts of this province [Nova Scotia and Cape Breton] had not yet wholly made their submission to His Majesty” due to the machinations of Jean Manach, a priest who worked among the Mi’kmaqs with Abbé Maillard and was imprisoned by the British authorities and sent to England in 1761; Amherst to Board of Trade, March 1761, TNA (PRO) CO 5/60, p. 240.

31[31]. Olaf Janzen, “The French Raid,” p. 45; Upton, *Micmacs and Colonists*, p. 61.

32[32]. See Martijn, “Micmac Domain,” pp. 222-223; Pastore, “Micmac Colonization,” p. 9. French records recorded sixty Mi’kmaq families wintering in Fortune Bay in 1707 and 1708, while others lived temporarily on Saint-Pierre; Marshall, “Beothuk and Micmac,” p. 57. Pastore and Martijn both suggest that game depletion in Cape Breton Island also contributed to Newfoundland’s appeal. Martijn adds that “whenever survival was affected by various circumstances, the Eastern Mi’kmaq responded by shifting their activities to different parts of this vast island domain”; *ibid.*, p. 225.

33[33]. Governor Wilmot of Nova Scotia would accuse the French at Saint-Pierre of engineering “the defection of several Indian families, to the amount of one hundred and fifty persons” from Cape Breton Island to Saint-Pierre in 1765; Wilmot to the Board of Trade, 17 September 1764, TNA (PRO) CO 217/21, p. 216. This view is not supported by the obvious nervousness of the French at having the Mi’kmaq come to Saint-Pierre; Ribault, “La Population des îles Saint-Pierre et Miquelon,” pp. 35-38.

34[34]. In 1727 Cape Breton Mi'kmaq seized a New England vessel at Port aux Basques; Governor de Brouillon to Minister of Marine Maurepas, 13 September 1727 and 20 November 1727, Paris, Archives des Colonies [hereafter AC] C11B, vol. 9, pp. 50v-51 and 64-70v (copy kept by Fortress Louisbourg National Historic Park, Louisbourg, Nova Scotia [hereafter cited as AFL]); Lt. Gov. Armstrong to the Committee of Trade and Plantations, 17 November, 1727, *Calendar of State Papers Colonial* [hereafter CSPC], vol. 35, #789. In 1747/48, when England and France were still at war, a party of forty Mi'kmaq over-wintering in southwestern Newfoundland plundered the homes of settlers and captured a number of prisoners, some of whom were put to death; Marshall, "Beothuk and Micmac," p. 65.

35[35]. TNA (PRO) Adm 52/1316, No.2, Master's log, HMS *Lark*, 1763; National Maritime Museum, Greenwich [hereafter NMM], Graves Papers [hereafter GRV], vol. 105, "Answers to Heads of Inquiry, 1763," esp. "Remarks" of Capt. Thompson and "Answers" of Capt. Thompson, No. 46.

36[36]. Thompson to Phillip Stephens, 16 April 1764, TNA (PRO) Adm 1/2590, #4. Governor Graves referred to it as "the Treaty with them made by Genl Whitmore"; Graves to Secretary of the Admiralty, 20 October 1763 (draft), NMM GRV/106. A copy of the treaty evidently accompanied this letter but has since disappeared. Annotations indicate that Stephens passed Jeannot's request for presents on to the Board of Trade, though the Board had already received the request directly from Thompson; Thompson to Board of Trade, 28 April 1764, TNA (PRO) CO 217/20, Part 2, p. 322. Martijn, citing Brown, claims that the presents for Jeannot and his band were subsequently delivered in 1764 by HMS *Tweed*; Richard Brown, *A History of the Island of Cape Breton* (London, 1869), pp. 356-7, cited in Martijn, "Les Micmacs aux îles de la Madelaine," p. 271. But this was not the case. The Board of Trade advised the Admiralty and Captain Thompson that Jeannot's band fell under the jurisdiction of the Governor of Nova Scotia, and that the Natives should "apply" for presents to Halifax; Minutes of a meeting of the Lords of the Admiralty, 2 May, 1764, TNA (PRO) Adm 3/72, p. 6. Captains of Royal Navy ships cruising in Newfoundland waters were authorized to give Jeannot this message, as was Jonathan Broom; see Palliser at York Harbour in the Bay of Islands to Jonathan Broom,

29 July 1764, Provincial Archives of Newfoundland and Labrador [hereafter PANL], GN 2/1A/3, p. 235.

37[37]. “Remarks” of Capt. Samuel Thompson, HMS *Lark*, NMM GRV/105.

