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Naval Presence: The Cruiser *Esmeralda* in Panama

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On 10 April 1885 The cruiser *Esmeralda* left Valparaíso for Panama. After loading coal at Callao it arrived at her destination on 28 April. There, the ship would carry out a task that is little known in Chilean historiography^[1].

No concrete information has been found detailing the reasons for the mission assigned, except what has been written by her captain Juan Esteban López Lermenda. In his book Recuerdos sobre la Guerra del Pacífico^[2] he tells us that he was called to the office of the President of Chile Domingo Santa María González. Waiting in the presidential office was the Minister of Foreign Relations Luis Aldunate who told him that “ the government has had some powerful reasons to pick you to carry on a delicate mission which has been communicated to you and now you are to carry on the mission.” These orders meant that he was being recalled to active duty after being relieved of the command of the ironclad *Blanco Encalada* during the War of the Pacific, which had ended a few years before. López does not tell us what the mission was and neither does he tell us how he carried it out. This may be due to the fact that his book was intended to explain his role during the War of the Pacific and the unjust reasons why he was relieved. Another officer who has mentioned the incident was then Commander Alberto Silva Palma,^[3] later a Rear Admiral.

The prominent Chilean writer, Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna, in an article published in 1885 about Easter Island, which had not yet been incorporated to Chile, mentions the rivalry between the United States and Chile^[4]. He claims that the port of Panama was “ occupied a few days ago by a naval division of the Northern Federation.” And continues by asking himself if the American expansion will stop at that point, and concludes: “ We don’t know for sure, but it is certainly a cautious and praiseworthy point that along with the gray capes of the soldiers of the Union had also shown, as in Chimbote, the blue blouses of our sailors from the “*Esmeralda*” even though their appearance may not have been more than a mute protest.” These unclear and unfocused statements by Silva Palma and Vicuña Mackenna, surrounded by the obscurity that has clouded the subject certainly deserve a deeper investigation.

Chile’s Relations with the U.S. at that Time

William Sater in his book Chile and United states, Empires in Conflict, has covered extensively the relations between the two countries^[5]. In the chapter covering this period, Sater claims that after the War of the Pacific Chile emerged as a potential threat to the United States. In the us Congress it was periodically stated that the three Chilean ironclads *Blanco*, *Cochrane* and *Huáscar* could easily sink all the wooden hulled ship of

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the United States Navy. At the end of the War, Chile had added the protected cruiser *Esmeralda*, with a very powerful artillery and impressive speed. According to Sater a us publication in August of 1885, right after the Panama events, stated, “ the later (The *Esmeralda*) could destroy our whole navy, ship by ship and never be touched once.” It was during this time that Captain Alfred Mahan served in the South American Pacific Ocean as captain of American ships. Learning from his experiences, readings and analysis of events he would later write his book *The Influence of Seapower in History*, probably the most important naval treatise ever written. Says Sater: “Alfred Thayer Mahan’s theories reinforced the lessons of the war of the Pacific. The United States would build a great fleet maybe be inspiration from the Chilean example”^[6].

Chilean author Emilio Meneses Ciuffardi agrees in general terms with the already mentioned United States awareness of Chilean naval power at the end of the War of the Pacific and the frustration felt by the American authorities when they failed to prevent Chile from imposing her own terms at the end of the conflict on Peru and Bolivia^[7].

Besides the authors already quoted, many others have mentioned the fact that the United States sympathies were for Peru and Bolivia during the conflict. The American attempts at mediation were an effort to prevent the incorporation of the occupied territories by Chile. These efforts failed. Later, the provisional Peruvian government of García Calderón offered to cede a naval base to the United States in Chimbote Bay. Rear-Admiral Patricio Lynch, commander of all Chilean military forces occupying Peru, learned of the negotiations between the two governments and ordered the immediate occupation of Chimbote by a force of Chilean marines on board the ironclad *Blanco Encalada*. This landing prevented the occupation of the port by the American steam frigate *Pensacola* in December of 1881. The crisis in Panama took place four years later, when the modern and powerful cruiser *Esmeralda* had already been commissioned in the Chilean Navy. A review of the *Memorias del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile*, an annual report to Congress in 1885 and 1886, nothing is found about the trip of the *Esmeralda*. The section covering Colombia describes the revolutionary movements in several of the confederate states and goes on to discuss the rough spots with three Pacific Coast nations. In Colombia, the Chileans were concerned about the conditions of the Chileans workers laboring in the Panama Canal project and the attitude of the Colombian authorities towards the transportation of war materials over the isthmus during the War of the Pacific. Chile wanted some sort of written guarantees for the future. In Ecuador, a country traditionally friendly to Chile, a small diplomatic crisis had not been solved. Chile had captured the Peruvian torpedo boat *Alay* in Ecuadorian waters, thus violating the neutrality of the country. The problems with Peru were many, all concerning the difficulties arising from the end of the war.

The Crisis in the Isthmus of Panama

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Panama was one of the states, which was part of the República Federativa de Colombia. Geographically it was very distant from Bogotá and very isolated from the rest of the country. It could only be reached by sea due to the thick jungles that cover the southern portion of the state. From Colonial times it had enjoyed a certain amount of autonomy and it was the important bridge carrying the gold and silver from the Viceroyalty of Peru to Europe besides being an important trade and commercial center. During the Republican period the mule trains that crossed the isthmus were the major form of transportation until the American built railroad replaced the pack animals. The train offered a fast, safe and secure method of transportation across the isthmus for both passengers and cargo between the two oceans. During the period that concerns us, a French company was attempting to build a transoceanic canal through the isthmus, using the experience gained in building the Suez Canal. In the United States there was concern of the French influence that was to be gained in the Americas, especially when considering the fact that France was in full colonial expansion in several parts of the World. There was a considerable strong opinion in the United States that American capital should be invested to build an interoceanic canal in Nicaragua.

At that time, Chile was one of the few Latin American countries that enjoy political stability. Peru, having lost the war was now immersing in a civil conflict. Clearly unstable governments governed Bolivia and Ecuador. Colombia was a special case. There had been numerous revolutionary uprisings in several states of the federation but in the state of Panama the movements had been violent with a definite separatist tendency and stimulating by both the United States and France who hoped to gain from the process

Political convulsions were frequent in the isthmus. Reussner y Nicolás^[8] tell us that between 1850 (the year when the railroad was built) and 1903 (when Panama gained independence) there were fifty-three revolutionary movements against the Bogotá government. An average of one a year!

The Valparaíso newspaper La Unión published during 1885 numerous news items concerning the crisis in Panama, all received through the submarine cable and published without much comment by the editorial staff. The official naval magazine Revista de Marina^[9] later published the itinerary of the cruiser *Esmeralda* that had been sent to Panama in order to intervene in the crisis. This can be complemented with the news published in La Unión but neither source tells us what the cruiser did during her stay in Panama. The only news item that refers to the incident was published in La Unión on 28 May 1885 and is just a reprint from the editorial page of El Telégrafo de Guayaquil without stating the date. One of the paragraphs reads:

The Chilean ship unfortunately arrived at the isthmus when the conflict had completely disappeared, leaving in darkness or for the future, the important explanation of the mystery, that is to say: Did the American forces proceed arbitrarily or did they have an

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agreement with the legal government? This should briefly be known, we don't doubt it, and that should determine the policies to be followed by the rest of the American nations, and specially Chile, which we consider at the vanguard, which policies must we adopt to prevent from such emergencies or situations in the future^[10].

There can be no doubt that the presence of the Chilean cruiser in an Ecuadorian port at that time has a close relation with this publication.

Emilio Meneses^[11], quoting American sources and a report by Captain López dated on El Callao on 9 June 1885, gives a more detailed account of what happened. The American reaction showed itself on 7 April 1885, USS *Shenandoah* arrived in Panama City and three days later, other American ships started arriving in Colon. On 27 April a force of marines was landed in Panama City. The next day, federal troops from Colombia arrived from Buenaventura, the nearest Colombian port on the Pacific. When on 28 April, the *Esmeralda* arrived in the port; conversations were started among the rebels, the commander of the American forces and the Colombian Federal Forces. These negotiations cooled the crisis. Captain López thought it was strange that the Colombian authorities did not approach him. He also reports that numerous American officers who wanted to know details of her capabilities visited his ship. Meneses concludes that,

the visit of the *Esmeralda* was cause for curiosity and worry to the naval authorities of United States and France both concerned as to what had motivated Chile to send that ship. And later he concludes: The trip did not turn out to be a Chilean intervention in favor of Colombian interests, among other reasons, because they were not in danger, put her presence clearly established what nation had the most powerful ship, if the circumstances required it. The Chilean navy was well aware of the usefulness of employing naval forces in politics and the reasoning followed by López not to act impulsively shows a well thought out political judgment to evaluate the situation he encountered when he arrived in Panama. The goal of the Chilean navy was not to show it could physically defeat potential rivals but to assure that the interests of Colombia be properly guarded.