38[38]. Draft of Graves to Secretary Stephens, 20 October 1763, NMM GRV/106.

39[39]. Palliser to Board of Trade, 30 October 1765, TNA (PRO) CO 194/16, pp. 173-173v.

40[40]. Palliser, Remarks on Article 32 of his instructions, TNA (PRO) CO 194/17, pp. 26v-27.

41[41]. Palliser refers to this in a letter to Michael Francklin, the Lieutenant Governor of Nova Scotia, dated 16 October 1766; see TNA (PRO) CO 194/16, pp. 308-9. Palliser indicates that he immediately wrote to Major Wallace, the commanding officer at Louisbourg, insisting that the passes be revoked.

42[42]. Palliser to Board of Trade, 30 October 1765, TNA (PRO) CO 194/16, pp. 173-173v; Palliser to Lt. Col. Pringle (Louisbourg), 22 October 1765, PANL GN2/1A/3, p. 343.

43[43]. Pastore, “Micmac Colonization,” p. 13, and Ralph Pastore, *The Newfoundland Micmacs: A History of Their Traditional Life* (St. John’s, 1978), p. 14. See also Virginia P. Miller, “The Decline of Nova Scotia Micmac Population, A.D. 1600-1850,” *Culture* 2, No. 3 (1982), pp. 107-120, esp. p. 110.

44[44]. In 1766 Lt. Gov. Francklin urged Palliser to have the warships stationed near Saint-Pierre and Miquelon do more to prevent all contact between the Mi’kmaq and the French, for fear that such contact would “in time prove of very ill consequence to this Young Province as our settlements are very stragling and defenceless”; Francklin to Palliser, 11 September 1766, TNA (PRO) CO 194/16, pp. 307-307v.

45[45]. Wilmot to Pringle, 12 December 1765, cited in Pastore, “Micmac Colonization,” p. 13.

46[46] Wilmot to the Board of Trade, 17 September 1764, TNA (PRO) CO 217/21, p. 216. Wilmot was reacting to the Board’s refusal to comply with the request for presents which Jeannot had made in 1763 to HMS *Lark*. When Jeannot redirected his request to the authorities in Cape Breton, he was turned down by the commandant at Louisbourg.

47[47]. As Wilmot explained, “the same Indian chief mentioned by your lordships [i.e., Jeannot] had ineffectually applied to the officer commanding the troops at Louisbourg for some small allowance of provisions, and other necessaries, and the declarations he then made, of being obliged, on the refusal he met with, to have recourse to the Island of St. Peter, and I have lately had the mortification to find that he was not only well received there, but that he has continued on that Island ever since with his whole tribe.” Wilmot to the Board of Trade, 17 September 1764, TNA (PRO) CO 217/21, p. 216.

48[48]. Choiseul’s instructions to d’Angeac, 23 February 1763, cited in Ribault, “La Population des îles Saint-Pierre et Miquelon ,” p. 35.

49[49]. See Thorpe, “The Debating Talents of . . . d’Angeac.”

50[50]. Capt. Colvill to Admiralty Secretary Phillip Stephens, 25 October 1763, TNA (PRO) Adm 1/482, p. 305.

51[51]. Thomas Graves to Board of Trade, 20 October, 1763, TNA (PRO) CO 194/15, p. 108. South Coast residents were attracted to this trade because the merchants of Saint-Pierre sold them supplies and gear at half the price charged by British merchants in Newfoundland; Palliser to Lord Halifax, 11 September, 1765, TNA (PRO) CO 194/27, pp. 122v-123. A lively trade also developed between the mainland colonies of British America and the French. Lt. Dundas of the *St. Lawrence* schooner reported both New England and Nova Scotia traders at Saint-Pierre to his commander, Lord Colvill; Colvill to Admiralty Secretary Phillip Stephens, 13 November 1764, TNA (PRO) Adm 1/482, pp. 410-2.

52[52]. Baron de l’Espérance to the Minister of Marine, 28 April 1766, Archives nationales de France, Colonies C12/2, ff. 22-22v (National Archives of Canada Reel F-568); hereafter cited as (NAC) AN Colonies C12/2.