Rodrigo Fuenzalida Bade, a Chilean naval historian, gives us a very different version of the events^[12]. In his biography of captain López, he says:

Upon taking command of the *Esmeralda*, Lopez was ordered to go to Panama and stop at Guayaquil and Callao. The United States was threatening the security of Colombia and could bomb Guayaquil if their requirements were not met.

One hundred miles off the coast of Chile, López opened a sealed envelope with the instructions from his government. It said, "You have carte blanche to do as you wish." In 1885 during the revolution led by Aizpurú in Panama and Prestán in Colón, he anchored in Panama where he learned that the United states had taken possession of Colon and was getting ready to do the same in Panama, then direct the internal politics of Colombia, change the authorities and then start the gigantic work that would later become

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reality with the opening of the Panama Canal. Under consideration was the bombardment of Guayaquil in case Ecuador would oppose these projects. Ready to defend the principles of Hispanic American brotherhood, audaciously and stubbornly, he announced that Chile would take possession of Panama to guarantee order just like the United States squadron had done in Colombia during the revolution against President Rafael Nuñez in 1884. Once his deadline had expired, he landed troops and occupied the main part of Panama City causing a great impression on all who witnessed it. A French admiral warned him that the American ships could attack him but Lopez paid no attention. "I will not abandon Panama until the American forces leave Colon" was the answer of the Chilean captain. A few days later, the United States re-embarked its forces in Colon and the Chileans did the same in Panama, keeping their integrity and returning on board the *Esmeralda*.

It should be noted that when this author writes about Panama, he is talking about the city and port of that name located on the Pacific coast and not the whole country. The already quoted Alberto Silva Palma (Silva Palma, 1912) gives us yet another version, different from the previous one. After mentioning the incident in Chimbote, he tells us that when López arrived in Panama in the *Esmeralda*

he found out surprisingly that the Americans had already landed on the other side of the isthmus with the intention of either controlling or putting pressure on the fighting sides with the purpose of guarding or protecting American interests. From this side, in Panama, captain López, after talking to the captain of a French corvette and as the senior chief present, communicated to the chief of American forces in Colon that if the American forces did not re-embark, he would be forced to land the same number of Chilean troops in Panama. Under these conditions, if the Americans did not abandon Colon, things could become very complicated. The justness of the request or perhaps the desire not to antagonize the nations of South America, which at that time were better armed than they were, the Americans decided to re-embark their troops. Once this was accomplished this act the foreign intervention in the affairs of an independent country, ceased.

As we can see, Vicuña Mackenna and Silva Palma who wrote immediately after the events and Fuenzalida Bade, writing in mid twentieth Century, all differ in their version as to the exact reach of Chilean intervention in this crisis. This makes it necessary to search for a direct and primary source to clear the subject.

A Primary Source

The report of the commanding officer of the cruiser *Esmeralda*, Captain Juan Esteban López Lermenda is a long document handwritten at El Callao ^[13]. He explains that he is writing in accordance with that part of the instructions that requires him to submit a memorandum detailing the information obtained. His mission was to obtain information

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about the situation in the isthmus and other areas bordering the Pacific coast of South America.

The extensive report goes into details that confirm the true nature of the mission. Upon arriving in Panama on 28 April 1885, López found three French ships, one flying the flag of the Admiral in command of the French Pacific squadron, one English and two Americans. A few days later the Colombian gunboat Boyacá arrived towing a barge. She was coming from the port of Buenaventura in the State of Cauca. This ship and the barge carried a military force under the command of General Montoya with the mission of restoring to power the federal Colombian authorities in the Isthmus of Panama.

The rebel troops under the command of general Aizpuru were a similar force poorly armed and trained, just like the federal forces, according to captain López.

In the railroad station and protecting the traffic across the isthmus, was stationed a United States contingent of troops composed of marines who had come from New York and in part from the sailors of the American ships anchored in Panama. In Colon there was a small force of the National Army of Colombia supported by strong contingent of American troops.

That was the situation when the *Esmeralda* arrived in Panama. Captain López tells us that the French Admiral and the British and American captains tried to learn why the Chilean cruiser was there. He asked the same questions. Contacting the Consul of Chile and other persons in Panama. He was surprise that neither the authorities in command at sea nor on land made any attempt to contact his or the other foreign warships anchored in the port. No doubt that he was talking about the two warring Colombian factions. "Since the events were going to have a quick ending I thought it prudent to abstain from communicating with either one of the warring parties and wait for the situation to solve itself before proceeding".

The captain of the *Esmeralda* explained the general situation in Panama at the time of his arrival there.

There are in Panama two great enterprises that rival for their influence over the isthmus. The Sociedad Universal del Canal Interoceánico (digging the canal) and the railroad company that crosses the isthmus. Both companies give life to all the commercial movement in that place; large amount of capitals are at stake, the both have large personnel and nobody or nothing moves in the towns unless it is related to these two great companies or some how tied to them in some way or other.

He goes on to say that the two companies share the capital but have separate administrations. The canal company has a French majority and the railroad is predominantly American. There is great rivalry between the two groups: "The day that the two companies become one, nothing will be done in the state of Panama that is not

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controlled by them and they would change authorities and administrators as they wish”, he says to close this part of the report.

In his opinion the expropriation or confiscation of the railroad company would result in a large compensation to the government of Colombia, according to the treaty that allowed it to be built. It would also mean the end of United States control over the line. For this reasons both companies are kept separated even if the stockholders are the same people.

He also reports that it is noticeable the cosmopolitan composition of the population, having a minority of prominent Colombians.

Add to this the fact that government is indifferent and absent to the point of not being connected, with laws that are ignored and justice just in name. The Colombian government does not care: it has no strength or power to right the wrongs, to benefit the community, residing at such a great distance, all these make that the inhabitants of the city know more about Chile a country closer in days at sea and even better with New York whose distance by ship is only eight days, a much shorter distance than the capital of the government...(Bogotá). The constant revolts and their repressions by troops brought from Buenaventura, Cauca or Cartagena has created a profound hate among them (the Colombians from other states and the Panamanians) and if to these you add the indifference towards public affairs it turns out that if they are dominated by Caucanos or Americans it is not important for the Panamanians. The patriotic spirit is dead there and there is no other motivation than the money of the two large companies and the will of their administrators.

The report by Lopez then goes on into an interesting prediction. He claims that in not to distant future, the isthmus will be sold by Colombia becoming part of the United States. He does not believe that this is the right moment because the United States does not have the naval power needed in the Atlantic to confront the European powers and neither does it have a naval presence of consequence in the Pacific. He points out that the serious newspapers of New York editorialize over the presence of the *Esmeralda* in Panama. La Estrella de Panama reproduced this information but the subject causes no concern on the people or the local authorities, any more than the fact that in Flamenco Island there is a factory owned by an American enterprise into which the Colombian authorities or police are not allowed.

Captain Lopez's report also contains some details of the revolution then in progress in Panama. The President of the State of Panama, General Santo Domingo Vila, decided to lead an expedition against Cartagena, which had rebelled against the central federal government of Colombia. Since the government troops had left Colón, Pedro Prestán had no trouble revolting in that port. The company of the Canal under construction supported him. The revolutionaries ordered weapons from New York, at the same that they negotiated with the captain of an American warship assuring him that the free passage

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across the isthmus would be secure. When the weapons arrived, the American captain refused to allow their landing. Prestán answered by taking an officer from the ship as hostage and threatening to set the city on fire. It was believed that the change of attitude by the captain was the result of pressure by the railroad company that rivaled the canal company. A solution was found allowing a partial unloading of the weapons in return for the liberation of the officer.

Back in Panama City, the loyal Colombian forces organized a military expedition, which after crossing the isthmus by train defeated Prestán's troops in Colón. The defeated force sacked and pillaged the city and set it on fire before the loyal troops and the American landing force could intervene. But once the loyal forces left Panama City to fight at Colón, Rafael Aizpuru led another revolt and took over the Pacific port. It was thought that this movement was encouraged the canal company just like the troops that defeated Prestán in Colón had been backed by the railroad company. The loyal Colombian forces and the Americans that had been arriving in the Atlantic side at the request of Colombia were left isolated as rebel forces occupied several points. The railroad company pressured the American authorities to increase the number of American troops in Panama City, which was still in Aizpurú's hands. When this leader found out that these requests had been made and that a strong Colombian force was getting ready at Buenaventura, to put down his rebellion, he proceeded to raise barricades in the city causing great alarm among the population who feared the repetition of the excesses at Colón. The American marines and sailors intervened and were at the point of open combat with Aizpurú's forces forcing the rebel leader to back down and committing himself not to fight inside the city. Almost simultaneously the Colombian forces from State of Cauca arrived from Buenaventura. The Americans left the city and Aizpuru reached an agreement with General Montoya in command of the Colombian forces, which occupied Panama City on 30 April 1885. Part of the agreement was freedom for Aizpuru, his followers and troops.