53[53]. Palliser to Board of Trade, 30 October 1765, TNA (PRO) CO 194/16, pp. 173-173v; Palliser to Lt. Col. Pringle (Louisbourg), 22 October 1765, PANL GN2/1A/3, p. 343.

54[54]. See, for instance, Whiteley, “Governor Hugh Palliser” and Whiteley, “James Cook, Hugh Palliser, and the Newfoundland Fisheries.”

55[55]. Palliser to Board of Trade, 30 October 1764, TNA (PRO) CO 194/16, p. 172v. He was not so optimistic that he could put a stop to the trade between the French and the residents of Newfoundland's South Coast: "I am Satisfy'd that no Examples, Orders or threats will have any effect on such People as the Winter Inhabitants of Newfoundland are." Ship movements based on information in captains' letters and ships' logs, including TNA (PRO) Adm 1/2300, IX; Adm 51/674; Adm 51/4210, IV (*Guernsey*), Adm 51/674, II (*Pearl*), Adm 51/4220 and Adm 52/1288 (*Hope*), Adm 51/925 and Adm 52/4396 (*Spy*).

56[56]. Indeed, in February, long before *Spy* herself could set out, Allwright began to send shallops out on patrols; Captain's and Master's logs, HM Sloop *Spy*, TNA (PRO) Adm 51/925; Adm 52/4396.

57[57]. Captain's and Master's logs, HM Schooner *Hope*, Lt. [William?] Stanford, TNA (PRO) Adm 51/4220; Adm 52/1288; Captain's letters, Adm 1/2300, IX. Stanford took over command of *Hope* in October from Lt. John Candler. Great Jervis Harbour was also frequently identified as Grand Jarvis Harbour .

58[58]. Shortly after Christmas, *Hope* was nearly wrecked in a snow squall while on a brief cruise across Hermitage Bay . Details in this and subsequent paragraphs are taken from entries for the period November 1765 to March 1766 in the Captain's and Master's logs, HM Schooner *Hope*, TNA (PRO) Adm 51/4220 and Adm 52/1288.

59[59]. A shallop was a large open boat, occasionally provided with a canvas shelter or partial deck, propelled by both sails and oars. It was quite common for shallops to be purchased or hired by the navy to expand the vessels available to the station for purposes of visiting out-ports, probing deep into bays like Hermitage Bay and Bay d'Espoir. They were typically given names that identified the home station of the warship from which came their crew and officer or even the warship itself; usually the single officer would be a junior lieutenant or even a midshipman. In addition to extending the patrolling capability of a warship, the shallops therefore also gave midshipmen and junior lieutenants the kind of command experience that was an essential part of their training.

60[60]. Master's log, HM Schooner *Hope*, Mr. James Blake, TNA (PRO) Adm 52/1288.

61[61]. Charles-Gabriel-Sébastien, Baron de L'Espérance, Governor d'Angeac's nephew and eventual successor, noted the arrival at Saint-Pierre of a shallop of "sauvages

micmacs” from the Newfoundland coast on 24 December 1765; Baron de L’Espérance to the Minister of Marine, 28 April 1766, (NAC) AN Colonies C12/2, ff. 22-22v. See also Ribault, “La Population des îles Saint-Pierre et Miquelon ,” p. 35.

62[62]. Palliser to Board of Trade, 21 October 1766, TNA (PRO) CO 194/16, p. 302v.

63[63]. Palliser to Lt. Gov. Francklin (Halifax), 16 October 1766, TNA (PRO) CO 194/16, pp. 308-309. Spending the winter at Placentia this time was the sloop *Favourite* (16); *Hope* schooner again wintered at Great Jervis Harbour . See *Favourite*’s Captain’s log, TNA (PRO) Adm 51/347 and *Hope*’s Captain’s and master’s logs, TNA (PRO) Adm 51/4220 and Adm 52/1288.

64[64]. Palliser to Board of Trade, Postscript of 27 October 1766, TNA (PRO) CO 194/16, pp. 305-305v. James Cook “found ... a Tribe of Mickmak Indians” in Bay St. George while conducting his survey of that coast in 1767; Master’s Log, *Grenville*, 20 May 1767, TNA (PRO) Adm 52/1263, p. 233.

65[65]. A shallop of Mi’kmaq arrived in Saint-Pierre in 1769 on the pretext of seeking news about the health of the French King and to assure the local authorities that their loyalty to France remained strong; additional visits by small family groups were reported in 1777 and 1778. See Ribault, “La population,” p. 35.