Captain López had arrived with his cruiser two days before and went to visit the new person in charge, General Montoya. López says in his report that he went: "to let him know the desires of the Chilean government of keeping peace in the isthmus and how sorry it was about the sad events at Colón. I did not see fit to express any other comments, not only because the situation was under control and I saw the Colombian authorities were working closely with the United States however, before leaving, I made him know of my enthusiastic support if he thought we could be of use". The report goes on to enter into details of the respectful attitude of the United States forces towards the Colombian authorities and troops that had just arrived. López also reports the displeasure of the French admiral and the French citizens over the fact that they had no participation in the events and the advances in the influence of the United States. It was even thought that everything had been arranged beforehand because of the prompt arrival of American forces. He adds: "The Americans will tell and repeat to anyone who wants to listen that they will not allow the intervention of any European nation in American events and add

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that they are powerful enough to guarantee the South American interests and of the foreigners residing in this continent”.

The report goes on to explain the situation of Chilean citizens in Panama and the poor conditions in the area. He also believes that the French company attempting to build the canal has little or no chance to success.

Lopez ends his report writing: “Having ended my mission in Panama, I left the bay on 12 may at noon with destination the Colombian port of Buenaventura where we anchored at the mouth of the river on the night of the 13th”. Since the captain did not trust the pilot that was to guide the ship through the river, he stayed where he anchored and sent in his boats to get information before leaving for Guayaquil.

In the Ecuadorian port, López met with the Chilean gunboat *Chacabuco* whose captain let him know that there was some worry in town concerning the presence of Chilean ships thinking that they were trying to interfere in their affairs. López became aware that there was concern among the local authorities and the population of Guayaquil regarding a possible intervention by the United States in their affairs. There was also an internal tension within the country. Guayaquil was dominated by the liberal elements while in Quito the conservatives ruled. The governments of Colombia and Ecuador had agreed to keep an eye on the exiles from both countries so that they would not plot new movements that could alter public life.

The conflict with the United States was caused by the apprehension of an American citizen who had participated in a revolutionary movement against the government. The American government demanded the release of its citizen and the payments of damages. In those days, rumors circulated in Guayaquil that an American ship had arrived in Puná Island and would present an ultimatum for the release of the man on the threat of bombarding the town. The Quito government had deferred the claim to its representative in Washington. The captain of the cruiser *Esmeralda* was invited by the Governor of Guayaquil to analyze these events. The governor asked the Chilean captain involvement to avoid the port from being set on fire using his influence and the power of his ship. They had already asked for help through their representative in Santiago, asking that instructions be given to Captain López. The Chilean Captain answered that he did not share his concern and if there was something seriously grave going on, Santiago would know and let its representative in Quito know. He added: “I explained to him that the attitude and intentions of the United States could not be true considering that there were many ways in which the matter could be settled in a friendly way, before resorting to burn Guayaquil. Then the governor insisted on his fears because the government of Ecuador was unwilling to turn over the prisoner on the basis of its autonomy. López insisted that the American threat *was* only that with no true will to carry it out.

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Another factor fueling the concerns of the governor was the fact that the Panamanian press was favorable to an American intervention in the isthmus. López suggested that the local press could counter this information, which it actually did a few days later. The governor finally asked his help in the defense of Guayaquil. The cruiser then remained in port until it was clear that the threat of a bombardment would not be carried out. The ship departed when her captain decided that the sailing could not be seen as “trying to avoid our services to a friendly nation, so it was that our departure was seen as a sad move, because the citizens had pinned their hops that the cruiser would protect them in case a conflict would ensue”.

After commenting on the energy of the people of Guayaquil and the good coastal signaling along the Ecuadorian coast, López final phrase sent to his superiors is: “Having arrived in Panama when the major events had taken place and finding the isthmus occupied by American forces with the approval of the Colombian authorities, my mission was made easier as you can see in this small report which I hope will be acceptable to the Supreme Government....”

Final Comments

In studying the activities of the cruiser *Esmeralda* in Peruvian, Colombian and Ecuadorian waters between April and June 1885, we can see how contradictory are the sources available in Chile. Captain López report in none of it pages mentions having landed troops in Panama City. The Chilean ship acted by his presence alone, fundamentally because the Colombian authorities did not request help. The ship performed the duty of naval presence that is to show the flag and her naval power to promote national interest. In the case of Panama, the stoppage of traffic across the isthmus would have been a serious disruption for Chilean commerce. In the case of Ecuador, Chile was trying to protect a friend.

A naval presence, according to López, can be of great benefit to the Chilean nationals living abroad. It was shown that Chile not only maintained but also increased her naval power after the War of the Pacific against Perú and Bolivia in view of some pending matters originated by the war. In Panama he says “the applause was unanimous. The press let it be known many times of the presence of our ship and calling attention to the fact that it was the most powerful and fast war machine afloat. Not satisfied with their visits to our ship the American officers stationed there in both oceans drew sketches and wrote details of even the most insignificant details”.

If the purpose of the visit was naval presence, López carried it on accordingly. If his goal was to establish order in the isthmus, it was not done because it was not necessary since upon the arrival of the Chilean cruiser, the American and Colombia federal forces had already achieved the objective. In Ecuador the naval ´presence could have reduced the risk of an incident

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
The report by López, not confirming what Chilean naval historians and writers have written, puts a veil of doubt over their statements and points once more, to the need of searching primary sources. No doubt a deeper search in archives, diaries or newspapers could allow us to go deeper into this event.

Finally, we must conclude that the false statements that we have found in the texts concerning this crisis show that the historian's work can never be definitively finished.


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Chilean cruiser “Esmeralda”. Author: Willy. Location: Chilean Navy Headquarters, Santiago, Chile.




The Chilean cruiser *Esmeralda*, launched in England 6 June 1883: 3,000 tons displacement, two 10 inch and six 6 inch guns, three torpedo tubes, 18.5 knots, 293 men.

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Captain Juan Esteban Lopez, commanding officer
of the Chilean cruiser *Esmeralda* 1885

^[1] “Movimiento del Material de la Armada”. *Revista de Marina*. July 1885. 66.
The most important dates of this trip are given in the quoted article. Surprisingly, nothing is said about the trip in the official publication *Memorias de Marina* of the period 1885 – 1886, except that the ship was repaired in the Callao shipyards.

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[2] López Lermenda, Juan Esteban. *Mis recuerdos de la Guerra del Pacífico de 1879*. (Santiago de Chile, Imprenta Universitaria, 1910), 92.

[3] Silva Palma, Alberto. *Crónicas de la Marina Chilena*. 2. Ed. (Santiago de Chile, Talleres del Estado Mayor General, 1913).

This book containing chronicles includes a chapter called “La Escuadra Americana” (The us fleet) and the subject of cruiser “Esmeralda” in Panamá is covered in p. 235. It also covers the intervention of the ironclad “Blanco Encalada” to oose the us plans to set a base in Chimbote, while Perú was occupied by Chile en 1882.

[4] Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna. “*El Reparto del Pacífico. La posesión de la isla de Pascua*”. *Revista de Marina*. N°.1/ 1885, 85. This same article was reproduced one hundred years later in issue 3/1995, 291 of this magazine.

[5] Sater, William F. *Chile and the United States. Empires in Conflict*. (Athens, Georgia, usA, The University of Georgia Press, 1990), 51–68.

The subject of this paper is covered in the chapter significantly called *Chile confronts the United States 1884–1891*.

[6] Sater, Ibid..

[7] Meneses Ciuffardi, Emilio. *El factor naval en las relaciones entre Chile y Estados Unidos*. (Santiago de Chile, Hachette, 1989).

[8] Reussner André y Nicolas L. *La Puissance Navale dans L’Histoire*. (Paris, Editions Maritimes et d’outremer, 1963).

[9] “Movimiento del Material de la Armada”. *Revista de Marina*. July. 1885.66.

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^[10] *El Telégrafo de Guayaquil Editorial Note* quoted in *Diario La Unión de Valparaíso*, 28 May 1885.

^[11] Meneses, 66

^[12] Fuenzalida Bade, Rodrigo. *La Armada de Chile. Desde la Alborada al Sesquicentenario*. (Valparaíso, Chile, Imprenta de la Armada, 1975). In this book the author does not go into details about the subject of this paper as he does in : *Marinos Ilustres y Destacados del Pasado*. (Santiago de Chile, Sipimex, 1985), 112.

^[13] Archivo Nacional. Fondo Ministerio de Marina. 1885 (Chilean National Archives. Ministry of the Navy Papers). *Captain Juan Esteban López Lermenda's Report, Callao, 9 July 1885*, 44.